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ABSTRACT
A Problem of Perception
An Analysis of the Formation, Reception, and Implementation
of National Socialist Ideology in Germany, 1919 to 1939
by
Derrick Angermeier
This thesis seeks to dispel the notion that Nazi ideology was merely an afterthought to numerous
actions taken by the Nazis. The first chapter discusses how Nazism’s earliest adherents
internalized notions from World War I into an ideology that would motivate the early Nazi
Movement to launch the Beer Hall Putsch. The second chapter focuses on the Nazi Party’s
electoral tactics and how those actions correlated with entrenched Nazi ideological notions of
recognition and community. Finally, the third chapter will seek to demonstrate that the numerous
repressive measures implemented by the Third Reich were part of a general plan to prepare a
future generation of Nazi citizens for, the worldwide struggle for existence. This work exists as a
counter to a considerable amount of literature in the historiography that, by maintaining Nazi
ideology and Nazi actions were two separate entities, belittles the importance of Nazi ideology
thereby fundamentally misunderstanding Nazism.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Burgfrieden: Notion of German Identity that Called for Germans to forget divisive elements like
class, race, and religion in order to unite. A unified Germany could accomplish
anything, including defeat the enemies of Germany.
DAP: German Worker’s Party; Predecessor of the Nazi Party
DNVP: German National People’s Party; Right Wing Nationalist Party
DVP: German People’s Party; Leftist Nationalist Party
KPD: Communist Party of Germany
Mittelstand Thesis: Argument that Nazi voter support was primarily from the Lower Middle
Class
NSDAP: The Nazi Party
SPD: Social Democratic Party
The Nazi Movement: The Nazi Organization in existence before the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923
The Nazi Party: The Political Party of the Nazi Organization in existence from 1924 to 1933
The Reich Government: The Nazi Organization in Power after 1933
Volksgemeinschaft: National Community
Volkspartei: A People’s Party; Generally reference to a Party with a support base of multiple
social backgrounds
.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
What was Nazism?

This question exists as an exercise in mental exhaustion as numerous great minds have
struggled with finding its answer. Eighty years after the 1933 rise of the Nazi Party historians
still have no definitive answers about Nazism. The question is difficult because it asks many
different things. “What was Nazism” begs for a definition of Nazi ideology which in and of itself
is a complicated matter as Nazi ideology was buried underneath a great deal of captivating,
caustic yet severely opportunistic rhetoric. Also, the prospect of defining Nazism runs into a
timing difficulty as Nazi actions and intentions seemed to change as need and circumstance
mandated. Nazi purpose and direction altered during the transitions from a political movement to
political party to government to military-industrial machine. Depending on which time frame one
chooses drastically varied answers would be produced which complicates defining Nazism.
Beyond definition, this question comes with the stark realities of the Holocaust that
shadow any discussion of Nazism. Over seventy years after the beginning of the Third Reich's
mass-execution programs it is still impossible to study any aspect of Nazi Germany without
framing such discussions in terms of the Holocaust. Jews were not the only victims of Nazism as
the Nazi movement claimed many lives in violent street fights and political assassinations. The
initial purges of 1933 and 1934 witnessed the Nazis consolidate their power via a great deal of
political murder. The Third Reich also waged a World War with deaths spanning the globe.
Therefore, Nazism can be considered an entity responsible for a considerable amount of death,
destruction, and anguish. As such any question pertaining to Nazism demands an answer with
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respect to the many atrocities and acts of violence committed in its name. However, reverence to
those affected by atrocity has placed a cloud over studying the logic and cohesion of Nazism.
That is not to say that Nazism was in any way valid, but in treating it exclusively as madness
bent on death and destruction makes objectively studying the foundations that motivated these
actions impossible. Any attempt to study Nazism must balance the line between reverence for
atrocity and objective analysis, a line not easily navigated.
To that end, “what was Nazism” can ask for more than a definition, but instead inquire
about the impacts of Nazism. This question then becomes one of audience as Nazism exists as
multiple things to multiple people. For a German, Nazism exists as a weight around their
collective identity that constantly demands explanation. It has often been said that for most
people German history only spans twelve years, 1933 to 1945. Every German is thus constantly
reminded of these twelve years in their interactions with outsiders and one another. For the
Jewish faith, Nazism is the dogmatic philosophy that eliminated perhaps six million of their
community. For England, Nazism brought on a moment of national glory, but also the reality of
decline, as the war finished off the British Empire. For the United States, Nazism led to a set of
circumstances that established America as a superpower. Nazism thus means different things to
different people and impacted multiple cultures in deeply profound manners, further
complicating the task of determining an exact interpretation of Nazism.
Another difficulty in answering this question is one of scale. Is Nazism embodied within
all of those who adhered to it, by the entire German citizenry, the Party members, or could
Nazism be explained in the terms of one person?1 Many historians of great repute have attempted
to explain Nazism in the terms of its leader Adolf Hitler. Disputing that Hitler was Nazism is
difficult given his personal influence throughout the many stages of the Nazi Party's history. In
1

Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).
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1920, Hitler helped develop the formal platform of the German Worker's Party, the organization
that would evolve into the Nazi Party. Hitler became the Party's most dynamic speaker and
eventually asserted his power to become the party leader. Hitler led the failed Putsch and
reformed the Party after its ban was lifted. He was critical to the electoral victories that propelled
the Nazis into office and directed the implementation of Nazism throughout Germany.
Oftentimes historians take sections of Hitler's opus, Mein Kampf, to validate aspects of Nazi
ideology.2All of this evidence lends a great deal of credence to the argument that Nazism was
Hitlerism, but this definition is far too strict. For example, despite Hitler's presence throughout
all of the Nazis critical actions, Nazism was more than sweeping leadership and caustic speeches.
Nazism had a strong grassroots populism at its heart focused on the mass desire for an
implementation of the utopian national community, known as the Volksgemeinschaft. To claim
Nazism was solely what Hitler determined is to ignore the numerous everyday Nazis who held
interpretations of Nazi ideology separate from the Führer.
One could simplify the query by answering that Nazism is simply a combination of
Nationalism and Socialism, but what does that truly answer? Some would say National Socialism
2

A great deal of literature exists pertaining to Hitler and his role with Nazism. Included here are pivotal works on
Adolf Hitler anyone interested in the Führer should read. R Cecil, “Review of Hitler’s Mein Kampf: An Analysis
By Maser, Werner; Hitler’s Weltanschauung: Entwurf Einer Herrschaft by Jackel, Eberhard,” International
Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 46, no. No. 4 (October 1970): 746–747.H. W. Gatzke,
“Hitler and Psychohistory,” The American Historical Review 78, no. 2 (1973): 394–401.Brigitte Hamann,
Hitler’s Vienna: A Dictator’s Apprenticeship, trans. Thomas Thorton (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999).Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf, ed. Gerhard Weinberg, trans.
Krista Smith (New York: Enigma Books, 2003).Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999).Eberhard Jackel, Hitler’s Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power, trans.
Herbert Arnold (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1972).Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936 Hubris (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998).Ian Kershaw, Hitler:1936-1945 Nemesis (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2000).I. Kershaw, “Hitler and the Uniqueness of Nazism,” Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 2
(2004): 239–254.Richard A. Koenigsberg, Hitler’s Ideology: A Study in Psychoanalytic Sociology (New York:
The Library of Social Science, 1975).Walter Langer, The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report (New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972).John Luckas, The Hitler of History (New York: Random House, 1997).Werner
Maser, Hitler: Legend, Myth & Reality, trans. Peter Ross and Betty Ross (New York: Penguin Books,
1973).Hans Staudinger, The Inner Nazi: A Critical Analysis of Mein Kampf (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1981).R. G. L. Waite, “Adolf Hitler’s Guilt Feelings: A Problem in History and Psychology,”
The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1, no. 2 (1971): 229–249.
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is a specifically German fascist ideology, but arguably the first National Socialist was 1896 failed
North Dakotan farmer and French aristocrat the Marquis de Mores, who “appealed with a
mixture of anti-capitalism and anti-Semitic nationalism.”3 Mores's squads wore “cowboy garb
and ten-gallon hats which thus predate black and brown shirts as the first fascist uniforms.”4
Thus, if Nazism is National Socialism then it cannot be a specifically German historical object as
even the term “national socialism” was coined by a French nationalist author.5 To take this
interpretation forward, by scholar of fascism Robert Paxton's definition National Socialism
stands as a critical part of fascism in general. Thus, in order to explain Nazism one would have to
understand fascism in its entirety as experienced in Italy, Spain, France, Russia, and even the
United States. Even Paxton is careful not to give Fascism, and by extension Nazism, a firm
definition claiming that “fascism in action looks much more like a network of relationships than
a fixed essence.”6 Therefore, in defining Nazism as National Socialism and therefore Fascism,
the process of finding out exactly what Nazism was becomes impossible, lost in the myriad
similar platforms like French nationalism, Ku Klux Klan rhetoric, and Spanish and Italian
corporatism.
Perhaps Nazism cannot be explained in terms of the fascist ideologies that formed
alongside it in the early twentieth century but should be looked at as a strictly German
phenomenon. If so, what characteristics of Germany history and identity can be used to explain
what Nazism truly was? Historians have pondered this question in numerous forms, the most
notable expression of this idea being the Sonderweg thesis. Meaning the “Special Path,” the
Sonderweg debate contends that Nazism can be explained as the result of Germany's failure to

3

Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, 48.
Ibid., 48.
5
Ibid., 48.
6
Ibid.,207.
4
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follow the “normal” path of development that resulted from English, French, and American
bourgeois revolutions. Historian Jurgen Kocka thus interprets this position as claiming only that
Germany suffered Nazism because conditions of the economy and class struggle prevalent in
other nations were, in Germany, “aggravated and reinforced by challenged, but surviving,
structures and traditions of a pre-modern kind.”7 Therefore, Sonderweg historians would claim
Nazism was simply the inevitable result of stunted German development.
Sonderweg interpretations were largely held as valid until the mid 1980s when challenges
to the thesis substantially undermined the line of thought. The first prominent protest against the
Sonderweg thesis came from now established historians David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley in
their work The Peculiarities of German History. In this work Blackbourn and Eley present
multiple challenges to the Sonderweg thesis that fatally damaged the line of thought. Their
strongest argument against the Sonderweg asked “what was it, in terms of content, that was said
to mark an aberration in German history when judged by western norms?”8 In simpler terms,
what was exactly “normal” about western Bourgeois revolutions? Blackbourn and Eley are quick
to point out that although “the bourgeoisie characteristically became the dominant class in
European countries” they did not become the ruling class as the dictatorships of Napoleon
Bonaparte and Oliver Cromwell can attest.9 Nor, did the western bourgeoisie attain this power
through “heroic means or open political action.”10 The bloodletting of the French Revolution, the
decapitation of King Charles I, the Civil War, American slavery, and British-French colonialism
stand as examples of flawed aspects of Western development that were held by Sonderweg

7

J. Kocka, “Germán History Before Hitler: The Debate About the German Sonderweg,” Journal of Contemporary
History 23, no. 1 (1988): 3–16.
8
David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in
Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984)., 12-13.
9
Ibid., 16.
10
Ibid., 16.
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adherents as normal. Additional flaws with the Sonderweg thesis will be discussed in subsequent
portions of this work, but for now it is worthwhile to note that any analysis of Nazism that claims
it was the direct result of flaws in German cultural or political development during the nineteenth
century have numerous interpretive flaws.
It seems that identifying Nazism as the consequence of failed nineteenth century
development has its weaknesses, but perhaps claiming Nazism was the result of developments in
the twentieth century can be argued more persuasively. Historian George Mosse is a wellestablished historian of German memory and identity who has made a name for himself
analyzing the numerous ways the World Wars impacted German conceptions of identity. Mosse
is perhaps the most influential historian to argue that World War I had tremendous impacts on
Nazism and exists as a bedrock of Nazi ideology. Mosse is not alone in this assertion as multiple
historians weigh in on the First World War's presence in Nazi ideology, literature which will be
explored in the first chapter of this work. For the time being, it is important to note that World
War I had several impacts on the Nazis from the militarism it fostered in multiple generations of
Nazis, to the perceived class unity the war fostered and the calamitous effects the war's aftermath
had on Germany. If one argues that the First World War could have an effect, then the devastation
that followed during the Weimar Republic could also be countenanced as impactful on Nazism.
However, historians often take one side or the other, either minimizing the influence of the war
and blaming the rise of Nazism on the instability of the Weimar Republic or defending the
Weimar system and pointing to the war as the main culprit. The prevalence of such a conflict
leads the process of defining Nazism to yet another dead end.
Ultimately this question of defining Nazism is not the sole property of the historical
profession, or even other professional intellectual environments. The question of “what was
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Nazism” still resides very much in the public and therefore “entertainment” history has staked a
seemingly permanent claim to this issue. Entertainment history is historical study presented to
enthrall an unfamiliar public audience in many cases at the expense of thorough and factual
research. Nazism has been a common thread of “entertainment” history as the public remains
both captivated, mystified, and disgusted by numerous aspects of Third Reich history which
entertainment outlets and journalists play up to generate revenue. Perhaps one of the most
professionally condemned histories of Nazi Germany, William Shirer's international best-seller
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, recently marked its fiftieth anniversary with a release of a
new edition.11 Thus, for fifty years Shirer's interpretation has been provided to the masses many
of whom internalize Rise and Fall as historical fact. Shirer's work is biased, unprofessional,
inadequately researched, and irresponsibly glosses over pivotal aspects of Third Reich history,
but these are all missteps in the world of professional history.12 Shirer as a journalist was not
bound to Historian codes and practices, but his word is just as valid in the public as Richard
Evans's exhaustive three volume history of the Third Reich.13 Beyond Shirer other non
historically trained authors and movie makers generate their own interpretations, largely based
on scandal, atrocity, and myth, which become accepted into cultural thought. Thus Nazism has a
character beyond historical interpretations that must be accounted for which makes coming to an
all encompassing definition of Nazism that much more difficult.

11

William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1959).
12
Klaus Epstein, “Shirer’s History of Nazi Germany,” The Review of Politics 23, no. 2 (April 1961): 230–245.
13
Richard Evans wrote three copious books laying out an in-depth narrative of Nazi history from the days of
Imperial Germany to the collapse of the Third Reich. His first work studies Imperial and Weimar Germany
chronicling the Nazi rise to power. The second work picks up after the Nazis seized power following the purges
of 1933. The final work studies the Third Reich through the entirety of the Second World War. Anybody just
beginning to scratch the surface or looking for a continuous narrative on the entirety of Nazi history should look
at Evans' works. Richard J. Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004).Richard
J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005).Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at
War (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008).
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Is Nazism a top-down progression of the Party and the Reich government dictating its
whims to the citizenry or is Nazism built from the bottom guiding the Nazis in a certain direction?
Paxton and other supporters of Nazism as fascist ideology would contend that the Nazis dictated
their own practices on the German people. This line of reasoning becomes particularly evident in
literature on the collapse of the Third Reich where German citizens are portrayed as victims of
Nazi manipulation and tyranny; driven to a hopeless situation by a power-hungry dictatorship.14
Although validity exists for the top down theory of Nazism, a school of thought fostered by
historians like Peter Fritzche and Joe Perry argues compellingly that the German citizens were
equally culpable in the fostering of Nazism throughout the Third Reich.15 Fritzche uses the
phrase “forcibly volunteered” to demonstrate that “consent as well as compliance structured the
practices of everyday life in Nazi Germany.”16 Perry agrees with the idea that the German
citizenry actively participated in Nazism as evidenced by their involvement in Nazi themed
holiday festivities. The Reich Government provided the major impetus for such celebration as
“state orchestration met with an active and enthusiastic popular response because participation in
Nazi political rituals...offered Germans attractive material and symbolic rewards and a privileged
place in an exclusionary social system.”17 The role of the German citizenry as shapers versus
receivers will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of this work. For the purposes of
the present discussion, the complexities of the German people's ties to Nazism further complicate
the task of finding a catch-all definition of Nazism.
Focusing on one area of Nazi Germany with the expectation of defining Nazism will
14

Jörg Friedrich, The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945, trans. Allison Brown (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006).
15
Joe Perry, “Nazifying Christmas: Political Culture and Popular Celebration in the Third Reich,” Central European
History 38, no. 4 (2005): 572–605.
16
Peter Fritzche, Life and Death in the Third Reich (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008),
55.
17
Perry, “Nazifying Christmas: Political Culture and Popular Celebration in the Third Reich,” 574
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result in resounding failure as Nazism encompasses a wide area of intellectual discourse. As such,
this is not a work that has the goal of coming to a catch-all definition of Nazism. Rather, in
demonstrating the above complexity of Nazism one aspect is often kept just underneath the
surface of all of these debates that receives indirect or cursory attention in most of the
historiography. This aspect is the ideology of Nazism. Often referred to as National Socialism,
discussions of Nazi ideology feature in most works but are almost exclusively discussed in terms
of another topic. For example, George Mosse refers to Nazi ideology, but in reference to how
World War I's glorification informed that ideology.18 Thomas Childers and Richard Hamilton
argue that Nazi ideology was twisted and many times abandoned by the Nazis to appeal to
multiple electorates in order to form a Volkspartei that would usher the Nazi Party into power.19
Peter Fritzche would advocate that Nazi ideology was the expression of German disillusion with
the status quo of Weimar Germany and their desire for the formation of the Volksgemeinschaft.20
Nazi ideology exists throughout almost every historical work on the Third Reich as historians
18

G. L. Mosse, “Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience,” Journal of Contemporary History 21, no. 4
(1986): 491–513.G. L. Mosse, “National Cemeteries and National Revival: The Cult of the Fallen Soldiers in
Germany,” Journal of Contemporary History 14, no. 1 (1979): 1–20.G. L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the
Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).George L. Mosse, “Friendship and
Nationhood: About the Promise and Failure of German Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary History 17, no. 2
(1982): 351–367.
19
Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voters: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1983).Thomas Childers, “The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The
Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic,” The American Historical Review 95, no. 2 (April
1990): 331–358.T. Childers, “The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote,” Journal of Contemporary History
11, no. 4 (1976): 17–42.Thomas Childers, “Who, Indeed, Did Vote for Hitler?,” Central European History 17, no.
1 (March 1984): 45–53.Thomas Childers and Eugene Weiss, “Voters and Violence: Political Violence and the
Limits of National Socialist Mass Mobilization,” German Studies Review 13, no. 3 (October 1990): 481–
498.Richard Hamilton, Who Voted For Hitler? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).Richard Hamilton,
“The Rise of Nazism: A Case Study and Review of Interpretations: Kiel, 1928-1933,” German Studies Review 26,
no. 1 (February 2003): 43–62.R. F. Hamilton, “Braunschweig 1932: Further Evidence on the Support for
National Socialism,” Central European History 17, no. 01 (1984): 3–36.Rudy Koshar, “Political Gangsters and
Nazism: Some Comments on Richard Hamilton’s Theory of Fascism. A Review Article,” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 28, no. 4 (October 1986): 785–793.
20
Peter Fritzche, Germans into Nazis (Campbridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).Peter Fritzche, Rehearsals for
Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany(New York: Oxford University Press,
1990).Peter Fritzche, “Weimar Populism and National Socialism in Local Perspective,” in Elections, Mass
Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany: New Perspectives, ed. L. E. Jones and James Retallack (New
York: Campbridge University Press, 1992).Peter Fritzche, “Presidential Victory and Popular Festivity in Weimar
Germany: Hindeburg’s 1925 Election,” Central European History 23, no. 2/3 (September 1990): 205–224.
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contend that ideology justified many of the actions carried out, but seldom is ideology ever
focused on as the impetus for Nazi action.
Few works exist that focus meaningfully on Nazi ideology as a guide to action and many
of those that do are not specifically historical works. For example, psychological and
sociological arguments are often presented to attempt to explain Nazi ideology. Although nonhistorical, the discussions that arise from these fields have valuable insights on the historical
importance of Nazi ideology. For example, Emil Fackenheim explained the Nazi
weltanschauung, or worldview, was separate from religion and metaphysics. Per Fackenheim,
this worldview was “put forward not as being true but only capable of being made true” through
conflict and victory over differing weltanschauung.21This narrative certainly rings true as Nazi
ideology never admitted to its work being accomplished. Political psychologist Donald Dietrich
stressed that there were four pillars of Nazi ideology. To sum these pillars up briefly, Nazi
ideology centered on the idea the past was not only to be restored, but elevated, rhetoric of
struggle against opposition, “affective characteristics” defined as “instinct, will, blood, etc.” were
valued over rationality, and finally, the hierarchical social order was to be reestablished.22 One
piece in the journal Critical Inquiry investigated Nazi use of myth, but when it came time to
analyze ideology and myth this piece stated that Nazi ideology sought to be “a total explanation”
of history that is “specifically German” and “a racist ideology.”23 The authors are quick to shun
the sonderweg implications of their argument, claiming that Nazism in and of itself was a
German reaction to specifically German problems, not applicable to other nations or peoples.

21

Emil Fackenheim, “Nazi ‘Ethic,’ Nazi Weltanschauung, and the Holocaust. Morality After Auschwitz: The Radical
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Even film analysts have taken the efforts to focus on Nazi ideology as Stephen Lowry in his
analysis of The Golden City stepped beyond the parameters of this film arguing that the
“ideological function of Nazi films abides less in the overt political 'contents' than in diffuse
emotional effects and the symbolic transformations of socially relevant issues.”24 Thus analysis
of Nazi ideology, this work has found, can be ascertained and understood independent of
prevalent opportunistic actions by the Nazis. As such, one of the primary goals of this work will
involve tying down abstract notions of Nazi ideology to specific events to demonstrate the
importance of ideology as an impetus for Nazism.
Many of the presented issues with defining Nazism and the role of ideology in the actions
of the Nazi Party and Reich government are not original to this work. Rather in 1974 historian
Barbara Miller Lane penned an article “Nazi Ideology: Some Unfinished Business” in which she
protested the lack of a “satisfactory interpretation of Nazi ideology.”25 Even more surprising to
Lane was that many of her contemporaries believed “that political thought played a relatively
unimportant part in the rise (and fall) of the Third Reich.”26 Lane goes on to analyze Nazi
ideology not in terms of Adolf Hitler, but other prominent Nazi ideologues like Dietrich Eckart,
Alfred Rosenberg, Gottfried Feder, and the Strasser brothers (Otto and Gregor), but her analysis
thus only focuses on pre-1933 Nazi ideology, a self-imposed barrier. Lane concludes her work
calling for “a fresh look at Nazi institutions against the background of a thorough study of Nazi
thought.”27 As such this work strives to address Lane's concerns by centering on critical Nazi
events, such as the Beer Hall Putsch, Nazi electoral activity during the Weimar Republic, and the
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implementation of the Volksgemeinschaft, in terms of Nazi ideology. It is the expressed goal of
this work to add to the historiography's efforts to define Nazism by understanding the nature of
Nazi ideology, not as a concept that provided post-hoc justifications for Nazi actions, but rather
as the impetus for the actions of Nazi Germany.
Similar to previously mentioned efforts to define Nazism, this effort to understand Nazi
ideology needs to qualify a time period or run the risk of losing focus and clarity. As such this
work will focus on three distinct time periods of Nazi history that have profound importance on
understanding their ideology. Understanding this pattern before reading the following chapters
will go a long way towards understanding the continuity of this narrative as it stretches across
Germany from 1914 to 1938. First, this work will attempt to understand the foundation of Nazi
ideology as only in understanding the beginning of Nazi ideology can we come closer to
comprehending this complex institution. As such, this foundational period of Nazism will follow
the Nazi Movement through the end of the First World War, the formation of the Weimar
Republic and culminate in the Beer Hall Putsch. At this stage it is important to make reference to
this work's terminology. The Nazis of the foundational period will be referred to multiple times
as members of the Nazi Movement. To refer to this small Bavarian assemblage of political
amateurs as the Nazi Party is woefully inadequate and misleading. Political parties enter the
political arena in a socially acceptable manner and until after the disaster of the Beer Hall Putsch
the Nazis were no such organization. Therefore, the Nazis of 1918 to 1923 will be referenced as
part of the Nazi Movement, a loose, but rabid organization of Bavarians with the intentions of
seeing the Weimar Republic toppled. Only in understanding this movement's efforts can Nazi
ideological foundation truly be understood.
After exploring the foundational period, this work will focus on the period of Nazi history
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which begins with Hitler's imprisonment following the Beer Hall Putsch, the Party's failures and
successes in Weimar politics which culminated in Hitler becoming Chancellor. The Nazis had
created an ideology that strove to use activism and struggle rhetoric to topple the despised
Weimar Republic. When that plan failed the Nazis, Hitler and many of his supporters changed
tactics and accepted the reality that armed confrontation would not win the day, but rather
political manipulation would help the Nazis realize their goals. Although initial efforts to follow
the path of legality would result in electoral failures, the Nazis would eventually radicalize their
message, expanding its popularity amongst the citizenry of multiple social groupings. The
subsequent electoral bump would allow the Nazis to negotiate their way into the second most
powerful office in Weimar Germany. This period is largely seen as an aberration in Nazi
ideological continuity because the Nazis opportunistically promised the world to every
population, often resulting in multiple contradictions. However, this time is fundamentally
important for any study of Nazi ideology as these perceived discontinuities tied in with Nazi
ideology in fundamental ways. Thus, whereas the Nazis were perceived as the master political
liars, the adage that one should “be careful what you wish for” seems apt as Nazi ideology not
only motivated Nazis into an electoral frenzied but matched multiple desires of a disparate group
of alienated German citizenry.
The third chapter of this work begins in 1933 after the Nazis have come into power and
began the transfer of the various labor, professional, and social institutions of Germany into
equivalent organizations formed and based in Nazi ideology. This chapter will explore the
various interpretations of the Volksgemeinschaft and through such analysis come to an
understanding of not only the nature of the Nazi national community but the Reich government's
purpose for such an institution. The establishment of a national community stands as a highly
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contested historical topic as this creation would pacify the German people under the Nazis and
allow the Third Reich to wage a destructive World War. This work contends that the changes
witnessed between 1933 and the beginning of Hitler's expansionary wars were motivated and
directed by entrenched aspects of Nazi ideology.
Any effort that attempts to come to a definitive understanding of Nazi Germany is
doomed at its outset. Many of the reasons for this predetermined failure stem from arguments
presented above. However, historian William Sheridan Allen best stated the ultimate difficulty in
coming to an understanding on Nazi Germany when he wrote “the problem of Nazism was
primarily a problem of perception.”28 No truer words have ever been written as the totality of
Nazism is imperceptible through only one viewpoint or one interpretation. The only way to come
to a total understanding of Nazi Germany is to study the Third Reich from every possible angle
and address every hole in the historiography. Therefore, this work does not intend to come to a
catch-all interpretation of the entirety of Nazism but rather address the nearly forty year old
request of Barbara Lane to tie Nazi ideology to the actions of not only the Nazi Movement and
Party, but to the Reich Government in an effort to demonstrate that National Socialist thought
had a profound impact on German history.
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CHAPTER 2
KÄMPFEN: 19TH CENTURY TO 192329

The adage that a picture is worth a thousand words falls short when it comes to one photo
taken in August 1914. Taken by eventual chief photographer for Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Hoffmann,
long before his tenure with the Third Reich, this photo depicts an enthusiastic crowd gathered at
the Odeonsplatz in the heart of Munich swept up in “the Spirit of 1914,” the name generally
given to the nationalistic optimism felt throughout Europe on the eve of the First World War.30
The crowd itself provides a compelling visual for the elation evoked by the German people at the
opportunity to prove their superiority in Europe. However, many photographs exist that
demonstrate the nationalistic fervor that swept through Germany. This particular photo is
noteworthy in that after having formed a professional relationship with Hitler, Hoffmann studied
all of his photos from that day and after various enlargements found an elated Adolf Hitler
celebrating shortly before he joined the war effort.31 This photo has been discussed ad nauseum,
but it exists for most historians as proof that the First World War had a profoud impact on the
future Fuhrer. The contrast between the elated Hitler of 1914 and the embittered demagogue of
the 1920s leaves little room to dispute the impact the Great War had on this man. Historians
have taken this photo, along with its implications, and argued that the First World War, if for no
other reason than its impact on the future Führer, led directly to the rise of Nazism.
Historians have conjectured that the First and Second World Wars should be considered
one long and contiguous event. However, arguments of this nature are the holdovers from early
arguments that claimed the seeds for the Second World War were sown in the ashes of the First.
29
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However, both of these claims exist on a pattern of determinism where as soon as World War I
ended the Nazi Party and World War II were the inevitable result. The argument in favor of
World War I causing the Nazi rise can be found in numerous forms but perhaps is best illustrated
within Niall Freguson's Pity of War. Ferguson analyzes the First World War asking numerous
questions in terms of counter-factual arguments that help “recapture the uncertainty of decisionmakers in the past, to whom the future was merely a set of possibilities; and to assess whether
the optimal choices were made.”32 In doing so Ferguson presents many valuable arguments about
the nature of the war, some of which will be explored shortly, but he also demonstrated with
clarity the simple thread tying the First World War to the Nazis. Per Ferguson, “with the Kaiser
triumphant, Adolf Hitler could have eked out his life as a mediocre postcard painter.”33
Furthermore, the army allowed Hitler the opportunity to join the Nazi cause cementing the idea
that the loss of World War I led to an event causality that pushed Hitler to the Nazis setting the
stage for later significant events.34
Arguments that the loss of the First World War caused the rise of Nazi Germany are
certainly compelling and logically cohesive, however in recent years historians have made
arguments demonstrating that even after Germany's defeat the Third Reich was not inevitable.
William Keylor argued that those who lived during this time were disillusioned and formed the
mythology of defeat that informed such arguments.35 Thus, more information on the depth of
German defeat and less hostility to the conventions of the peace settlement could have gone a
long way towards mending the post-war fences and therein prevent the Nazis from gaining a
voice. Beyond such optimism, John Morrow's in-depth analysis of World War I works to dispel
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the determinist aspects of World War I's conclusion on the Nazi rise. By Morrow's argument, the
Nazis were able to rise to power not because of World War I and the much condemned Treaty of
Versailles. Rather, Morrow contends that because the United States retreated to relative isolation
and the British worked to keep its empire intact, a decimated France was left responsible for
enforcing the treaty on a temporarily wounded, but angry Germany.36 France could only
accomplish so much and had little to no power to back up its authority, leaving German politics
in disarray and ripe for some fashion of takeover. Morrow further acknowledges that the rise of
the Nazi Party was multifarious as he also forcefully contends that “Adolf Hitler and the Nazi
rose to power as a result of the depression in Germany.”37 As Morrow and many others contend,
countless events took place between the end of World War I and the Third Reich which had they
happened in even the slightest different manner the history of the world would be drastically
different. Thus, the impact of World War I on the Nazi rise to power is a contested and complex
topic.
Summarizing the arguments on the Nazi rise appear out of place in a work on Nazi
ideology, but this work is determined to tie Nazi ideology to the actions of the Nazis to gain
some understanding of Nazi intentionality and by extension identity. As such, tying the Nazi rise
to power, an action that is largely considered opportunistic and devoid of coherence and
consistency, to Nazi ideology would be inadequate without addressing the foundations of that
ideology. Before that synthesis can be demonstrated it is important to note that while the First
World War may not have directly caused the Third Reich, World War I and its aftermath were
instrumental to the foundations of Nazi ideology. Therefore, studying the influences of World
36
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War I on the early Nazi movement will be profoundly important for demonstrating that Nazi
actions both of this foundational period and beyond were largely ideologically driven.

The First World War and the Nazi Movement

Before proceeding it is important to explain that the early Nazi Party could hardly be
labeled as a party. After the formal declaration of a platform in 1920 the German Worker's Party,
the predecessor of the National Socialist German Workers Party, would take three years to gain
55,000 members.38 Thus, in the early 1920s the idea of a dominating Nazi Party could only be
entertained by the delusional as the Nazis could only call on a very limited, fairly localized
support base. While the Nazi organization carried the label of a party, the Nazis that existed
before 1924 should be considered more or less a movement. Before 1924 the Nazis expressed
little interest in participating within the political and electoral frameworks of the Weimar
Republic.39 Rhetoric throughout their platform and speeches demonstrated that the Nazis of this
time intended to fade once Germany was restored.40 While later events indicate otherwise, the
Nazis of 1933 and the Nazis of 1923 were very different creatures.
Hitler himself admitted in a 1922 memorandum that the Nazis were to become a different
38
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kind of party. Per Hitler, the DAP and all previous nationalist parties “lacked the warm breath of
the nation's youthful vigor” and therefore was “no longer a movement of the people” but rather
“there reappeared in the new movement the distressing characteristics of our bourgeois parties,
lacking any uniform discipline or form.”41 Hitler believed that previous iterations of the Nazis
had failed because they became too much like political parties and thus he vowed that the Nazis
would become “a new movement aimed at providing what the others did not.”42 Hitler's Nazi
movement would be “a racialist movement with a firm social base, a hold over the broad masses,
welded together in an iron-hard organization, instilled with blind obedience and inspired by a
brutal will.”43 Perhaps most importantly, Hitler's new Nazi movement would be “a party of
struggle and action.”44 The Nazis had no intention of playing the electoral game at this stage, but
intended, through action, to reach a broad mass of people and have their vision of a superior
Germany restored.
Before asserting the impact of World War I upon Nazi ideology, it is necessary to
demonstrate the various ways the Nazis internalized German memory of the Great War. In order
to fully understand the relationship between World War I, the Nazi Party and the German
citizenry the numerous ways in which the First World War affected the German citizenry must be
understood in detail. Of equal importance will be demonstrations of the ways that the Nazis
matched, internalized, and manipulated these aspects in their early efforts to become a force to be
reckoned with during the early 1920s. Only once these relationships are understood can analysis
begin on the full extent of World War I's impact on the Nazi ideology.
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At the onset of war in 1914 Germans were swept up into an uproar of nationalistic fervor
that few could resist. Germany was preparing itself to meet the armies of Europe in a clash that
would determine which nation would become the dominant European power. The Germans had
numerous reasons to be optimistic thanks to their rise to world power status during the early 20th
century. Although many would look back on this time as the German people being hypnotized or
caught in a “wave of drunkenness” many others looked back and admitted to being overjoyed by
this Spirit of 1914.45 Historian Friedrich Meinecke reflected on the optimism swirling throughout
Germany in his post World War II reflections, The German Catastrophe, claiming that “the
exaltation of spirit experienced during the August days of 1914, in spite of its ephemeral
character, is one of the more precious, unforgettable memories of the highest sort.”46 Even
members of the upper echelon in the Imperial government were beyond optimistic, bordering on
the fanciful about what they could accomplish with this war. Beyond the severe optimism of the
Schlieffen Plan, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg posited that Germany could take large parcels of
territory from France and Belgium, make Luxembourg a German federal state, and create an
African colonial empire.47 With emotions high throughout all levels of Germany significant
events were afoot that would leave impressions on the German people that would last beyond the
Great War.
The importance of the Spirit of 1914 is a contested topic within the historiography of the
Nazi rise. Many historians do not believe that the Spirit of 1914 had a tremendous impact on
German identity claiming such emotions were largely a myth fostered after the war. Ferguson
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would certainly argue along these lines as he claimed that “crowds there may have been, but to
describe their mood as simply one of 'enthusiasm' or 'euphoria' is misleading.”48 Ferguson's
smoking gun against the Spirit of 1914 exists in the form of a multi-thousand worker protest that
in “overfilled meetings and on the street demonstrated against the war and for peace.”49 The fact
that this protest was on July 29th, only a few days before World War I erupted, lends itself to the
idea that the Spirit of 1914 was not universal by any means. John Morrow seconds the arguments
of the mythological Spirit of 1914 by claiming the enthusiasm was “primarily an urban-middle
class phenomenon.”50 Going further, Morrow contends that the rural populations were
preoccupied with harvests.51 Per Morrow, even the Nazi's home turf, Bavaria “reacted with worry
and fear, anxiety and uncertainty.”52 Thus, the existence of a universal German enthusiasm is
certainly debunked.
However, even if the Spirit of 1914 was not a universal phenomenon amongst Germans in
1914, the outbreak of war did motivate a large number of young, virile men to volunteer and
fight for Germany. The enthusiasm for war experienced by these young men and their tragic
sacrifices cemented themselves on the minds of Germans. After the war collapsed in German
defeat the vision of the volunteers became an entrenched aspect of German identity. Historian
George Mosse certainly agrees with the importance of volunteerism to German identity going
back to the French Revolution and establishing itself in German youth following the collapse of
World War I.53 Per Mosse, the Spirit of 1914 was picked up after the war by those disillusioned
with German defeat who “wanted to repeat this heady experience in the midst of the confusion
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and compromises of post-war politics.”54 Wars waged in between the First and Second World
War that saw German men volunteering to repeat this sweep of soldiers to the front exist as
further evidence of the enduring importance of the Spirit of 1914.55 Thus, stepping up to stand up
for Germany was indeed a powerful motivator for Germany's youth. Perhaps the Spirit of 1914
was not universal to all Germans, but by that same token the German people were not universal
supporters of the Nazis at any time.
Where the early Nazi Movement did gain appeal was with those who generally
entrenched the spirit of volunteerism in their own personality. Much of the early membership
encompassed former soldiers of the First World War and young enthusiasts whose age forced
them to miss fighting in the First World War. The Nazis were an ardently nationalistic
organization that took their cues from that nationalistic volunteerism that originated from World
War I. Hitler's earliest speeches provide considerable insight into the extent that nationalistic
optimism and a belief in the invincibility of the German people permeated the early message the
Nazis put forward. Hitler, attempting to get a rise out of his audience, used the same optimistic
nationalist rhetoric that was used in 1914 to motivate the German people. In a 1923 speech Hitler
stated, “we have both the hope and the faith that the day will come on which Germany shall
stretch from Konigsberg to Strassburg, and from Hamburg to Vienna.”56 This speech, coming
from a time when Germany was arguably at its lowest, evoked the same frenzied optimism that
those enthusiasts of 1914 evoked. In another 1923 speech Hitler duplicated the belief in the
invincibility of German youth claiming, “in the end the fire of German youth will conquer.”57 In
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speaking of Germany as an invincible juggernaut the Nazis were able to tap into the optimism of
1914 and were rewarded with valuable initial attention.
Beyond even the nationalistic optimism surrounding the start of the Great War there was
an aspect of the Spirit of 1914 that had a profound and lasting impact on the German people. As
the armies of Europe were being mobilized, Kaiser Wilhelm II, ruler of Germany, made a speech
in which he stated “I no longer recognize any parties or any confessions; today we are all
German brothers and only German brothers.”58 Wilhelm was announcing a sentiment known as
the Burgfrieden which called for the dissolution of those aspects that divided the German people,
such as class and religion, in a universal effort to glorify Germany. Meinecke verified this
optimism resulting from the Spirit of 1914 amplified by the Burgfrieden stating that “all the rifts
which had hitherto existed in the German people, both within the bourgeoisie and between the
bourgeoisie and the working classes, were suddenly closed in the face of the common
danger.”59The outbreak of the war cemented in the German psyche for multiple generations the
belief that as long as class conflict and other divisive statuses were disposed of there would be
nothing that could stop the German people, a belief that many would internalize to such an extent
that they would actually alter their memories of the war to maintain this belief.
Throughout the war the Burgfrieden was exploited to encourage German citizens to
remain productive for and enthusiastic of the war effort. In a 1917 Easter message Kaiser
Wilhelm proclaimed that “behind the front, the settlement of differences of opinion must be
postponed in the highest patriotic interest until our warriors have returned home.”60 Later in the
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same year the German Fatherland Party issued a proclamation which demonstrated a firm belief
in the Burgfrieden as the party tried to stir voters to not only support them but not allow the
divisions at home to result in “the collapse of German strength.”61The outbreak of the war
cemented in the German psyche for multiple generations the belief that as long as class conflict
and other divisive statuses were sublimated nothing could stop the German people. Throughout
the span of the war pleas would be made to remain united if only for the sake of the soldiers on
the front sacrificing their lives for Germany.62 Despite a waning optimism the desire to remain
united in the name of Germany would not diminish to any significant extent until the end of the
Great War and the defeat of the Imperial army.
When looking at the World War I notion of the Burgfrieden in terms of Nazi history,
George Mosse is again of paramount importance. Mosse contends that an important aspect of
German identity was the “Myth of the War Experience” that glorified the struggle and sacrifice
of combat.63 An important part of the Myth that ran central to the Burgfrieden was camaraderie.
Camaraderie, by Mosse’s argument, references the relationship experienced between soldiers of
the front lines that became romanticized during and after World War I.64 Camaraderie was seen
as an extension of manliness where soldiers entered an experience that lifted them out of the
confines of normal life. The camaraderie of the soldier superseded all other relationships, even
operating “outside the family structure,” constituting a glorification of German identity.65 The
family, government, and other relationships could not provide the sense of fulfillment felt by
most soldiers experiencing the hardships and accompanying glory of warfare. Historian Andrew
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Donson assents to Mosse’s argument contending that glorification of such camaraderie led many
to seek participation in future conflicts. Per Donson, war brought the promise of “schoolboys
who were arch nemeses before the war [to become] great friends while on the front. War let two
brothers resolve their years-long acrimony. Combat brought together friends whose petty parents
had severed their close ties in childhood.”66 Thus, camaraderie on the front superseded every
previous obligation and barrier, further enforcing the unity of the Burgfrieden leaving a desire in
the future Nazi supporters to join together to vanquish a common evil; ends that Nazi ideology
matched via the fundamental concept of the National Community, or Volksgemeinschaft.
After World War I, Weimar politics split into many different political factions making
unity similar to the “Spirit of 1914” nearly impossible. Both Mosse and Donson contend that the
political fragmentation following the Treaty of Versailles left elements of the German citizenry
craving some remnant of the unity and euphoria that camaraderie promised to provide. Historian
David Welch contends that the Nazis made use of the Volksgemeinschaft to gain support by
appealing to notions of the superseding effects of camaraderie.67 Welch argues that the notions of
Volksgemeinschaft did not originate with the Nazis because for propaganda to be effective it
must “preach to those who are already partially converted.”68 Therefore, the Nazi
Volksgemeinschaft correlated to the internalized desires by certain “partially converted”
enthusiasts of the camaraderie spawning from the volunteerism of the Spirit of 1914.
Nazi ideology evoked the emotions of the Burgfrieden that were still internalized by
many Germans, even if those emotions were somewhat quelled by the difficulties of life in the
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Weimar Republic. Again the speeches of Hitler provide insight into Nazi interpretations of the
Burgfrieden that meant to unite like-minded Germans under the Nazi banner. In 1923, Hitler
condemned the delays and inefficiencies of the divided Reichstag contending that “if today in
Germany one and a half millions could be united on a single platform, all prepared if necessary,
to sacrifice themselves for their fatherland, then Germany would be saved.”69 Hitler would later
that year state along the same lines “when the whole German people knows one will and one will
only-to be free- in that hour we shall have the instrument with which to win our freedom.”70
However, despite all of this appeal to Burgfrieden rhetoric the Nazis used their own idea of the
Volksgemeinschaft, the National Community, as an idyllic world where a united Germany could,
as Hitler said in April 1923 “rescue Germany (and achieve) the greatest deed in the world!”71
Hence, the Nazis hoped that by touting their conception of the Volksgemeinschaft in terms of the
Burgfrieden that they could raise an army of Germans that would one day topple the ailing and
despised Weimar Republic.
Young volunteers of the First World War, for the most part students, were vulnerable to
the ideas and emotions of both the Spirit of 1914 and the Burgfrieden to such an extent that they
willingly risked their lives for those beliefs. Within these soldiers existed an extension of the
emotional upsurge felt throughout much of Germany. For soldiers who were laying their lives on
the line there came with these notions of unity, an idea of self-sacrifice in which a wound
suffered or even death was an honorable and worthwhile sacrifice in the population wide effort to
bring victory, power, and superiority to Germany. The best way to observe this self-sacrifice
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comes from reviewing the writings of those who were on the front lines. As early as August 23,
1914 twenty-four year old volunteer Eduard Schmieder wrote “After each battle, one thanks God
that one is still alive; one values life so much. But we would all sacrifice our lives gladly for our
beautiful Fatherland.”72 In November Eduard would write “There is blissful joy in every victory
won for the sake of this beautiful German soil.”73 Another volunteer twenty-one year old student
of philosophy Sophus Lange wrote, “I am rather happy. This 'rush to the flag' especially among
intellectuals is not only based on the love of Germanness.”74 In January 1915 Sophus still saw
value in risking his life for Germany claiming, “I can't be any different-at the moment, all I want
to be is a soldier.”75 The early volunteers demonstrated not only a romantic notion of war and the
superiority of their task but believed in that task to such an extent that they willing and excitedly
sacrificed their lives for Germany.
Sadly, Eduard and Solphus would suffer the ultimate price for their service to Germany.
Eduard died on May 8, 1916, and Solphus died just four months later on September 6, 1916.76 As
the war progressed, what was initially a romantic ideal of self-sacrifice turned into a solemn and
obligatory duty towards Germany. Eduard in 1915 wrote that he had “an insatiable longing for a
life lived to the fullest which I can never achieve.”77 Eduard was slowly coming to the realization
that he would likely have to die for Germany. However, such pessimism making it back to the
home front was rare.78 Army censors prevented disturbing news of the front from reaching loved
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ones who held onto the romantic notions of volunteers willfully making the ultimate sacrifice for
Germany. A November 1914 letter that was sent from a volunteer had the following removed by
censors, “because of the cold, which in spite of three shirts and waistbands shakes our bodies,
because of the forced marches, because of the bacon and bread that stands in for warm meals,
because of long sentries at night, in which the ice cold wind brings tears to our eyes, we are
being forced to think about ourselves and to be candid about our situation and our burdens.”79
The only parts that made it back home mentioned “friendly and encouraging looks” from old
reserves and an artillery barrage.80 Bulletins from the front were also thoroughly optimistic,
depicting sweeping German victories while the young regiments sang 'Deutschland, Deutschland
über alles.”81 The Imperial government did not want pessimism to reach those back home and
although it was impossible to hide everything from the German public, the censors managed to
maintain many of the romantic notions of self-sacrifice which provided short-term benefits for
the war effort, but in the long run provided the Nazis with valuable foundations for their ideology.
The effect of the deaths of the First World War on those who remained cannot be
overstated. World War I claimed the lives of 1.6 million Germans who died at the time, while
over another two million would die later from injuries suffered during the war.82 These deaths
impacted the lives of Germans in profound ways. Families lost their chief bread winners, their
confidants, their tension breakers, some families lost their very souls. Bereavement on this scale
could only be resolved by holding onto the belief that their loved one's death was somehow
justified. A great deal of material falls into the category of justification of World War I deaths,
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but for now a prominent justification came from the idea that the death of a loved one was the
result of a noble sacrifice for Germany and the German community.83 Holding onto these notions
helped many Germans cope, including many Nazi supporters. The Nazis, through use of struggle
and activism rhetoric, often asserted their willingness to match these brave sacrifices as part of
an effort to see Germany not only restored to its previous glory, but improved beyond what the
Kaiser had failed to accomplish.
Thanks to the censorship and propaganda efforts of the Imperial government most
Germans managed to hold onto romantic notions of the First World War that endured into the
early Weimar Republic. Mosse contends that a particularly troublesome remnant of this
glorification permeated German consciousness in the form of the “Cult of the Fallen Soldier.”
Mosse’s Cult embodies the manifestation of glorified justifications for the many deaths
experienced during World War I. Per Mosse, youth was “symbolic of manhood, virility, and
energy, and death as not death at all but sacrifice and resurrection.”84 Inherent in the Cult of the
Fallen Soldier was the belief that the death of so many youths had meaning, a difficult premise to
establish in Germany following defeat. To compensate for the seemingly meaningless destruction,
the fallen would be re-appropriated to symbolize many different ideals that were meant to
strengthen Germans in the face of the difficulties of Weimar Germany and “regenerate a defeated
nation.”85
Jay Baird argues that the Nazis incorporated a great deal of the Cult of the Fallen Soldier
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into their own rhetoric. Baird contends that the Nazis were able to make the Cult of the Fallen
Soldier their own through the use of “the Blood Myth.”86 Per Baird, the Nazi Blood Myth
“featured the death of a noble warrior, his resurrection, and ultimately his spiritual return to the
fighting columns of the Brown Shirts.”87 The Nazis believed that any death, be it from World
War I or from street violence in the name of Germany was a death that further strengthened the
Volksgemeinschaft. Including members of the SA in the category of martyrdom alongside the
dead of World War I entailed a large logical leap, but its success is documented in the death of
Horst Wessel. Horst Wessel was a promising SA officer who died under less than dignified
circumstances. Nonetheless, Nazi propaganda turned Vessel into a national hero. According to
Baird, Wessel “became the source of myth and legend…a fighting Germanic troubadour who
died that the nation might live.”88 Thus, Nazi ideology asserted that its followers belonged
alongside the veterans of World War I as the masters of German identity.
Numerous examples exist that demonstrate the Nazi Movement's willingness to take on
the mantle of the volunteers of 1914. However, the most provocative demonstration involved the
Nazis efforts to stir activism and excitement amongst the German people just as the young
volunteers had in 1914. Using phrases that correlated the difficulties of Weimar Germans with
the same problems of the Imperial army, Hitler was able to sweep crowds into a fervor
resembling the mass excitement resulting from the Spirit of 1914. In 1923 Hitler exclaimed, “you
must learn to recognize that no one gives you freedom save only your own sword.'89 Trying to
stir people into a state of activism, Hitler argued the citizens of the Weimar Republic were
86
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coerced into giving up their engagement and desire for action. The individual was suffering from
an “excess of culture” brought on by the Weimar Republic.90 Using this rhetoric of struggle,
Hitler intended to wake up Germans and return them to the state of supreme power they evoked
in 1914.
Nothing served to better illustrate the Nazis’ desire for a renewed activism than the 1920
publishing of their political program. The DAP program is filled with very interesting and critical
aspects that require in depth investigation, but at this stage the critical item of the program that
demonstrates the activism and struggle aspects of Nazi ideology involves two words that feature
prominently within the program. Most of the program's points begin with the phrase “we
demand,” a seemingly inconsequential phrase that in all actuality was pivotal to demonstrating
Nazi intentions.91 The Nazis did not ask for circumstances to be restored to their prewar
equivalents. They did not ask for votes to enter the political arena and slowly change the
government within the realm of legality.92 The Nazis demanded change, insisting that Germany
needed to change. This type of activism, this all or nothing forcefulness, reminded Germans of
Imperial Germany that rolled the dice in 1914 completely opposite of the Weimar Republic that
made compromise after comprise in the Treaty of Versailles.
In order for the Nazi Party to convince the German people to wake up and fight against
the despised democracy they needed to correlate those who chose to take up the Nazi banner
with the highly respected 1914 volunteer. To accomplish this tie in the Nazis went beyond
struggle and activism and tapped into memories of masculinity that the triumphs and travails of
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the Great War helped entrench within the German psyche. For many Germans, democracy was
viewed as effeminate and lacking any distinct masculine features that made imperial Germany
powerful.93 Hitler once stated “man is truly man only if he defends and protects himself” a
statement that called Germans to action to defend themselves in the same fashion the volunteers
stepped up to defend the Second Reich.94 It was a man's duty to defend Germany and by
extension himself, his livelihood, and the livelihood of the community. To fully understand the
ways the Nazis would internalize the masculine memories of the 1914 volunteers one needs to go
no further than the early SA.
The Sturm Abteilung was the initial paramilitary arm of the Nazi Movement. In 1921, the
SA was setup to protect various party meetings and disrupt in any way possible the meetings of
opponents. However, the important aspect of the SA's formation is best summed up in the Nazi
periodical the Völkischer Boebachter. According to the V.B., the SA was “intended to develop in
the hearts of young supporters a tremendous desire for action, to drive home to them and burn
into them the fact that history does not make men, but men history.”95 The SA as an organization
of young men volunteering to fight for Germany, through the Nazi Movement, evoked the
notions of the masculine volunteers of 1914 flying to their death in the Great War with the sole
hope of bringing victory to Germany. This type of activism appealed to other Germans within the
range of the Nazis support base, helping the initial Movement expand to the size of a burgeoning
political force. All SA members were “to give absolute military obedience to my military
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superiors and leaders; to bear (themselves) honorably in and out of service; to always be
companionable towards other comrades.”96 In joining the SA a member had to take a pledge
which demonstrated the Nazis' willingness to live up to the sacrifices needed. Per the pledge an
SA member would need to be “always ready to stake life and limb in the struggle of the
movement.”97 The SA was not only to match the 1914 volunteers in activism, but they needed to
be willing to lay their lives down for the cause of the movement, in other words the restoration of
a powerful Germany. Thus, the SA was setup to demonstrate that the Nazis intended to pick up
where Imperial Germany and the Volunteers of 1914, some of which were members, left off and
through their masculine activism free Germany from the difficulties of a despicable Weimar
existence.
Historians are correct in their assertions that World War I impacted Nazism in a
fundamental way. The nationalism of 1914 entrenched feelings of German superiority with many
Germans, future Nazis included, which permeated German consciousness allowing for a base of
supporters for the early Nazi ardent nationalistic agenda. The Burgfrieden that arose out of the
Spirit of 1914 directly correlated to the later Nazi pillar, the Volksgemeinschaft. The
Volksgemeinschaft allowed the Nazis to welcome new supporters into a community that intended
to work hard and make sacrifices to better each and every member. Glorification of masculine
activism in the name of Germany done by the Imperial Government provided the Nazi
Movement with a rhetorical framework that had proven successful in mobilizing the masses. The
sacrifices made by troops during the Great War left profound impressions on those whom they
left behind. Thus, the idea of sacrificing everything in the name of nation and community existed
as noble justifications for the losses many Germans felt. In light of the reverence given to
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sacrifice, the Nazis were able to tie their struggle into this idea of noble sacrifice and gain the
positive support of those still grieving for their critical losses. World War I helped the Nazis gain
an initial support base, but as critical as the war was to initial membership, support, and ideology,
it would be the after math of the war that had most significant impacts on Nazi ideology.

The Treaty of Versailles and Nazism’s Earliest Enemies

As impactful as World War I was to the early Nazi Party's buildup, the event that truly
established the Nazi Movement's ideology was the end of the Great War. The devastating defeat,
armistice, and Treaty of Versailles placed the responsibility for the war on Germany and because
of this war guilt, the Allied powers demanded reparations, secession of territories, restrictions of
military and naval power, and foreign occupation.98 Versailles humiliated the German people
previously filled with nationalistic pride. Believing they were superior to the other nations,
losing the war and then suffering to such an extent called those nationalistic feelings from 1914
and beyond into question. How could a nation destined for greatness now be cast to such a low
station?
The disparity between the imagined power of the German nation and its actual power
following the Treaty of Versailles alienated Germans bringing on a nationwide crisis of identity.
German artist George Grosz eloquently captured the identity crisis of postwar Germany within
his own autobiography. According to Grosz, “there were many who could not get over the defeat.
Others were unable to find their way back into the working world they had left. That world had
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disappeared or was disappearing.”99 There existed a large number of Germans who could not
understand how a Germany destined for domination could fail so utterly. Thus, as Grosz states,
“Germany seemed to be splitting into two parts that hated each other,” one part that accepted the
outcome of the war and the other that could never do the same.100 This dissolution of unity and
loss of a common cause refracted the German people to such an extent that there would be little
unity amongst the majority of Germans tragically until 1933. This haphazard discontinuity
amongst the Germans was exactly the emotional devastation that the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft
would exploit to staggering success. However, the German identity crisis provided the Nazis
with the building blocks to piece together a firm foundation to a dynamic ideology.
Following the end of the war those who could not accept that Germany had been defeated
looked for a scapegoat to blame the loss of the war on. Very early after German defeat General
Field Marshall, and future Weimar President, Paul von Hindenburg argued “the German army
was stabbed in the back.”101 Hindenburg argued that the Germany’s failure was not the German
Army’s fault, but rather revolutionaries at home had undermined the war effort.102 Thus,
according to Hindenburg, “our operations necessarily miscarr(ied); the collapse was inevitable;
the revolution only provided the keystone.”103 A statement coming from a prestigious general in
high command at the end of the war lent credibility to the revisionist-conspiracy theories that
other events had led to German loss, not actual military defeat. The citizens of Germany
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experiencing difficulty accepting the defeat no doubt would have taken notice of and
remembered the numerous leaflets and speeches made calling for an end to the war. Most notable,
Communist leader Rosa Luxemburg protested the war not from a standpoint of peace versus the
destruction of war. Rather, Luxemburg opposed the war because the global conflict would divide
and destroy the Communist agenda. Per the Communist leader, “the socialist proletariat cannot
dispense with class struggle and international solidarity, either in war or peace, without
destroying itself.”104 Therefore, in 1916, one of the chief Communists stated that they were not
part of the Burgfrieden and thus had interests separate from the German people. As Ferguson
asserts in Pity of War, Luxemburg was just one of many advocating an end to the war, thus when
Hindenburg lent his notoriety to the so called “Stab in the Back Legend” the Germans who had
seen these resistance and protest efforts found the justification they needed to refuse to accept the
outcome of the war.105
The Stab in the Back legend would become further cemented into the minds of those who
denied German defeat when the Treaty of Versailles became finalized. As previously stated, the
Versailles Treaty was designed to humiliate Germany and dissuade Germans from ever again
trying to become a relevant world power. Germany had to cede valuable coal mines to France
and had to abandon military occupation of the Rhineland.106 The treaty also mandated that
Germany recognize the independence of Austria, Poland, and the Czechoslovak state and
renounce all of its overseas possessions.107 To add to the diminished land power, the military was
severely reduced, criminal tribunals were setup, and Germany was made responsible for paying a
reparations bill of more than twenty billion Gold Marks, a staggeringly impossible compensation
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mark.108 Germany was not only defeated, it was ruined as the result of an international conflict
that, many historians would agree, it was not solely responsible for starting. Many Germans
found these terms unfair as Germany had willing agreed to an armistice before Allied troops had
ever fought in German lands. The shock at how harsh the peace turned out to be caused Germans
to treat the Versailles Treaty with a general disdain if not visceral hatred.
The terms of this treaty and the subsequent hardships the German people would be forced
to endure because of it fueled the fires of anger amongst those who denied Germany's defeat.
This blinding hate would be directed against multiple parties both internationally and
domestically. Thus, the German citizenry became filled with rage fueled by confusion,
uncertainty, bitterness, and denial. This state of affairs correlated with the Nazi Movement's
foundation as the Nazis themselves were filled with the same denial and identity crises as the
German citizenry, but the Nazis were anything but unfocused and had a plethora of targets for
their unbounded hate.
The popular target of criticism following the end of the war was the party responsible for
the negotiation of peace and the formation of the Weimar Republic, the Social Democratic Party.
As the driving force behind the revolution, the Social Democratic Party, known as the SPD,
existed as a prime target for those who denied German defeat. The SPD initially supported the
war, but as time dragged on they began to beg for peace thus separating themselves from
Burgfrieden, albeit less aggressively than the Communists separated. In August 1915 the SPD
responded to opposition by calling for peace and criticizing the waste of life that was the Great
War.109 Criticism of this point would not raise the ire of too many because most Germans had
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lost someone they knew to the War, but what did raise concern was the SPD's call at that time for
“the creation of a permanent international court of arbitration, to which all future international
conflicts are to be submitted.”110 Even before the war was over the SPD was willing to work with
Germany’s enemies. Thus, although the results of the Treaty of Versailles were themselves
shocking, the fact that the SPD had gained the most from it, in the way of international
agreements and the installation of the Republic, surprised no one and allowed the Nazi
Movement a prime target for their scorn.
The Nazi Movement was particularly adept at turning people against the SPD and others
believed to be behind the Stab in the Back. The most common way for the Nazis to demonstrate
that they shared, or exceeded, the citizens’ scorn of the responsible parties was through the use of
insulting names and buzzwords meant to condemn the SPD and the Weimar government it
established. The most common label placed on the SPD was that of the “November Criminals”
which alluded to the November 1918 signing of the armistice that removed the German army
from the war.111 Seemingly, even just the mention of November was enough as “November
scoundrels” and “November-republic” were also used by Hitler in his early speeches.112 In
addition using the word “international” usually condemned the targeted enemy as separate from
Germany and subsequently an enemy likely responsible for the Treaty of Versailles.113 Finally,
calling the enemies “Marxists” was equally effective at identifying and marginalizing those
outside of the Volksgemeinschaft as the Marxist agenda was denounced as an adversary to and
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destroyer of the National Community. Thus, the Nazis used simple phrases to remind the public
that the SPD was an enemy to everything they considered German, but their antagonism of the
SPD did not stop at simple name calling.
As previously stated, the Nazis made extensive use of struggle rhetoric to gain the
support of aspects of the German public. The Nazis glorified their struggle against the SPD in
hopes of being viewed as the primary vehicle for change in Germany. The DAP platform begins
with a hidden jab to this effect, “the programme of the German Workers' Party is designed to be
of limited duration. The leaders have no intention, once the aims announced in it have been
achieved, of establishing fresh ones, merely in order to increase, artificially, the discontent of the
masses and so ensure the continued existence of the Party.”114 Although the eventual hypocrisy
of this statement cannot be missed considering the Nazis eventual flagrant manufacturing of
enemies, this statement sets the Nazis as a dynamic, active organization with the goal of toppling
the stagnating, SPD led Weimar Republic. Thus, Germans were left with choosing an
organization that wanted to improve on the days of the powerful Imperial Germany or a group
that the Nazis would have people believe stabbed the German army in the back, bringing on the
devastation of Versailles.
The decision framed in these terms is leading enough, but the Nazis refused to halt their
criticism of the SPD there. The Nazis chose instead to further cement their struggle with the SPD
by tying their plight into the sacrifices made by the 1914 volunteers. Many who mourned for the
volunteers questioned the value of their loved ones’ sacrifice, especially given the results of the
war. To answer this need, the Nazis set themselves up as the organization that would pick up the
banner of German superiority that fell from the hands of these young soldiers. In an April 1923
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speech Hitler proclaimed, “two millions have remained on the field of battle. They, too, have
their rights and not we, the survivors, alone. There are millions of orphans, of cripples, of
widows in our midst. They too have rights. For the Germany of to-day not one of them died, not
one of them became a cripple, an orphan, or a widow. We owe it to these millions that we build a
new Germany.”115 Hitler tied the Nazi struggle with the Weimar into the sacrifice and grief
endured by countless Germans. The Nazis worked hard to set themselves up as the enemies of
the SPD and Weimar and in doing so managed to gain the allegiance of many disillusioned from
Germany's fall from power.
Another party, partially blamed for the end of the war, was targeted by the Nazis with an
unprecedented visceral rage. Following defeat and the Treaty of Versailles, many Germans
turned their anger and confusion towards a group of people who Europeans often made into
scapegoats, the Jews. Anti-Semitism following the collapse of the German war effort was rabid
throughout Germany. People across Germany screamed “The Jews are to blame!”116 In 1920,
German journalist and poet Adolf Bartels wrote, “Jewish disfigurement, it elevates the puny
individual to the measure of all things.”117 Any argument backed by anti-Semitism contains
critical flaws, but the accusations that would be leveled against the Jews would at best be labeled
as convoluted conspiracy theories, at worst the delusional ravings of the truly lost. Those
Germans who subscribed to such stories and accusations were prime targets for recruitment into
the Nazi Movement.
The Nazi Movement was an inherently nationalist organization and as such had a clear
hatred of all things not German. Thus, Nazis considered Germany's large Jewish population
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outsiders, as shown in the party program, despite the fact that many Jews had fought in the Great
War for Germany. The Nazi Movement's hatred for the Jews stemmed from similar arguments
that other anti-Semites in Germany internalized. The Nazis believed that the Jews were not
bound to spatial boundaries.118 The Jews were allowed to setup a state within multiple racial
communities by classifying themselves, not as a race, but rather as a religion.119 By presenting
themselves as a religion and not a competing race the Jew was assured of religious
tolerance.120Afforded time, the Jews would soften the stern militarism of the Germans via
catchwords such as “Democracy, Majority, Conscience of the World, World-solidarity, Worldpeace, Internationality of Art” and numerous other terms that cultivated internationalism.121 Jews
were thus able to hide themselves in every nation claiming to be citizens of another race while
secretly fostering the survival of their own race. Thus, as far as the Nazis were concerned, the
Jews were the prime enemy of the German people, and the Nazis intended to use whatever
means available to them to communicate that fact to the German public.
The Nazis had many ways to demonstrate that they were the group that would truly wage
an all or nothing battle with the perpetrators of the supposed Jewish conspiracy against Germany.
In their platform, the Nazis clearly stated, “no Jew may be a member of the nation” and that “all
non-German immigration must be prevented.”122 Going further, and perhaps more to the point,
the platform stated that the Party “combats Jewish-materialist spirit within and without us.”123
Thus, from the beginning the Nazis made it clear they were a serious enemy of the Jews. Beyond
such aggression using buzzwords and catchphrases allowed the Nazis to tie any topic they
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protested to their anti-Semitism. In condemning the free market, which, according to the Nazis,
was negatively impacting the German economy and by extension the livelihood of its citizens, a
Nazi handbill referred to bankers as “agents of the Jewish international stock exchange.”124
Various Nazis would become quite adept at blaming the Jews for all of Germany's ills, but no
one was more of a skillful anti-Semite than Adolf Hitler. Hitler's anti-Semitism came from a
place of intense emotions too copious to cover at this time. Needless to say, most of Hitler's antiSemitic statements at the time equated Jews with division, collapse, and responsibility for the
failure of the German people in 1918. In 1923, Hitler argued that the Jew “is the demon of the
disintegration of peoples, he is the symbol of the unceasing destruction of their life.”125
Responding to economic concerns, Hitler blamed the Jews for the depersonalizing free market,
or as he also called it “Judaized,” business.126 According to Hitler, “business lost the character of
work; it became an object of speculation. Master and man were torn asunder.”127 Through
Hitler's numerous speeches and the various other efforts of the Movement, the Nazis managed to
tie all of the woes of Weimar Germany to the already despised Jews while simultaneously setting
themselves in the role of the enemy of the Jews.
The emotions of World War I provided critical pathways into the German psyche that the
Nazis incorporated into their ideology, but that alone could not have helped the Nazis gain much
of an initial power base. What truly motivates people into action is having an enemy for
everyone to rally against. In the fallout of German defeat and the Treaty of Versailles, the
Germans gained a plethora of enemies to target their confusion and grief towards, but this anger
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was diffuse, split as it was amongst many parties. The Nazis managed to focus this anger and
mistrust towards specific enemies they deemed dangerous to the German way of life. Using
ancient racism and calling on powerful emotions the Nazis assembled around themselves a small,
yet significant group of supporters and readied themselves to make a move against the ailing
Weimar Republic. As many historians have asserted, without the First World War and all of the
emotions, anger, hatred, disillusionment, grief, sacrifices, and suffering that it brought to the
German people there would never have been a Nazi Party. However, before accepting the
argument presented here it is important to evaluate German identity before World War I in order
to determine whether Nazi ideology could have existed independent of the Great War.

The Second Reich and the Not-So-Sonderweg

A school of thought amongst historians argues that the German mindset before World War
I, as opposed to the results of World War I, allowed the Nazis their initial voice. Known as the
Sonderweg, or special path, this thesis claims that the German people suffered from a failed
Bourgeois revolution that sent them astray from the “normal” western path of development. The
bedrock of such an argument claims that anti-liberal sentiments from the days of Bismarck
managed to survive beyond the First World War allowing the Nazis room to rise.128 While there
is a logical consistency to such a claim, the Sonderweg argument has numerous flaws and is
largely becoming phased out of present day work on German history. The central contention
against this argument is embodied by the work of David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley who argue
that comparing Germany's development alongside Western developments of England, France,
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and the United States demonstrates an unfair bias by deeming these nations' development as the
standard of normality.129 Normal stands as a stretch as England and France endured a revolution
followed by dictatorship and the United States suffered a devastating Civil War. Following the
Wars of German unification Germans were thoroughly optimistic and anxious to demonstrate
their power in international competition, not tearing one another apart.130 Jürgen Kocka
demonstrates another flaw in the Sonderweg by making the simple claim that there is more to
German history than 1933 and historians need to focus on more than this era when they seek to
explain the entirety of German history.131 However, the concerns of Sonderweg historians are
still relevant in terms of Nazi ideology as numerous strains from before the First World War can
be found in Nazi ideology. Before determining World War I was foundational to Nazi ideology,
these pre-war aspects of German identity must be evaluated.
The Germans steadily built up an economy rivaling the powerhouse industrial nations of
Great Britain and the United States. Germany also put a great deal of money into a sophisticated
military and a navy that hoped to rival the British monopoly on the high seas. Thanks to some of
Bismarck's actions the Germans enjoyed peace and one of the most sophisticated welfare
systems in the world. Germany was at the precipice of becoming a world power and these
victories caused the Germans to internalize an ardent nationalism that would exist beyond the
days of the Second Reich. This environment of German optimism is critical to understanding the
Nazi Party's eventual popularity because it is this optimism that the Nazis would evoke during
the late 1920s and early 1930s.
The Nazis were able to appeal to the German citizenry because they evoked a masculine
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activism that hearkened back to the volunteers in the trenches. However, masculinity was a facet
of German culture long before World War I. The German people worshiped the powerful men of
their history believing that their masculinity, military prowess, and ability to rule helped the
German people stand on a superior plain above the rest of the world. In a letter written by Kaiser
Wilhelm II, the Germanic ruler praised his father and grandfather for the role their military
victories played in uniting the German Reich.132 Beyond worship and praise of masculine leaders,
German masculinity was tied into nature and physicality. In a 1906 German magazine, an article
proclaimed that Germans strove “towards a balanced physical vigor” while elevating “physical
culture to the status of one of the most authentic demands.”133 The idea that a man was meant to
be virile and strong in the name of “individual and communal life” existed with German citizens
well before World War I ever erupted. Therefore, an obstacle exits in claiming the Nazis
manipulated notions of masculinity from the First World War as those notions were internalized
in previous decades.
Notions of self-sacrifice in the name of the greater German community arose out of
trench warfare and the harsh life on the home front during the First World War. Subsequently,
the Nazi Party used these notions of self-sacrifice as part of the Volksgemeinschaft. While most
of this argument is correct, notions of self-sacrifice existed before the First World War ever broke
out. In a 1901 letter directed to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a German
conservative elitist, demonstrated some extreme nationalism when he contended that God
planned for the German people to advance science, philosophy, and other aspects of society. 134
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However, Chamberlain goes on to state that the German people “must submerge themselves
completely in the pursuance of this God-given duty.”135 Chamberlain also discusses the ways in
which he has made personal sacrifices in the name of bettering Germany and by extension the
world.136 Evidently notions of self-sacrifice and unification existed before World War I, but to
argue that the opinions of one German elitist in 1901 were pervasive in the German mindset
would indeed be irresponsible.
Notions of self-sacrifice seem to have existed, endured, and expanded beyond what
Chamberlain argued on the eve of the First World War. In 1912, the head of the Pan-German
League, a nationalist organization that existed before World War I, Heinrich Class wrote a
pamphlet If I Were Kaiser in which he argued that the key to mastering the success Germany was
experiencing in the early 20th Century resided in the ability of the German people to forget their
differences and unite in “the struggle for the soul of the people.”137 Class called for people to
enter “such honorable service” to “smooth out the divisions of that through ill will have escalated
into implacable enmity.”138 Hence, by 1912 notions of putting aside one's individual problems
and helping the German nation existed in ample form. Therefore, the Burgfrieden and by
extension the Volksgemeinschaft cannot said to be entirely unique to the First World War and
certainly not to Nazi ideology.
Anti-Semitism has existed for time immemorial, long before even the Kaiser came to
power. Proof of its presence within Germany is not hard to find whatsoever. In 1850, famous
German composer Richard Wagner demonstrated a belief in a Jewish conspiracy stating that the
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Jew “rules and will rule as long as money remains the power as a result of which all our
activities and doings lose their force.”139 Returning to Heinrich Class, the notions that Jewish
money interfered with the masculine culture predated the First World War as the head of the PanGerman League accused the Jews of being “the carriers and teachers of the materialism that
today is dominant.”140 Class, as if he was taking a page from Adolf Hitler's future manuscripts
stated that the Jews' “German-born supporters are dupes seduced and alienated from their inborn
instincts.”141 Before the Great War, anti-Semitism was used to place the failures of modern
society squarely on the shoulders of the Jewish people. Thus, as some would argue, the Nazis’
anti-Semitic messages already met a sympathetic and receptive audience independent of the First
World War.
What is to be made then of World War I's influence on Nazi ideology if so many of its
foundations were actually notions internalized by German's before the war ever began? Even
though notions of masculinity, self-sacrifice, community, and anti-Semitism existed before the
war, the Great War amplified the notions to an immeasurable scale. Sure, masculinity was very
important to the German mindset before the Great War, but to that same token “atom” vacuum
cleaners and trips to the cinema were highly valued before the war.142 Self-sacrifice and
community may have existed, but factory owners still exploited workers at every opportunity
that was presented to them.143Even anti-Semitism remained a very conservative reaction to the

139

Richard Wagner, “Judaism in Music, 1850,” in The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts, ed.
Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle (London: Routledge, 2002), 3.
140
Class, “If I Were Kaiser, 1912,” 21.
141
Ibid, 21.
142
L.F. Nissen, “The ‘Atom’ Vacuum Cleaner: Advertisement by the Firm L.F. Nissen, 1906,” German Historical
Institute, accessed July 26, 2012, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=643.
Ulrich Rauscher, The Cinema, 1913, accessed July 26, 2012, http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=702.
143
Paul Göhre, “Working-Class Life, 1891,” German Historical Institute, accessed July 26, 2012,
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=652.

55

woes of the world, and was not anywhere near as combative as it was following the war. Thus,
such aspects that would go on to form foundations of Nazi ideology were tepid and isolated at
best before World War I brought these aspects to the surface.
Perhaps most troubling to the Sonderweg idea that aspects of German identity were
unique to Germany is the fact that many of these notions were not unique to Germany.144 To
demonstrate how obvious the lack of uniqueness of aspects of Germany's pre-war identity were
one needs go no further than one of the United States most recognizable figures, Theodore
Roosevelt. President at the start of the twentieth century, Teddy Roosevelt has been held by
numerous historians as the embodiment of turn of the century American identity. Even if such a
bold claim is not to be accepted, Roosevelt's views are remarkably indicative of the previously
mentioned German notions of identity. In his inaugural speech of March 1904 Teddy Roosevelt
stated, “we [Americans] are the heirs of the ages...yet our life has called for the vigor and effort
without which the manlier and hardier virtues wither away.”145 Thus, TR demonstrated the
presence of a masculine nationalism in the United States before the World War. Continuing in
this speech, TR was effusive in his call for a sense of community and sacrifice amongst
Americans stating, “it is our own fault if we failed...the success which we confidently believe the
future will bring should cause...a deep and abiding realization of all which life has offered us.”146
Therefore, it becomes increasingly difficult for Sonderweg historians to undermine the value of
the First World War via pre-war interpretations of identity as those aspects were far from unique
to Germany.
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World War I intensified all aspects of German identity that the citizenry had internalized
for generations. With the outbreak of war, physical, virile masculinity was required by both those
on the front lines and those at home. Everyone needed to make sacrifices to help the greater
community and when all of this failed, when Germany at its peak could not bring victory,
unjustified and intensified hate was directed towards all enemies of Germany. Even though many
aspects of Nazi ideology existed before the World War, the importance that the Great War placed
on these notions endured beyond the failure of the war allowing the Nazis to form an amplified
emotional foundation to their belief system

Ideology’s Influence on the Beer Hall Putsch

Taking a brief moment to recap, the First World War amplified previously held notions of
German identity and when those notions failed to achieve victory, the German people suffered an
identity crisis. Those who would support and join the early Nazi Movement perhaps suffered
disproportionately from the disconnect between identity and reality in comparison with other
Germans. Nazi supporters and thinkers took on these notions of German identity and focused
them into a political agenda of overthrow that appealed to a very select support base during the
early inter-war years. This support base would continue to be limited as long as Nazism
remained on the political periphery of Bavaria. These circumstances being the case, historians
are correct in their assertions that the Nazis needed much more than notions of World War I to
become a political force. Thus, as this work argues for Nazi ideology as a driving force of Nazi
action more than amplified senses of identity are needed to justify how the Nazis began their
path to power. If, as this work suggests, the identity crisis that occurred following the loss of
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World War I was the pivotal foundation to Nazi ideology as opposed to a convenient context,
then it has to be demonstrated that the crisis-motivated ideology of the Nazi Movement led to a
watershed moment that without said moment the Nazi Party could never have risen to dominance.
That watershed moment would come in November 1923 when the Nazis decided to act upon
their overthrow ideology.
In November 1923, the Nazi Movement growing in popularity would be afforded a
chance to accomplish exactly what they set out for, a grand action that would seize broad,
national attention. By November 1923 the Nazi Movement feeling very confident with their hard
earned support base and the weaknesses within Munich and the surrounding area, launched a
coup known famously as the Beer Hall Putsch. The Hitler-led Putsch was the pinnacle of the
early Nazi Movement's achievement. Hitler and the Nazis had called for an end to the ineffectual
Weimar Republic, an event that would only occur in the wake of unity of action. In attempting to
overthrow the republic the Nazis were living up to everything they stood for. Brave, virile SA
men united despite their individual differences and rose up against the enemies of a potentially
restored Germany. However, the Putsch was a failure. Many of those responsible, Hitler included,
were arrested and put on trial for high treason. The Nazis, at that time a largely regional
organization 55,000 strong, would be outlawed albeit temporarily. With the leaders of the
movement facing possible execution, many members scattered by the outcome of the Putsch, and
the remainder not allowed to unify under the Nazi banner, the Putsch, a moment that the Nazis
had previously exclaimed as Germany's liberation, seemingly extinguished the torch of the Nazi
Movement. However, news of the failed Putsch spread like wildfire across Weimar Germany
receiving condemnation and compliments as all of Germany began to pay attention to the Nazi
Movement. Hitler's trial itself was highly publicized offering him the unique opportunity of
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having a nationwide audience to sermonize; an event the future Führer knew how to take full
advantage of.
In a speech Hitler made at the trial in his defense he spread critical aspects of the Nazi
ideology to the masses. Hitler began his defense by exclaiming “I have resolved to be the
destroyer of Marxism.”147 Hitler would go on to claim that despite the differing political
backgrounds and goals of those involved in the Putsch, they put aside their differences because
“the fate of Germany does not lie in the choice between a republic or a Monarchy, but in the
content.”148 Hitler then asserted that “We wanted to create in Germany the precondition which
alone will make it possible for the iron grip of our enemies to be removed”'149 Hitler took the
opportunity to insult the “international stock exchange slavery,” “trusts,” and “the politicizing of
unions.”150 During a trial where he could face execution, Hitler spread Nazi ideology's fostering
of activism, disdain, self-sacrifice, unity, and labeling the enemies of Germany. The trial allowed
Hitler his first national audience and he used that opportunity to attempt to sway people across
Germany to the Nazi way of thinking, just as he had been doing since the formation of the Nazi
Movement. Although the Nazis would be disbanded, Hitler's speech left a significant impression
on the minds of many more Germans than the 55,000 who followed the Movement in revolt.
Hitler had one last matter to discuss at his trial. As powerful as his words could be, Hitler
knew that with the Movement disbanded it could very well dissolve forever. Therefore, Hitler
took advantage of having a national audience to mythologize the remaining shadow organization
of the Nazi Movement. Per Hitler, “the army which we have formed grows from day to day; it
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grows more rapidly from hour to hour.”151 Hitler awaited the time “when these untrained bands
(would) grow to battalions, the battalions to regiments and the regiments to divisions.”152 Hitler
passed on to the German public the image of a Nazi Movement waiting in the shadows all the
while biding its time as it would grow to unthinkable size. That idea would help keep the Nazi
Movement in existence until its re-founding in February 1925.
Hitler ended his speech with a diatribe that shook many Germans right to their
nationalistic core. Hitler, calling into question the validity of the court trying him stated “For
gentlemen it is not you who pronounce judgment upon us.”153 He then claimed that “the Court of
History” would judge the leaders of the Putsch “as Germans who wanted the best for their people
and their fatherland, who wished to fight and to die. You may pronounce us guilty a thousand
times, but the Goddess who presides over the Eternal Court of History...she acquits us.”154 Hitler
in closing his speech cemented one aspect of Nazi ideology permanently in the minds of
supporters and enemies alike; the Nazis intended to carry on the torch of the 1914 volunteers by
fighting and if necessary dying in the name of a nationalist Germany. There would be no
sacrifice too high, no maneuver too risky. The Nazis intended to return to prominence and would
try again to destroy the Weimar Republic. The only difference between the Putsch and the future
strike of the Nazi Movement would be the fact that now many more than 55,000 people knew to
what extent the Nazis were willing to go to see their vision of the future realized.
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Closing Thoughts

Hitler would receive a light sentence and spend very little time in jail, most of which was
spent compiling his political testament Mein Kampf. When Hitler emerged he returned to a fairly
stable operation and began to turn a rabid Nazi Movement, enduring in his absence, into an
actual Nazi Party with the goal of winning elections and destroying the Weimar Republic within
the framework of legality. As previously stated, if World War I is to be considered an ideological
foundation for the Third Reich as opposed to simply the initial context, then it has to be
demonstrated that the amplified sense of identity from World War I led to a watershed moment
for the Nazi Movement that without said moment the Nazi Party could never have risen to
dominance. That watershed moment for the Nazis on which everything that would subsequently
follow was Hitler's speech in his defense.
Historians always attempt to find moments that they can point to as critical to everything
else that follows afterwards because those moments are truly rare and are incredibly informative.
Hitler's defense speech contained ideas of masculinity, a willingness to make sacrifices and unify
in the name of the community, clearly identified enemies of Germany, and most importantly
demonstrated the willingness of the Nazi Movement to sacrifice themselves to achieve victory.
All of these goals are indiscernible from the goals of the young volunteers setting out for the
trenches filled with the Spirit of 1914 and the Burgfrieden. In tying the struggle of the Nazi
Movement to the emotional memories of the First World War, Hitler established the Nazi ideals
within the psyche of the German people. Presumably, Hitler's speech allowed for the Nazi
Movement to endure during his absence and provided a national stage for the Nazis upon Hitler's
return. This work contends that this speech should be the critical moment of evaluation for the
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entirety of the Nazi rise afterward because although much remained to be determined, none of
the political and electoral intrigue over the next eight years would have happened without the
notoriety and significance of this speech and its assertion of the Putsch as an ideologically driven
action.
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CHAPTER 3
ERKENNUNG: 1924 TO 1933155

A 1930 letter to the Oldenburg Ministry of Churches and Schools complained about the
violence meted out towards children by National Socialist students. According to the letter, “the
son of a Republican was beaten up during the break...so badly that he had to stay home for over a
week.”156 The letter goes on to state that the National Socialist students had formed a “Pupils’
Association” and quickly took a majority within the school.157 It did not take long for “their
satchels [to be] smeared with swastikas” or for them to “join together and sing National Socialist
combat songs.”158 Children who did not join the Pupils’ Association became distraught from the
situation, which negatively impacted their studies.159 Such a decline resulted in punishments
from teachers despite their knowledge of the underlying situation.160 According to the letter,
“some headmasters have already declared that they are not in a position to deal with these
incidents.”161 Thus, the students who refused to join the Pupils' Association were left with the
choice of fending for themselves, a thoroughly risky option, or joining the National Socialist
agenda.
This letter is remarkably indicative of the generally accepted interpretation of the Nazi
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Party rise during the Weimar Republic. Similar to the school environment, Weimar Germany
should have been a safe environment that cultivated individual expression and personal liberty.
However, like the school, the Republic became a living hell where those trying to make it to the
next day were under the constant harassment of National Socialist violence. In the same manner
that the students were left to fend for themselves, those in charge of the Weimar Republic
seemed powerless to stop the Nazi terror machine. Thus, by this interpretation, the citizenry, left
with the choice between continued suffering or submission to National Socialism, chose to
submit and gain some peace. These types of arguments have entrenched the image of the Nazis
as fanatical bullies whose war of terror allowed them to coerce support from the unwilling
masses; an identity cemented by their actions during the Second World War.
The idea of the violent Nazi opportunists is not necessarily incorrect as Nazi SA
members often committed violent acts for no other reason than they could. However, to argue
that such violent opportunism explained their rise to political dominance is a severe mistake.
Thomas Childers has argued that by 1932 the Nazis actually lost support from the SA's “embrace
of political terrorism.”162 Violence did have a beneficial impact on Nazi success but not in a
sense of intimidating the unwilling public into support. Rather, violence stood as a pillar of the
Nazi ideological command for activism and struggle against the enemies of Germany. Per
historian Eric Weitz, Nazi violence “demonstrate[d] vividly the Nazis' commitment and
determination, and that, of course was the point.”163 Such activism afforded Nazis support from
various social groups looking for action in a time of helplessness and impotence. Therefore,
violent, opportunistic activity existed, but violence of this petty nature did not result in
significant support. Violence that matched Nazi ideology instilled a sense of activism in various
162

Thomas Childers and Eugene Weiss, “Voters and Violence: Political Violence and the Limits of National Socialist
Mass Mobilization,” German Studies Review 13, no. 3 (October 1990): 482.
163
Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 346.

64

citizens, thus gaining support in that fashion.
Another flaw with the Nazi oppression and opportunism argument is that under this
interpretation the Nazis would have to have been universally accepted as the majority party of
the Weimar Republic. However, as historians know, the highest percentage of votes the Nazi
Party attained in fair Reichstag elections was 37.8 percent.164 Such an argument of Nazi
universality was popularized by journalist William Shirer who stated “to all the millions of
discontented Hitler in a whirlwind campaign offered...some measure of hope.”165 Earlier Shirer
also lent credence to the Sonderweg thesis by claiming that “acceptance of autocracy, of blind
obedience to the petty tyrant who ruled as princes, became ingrained in the German mind.”166
Thus, Shirer and to a certain extent Sonderweg historians, set into the public mindset the idea of
a universally popular Nazi Party which was far from the case. After Shirer, historians rejected the
idea of a universal Nazi appeal and began postulating the Mittelstand Thesis in which the Nazis
gained their support almost exclusively from the lower middle class.167 However, beginning in
the late 1970s various historians began to criticize this thesis arguing in favor of the notion of the
Nazis as a Volkspartei, a party spanning various social groupings. The Volkspartei thesis will be
explored throughout this chapter as it encompasses the work of numerous historians most
notably Thomas Childers, Richard Hamilton, and William Sheridan Allen.168 For the time being
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it is important to note that Nazi appeal was in no way universal to all of Germany, but did attract
a disparate following across Germany.
Most historians offer multiple explanations for why the Nazis were able to attain a
diverse constituency, but these explanations almost always boil down to one of two points. Either
the mass-support for Nazism came as a result of the multiple failures of the Weimar Republic or
they were the result of the Nazi Party's shameless pandering from 1928 to 1933. John Morrow
certainly advocates the former claiming “Adolf Hitler and the Nazis rose to power as a result of
the depression in Germany.”169 Despite the copious credit he gives to the Nazi Party, historian
Detlev Peukert argues the centrality of the economic strife but is careful to note that “rejection of
Weimar clearly antedated the surge of support for Hitler.”170 Peukert contends that a considerable
amount of voter disaffection was already rampant across Germany and these voters eventually
voted for the Nazis as a means of protest. J.W. Falter and R. Zintl's analysis of Weimar crisis
voting agrees with Peukert making the claim that their research indicated “the NSDAP became
simply another protest outlet for SPD voters after 1928.”171 Falter and Zintl also conclude the
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dissolution of previous middle class protest parties, the German People's Party and German
National People's Party, led to substantial increases in Nazi support, an assertion seconded by
Larry Jones who argues that single-interest middle class parties also dissolved and supported the
Nazis.172
These arguments making Weimar protest and defections critical to the rise of the Nazi
Party put forward a passive argument in which the Nazis just happened to be in the right place at
the wrong time. Peter Fritzche warns against such a passive argument postulating that even if the
economic struggles of the Weimar Republic had not occurred Germany may not have “been
spared the pugilism of radical nationalists or the pitiless uncertainty of political terrorism and
civil strife.”173 Thus, the Weimar environment argument for mass appeal is inadequate as these
arguments ignore critical aspects of the Nazi rise. By this line of thought any party could
possibly have seized political control of the disaffected German citizenry, which, as this work
will demonstrate, was far from true.
Could any other party have really taken control of Germany in the same fashion as the
Nazis? Per Fritzche, protest support existed before the Nazis dominance as evidenced by the
disparate voter populations that elected staunchly conservative Paul von Hindenburg Republic
President in 1925 despite SPD domination of the Reichstag.174 If mass-disaffection existed,
which this work asserts, then the remaining question asks how did members of this group know
or deem the Nazi Party as the appropriate vehicle for their disgruntled support? Many historians
have chosen to argue that the Nazis opportunistically presented themselves as the end all be all to
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every part of the electorate, which certainly is valid, to a point. Jill Stephenson acknowledges
such assertions stating that “the Nazis were relentless in utilizing [reaction against modernism's]
facilities for their own heinous and often bizarre purposes.”175 However, if the only reason the
Nazis came to power was opportunistic pandering, why could no other party duplicate such
pandering to take or maintain control of the volatile Weimar Republic?
The other Weimar political parties had numerous marks against them that hindered their
goal of political dominance. The most powerful party of the time, the Social Democratic Party,
was tied to the Weimar Republic and as such could not distance itself from the problems thought
to have been brought onto Germany by that same democratic system.176 Another prominent
political party, the Communist Party of Germany, preached the Communist message of downfall
to the capitalist, democratic system and, due to their belief that Capitalism was in its dying throes,
were uninterested in seizing control of the Weimar Republic.177 Therefore, if these political
powerhouses, perfectly capable of pandering and making their own empty promises, could not
maintain their dominance, the question becomes why were the Nazis ultimately able to rise to
power? What made the Nazis unique from other political organizations in Weimar Germany that
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allowed them to take a path that ultimately led to the Third Reich?
Fritzche, while not asserting Nazi opportunism, certainly agrees that campaigning helped
them secure the support necessary to come to power. Per Fritzche, the Nazis, as opposed to being
the passive inheritors of the dissolving bourgeois political environment, “were successful insofar
as they adhered strictly to the changing requirements of bourgeois politics.”178 Thus, the Nazis
used the tools of an evolving German populism to reach the masses and demonstrate that they
existed as a true protest group. Slowly, Fritzche contends, “burghers recognized in the Nazis
what they believed to be the strategic advantages of the socialists, namely organization,
determination, and fanaticism, without having to purchase proletarian economics.”179 Thus, the
Nazis attained popular support by setting themselves up as a viable alternative to the stymied
Weimar parties.
The overarching argument of this work seeks to tie Nazi ideology to Nazi action. The
previous chapter analyzed how the First World War informed Nazi ideology and motivated the
Nazis to take up the banner of the 1914 volunteers and to topple the Weimar Republic. However,
with the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch, the Nazis were pushed into near irrelevance. The
turnaround from obscurity in 1925 to dominance in 1933 is remarkable and the subject of
investigation for countless historians. A 1992 Symposium held on “Weimar, the Working Classes,
and the Rise of National Socialism” that featured prominent historians such Jürgen Falter, Detlef
Mühlberger, and Jill Stephenson discussing the rise of National Socialism via Weimar elections.
After numerous presentations, a critique was made by many in attendance to the effect that “the
speakers came under fire from some quarters for neglecting fundamental questions of
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ideology.”180 Thus, the critical topic this work must now address centers on the often neglected
role of ideology in the Nazi rise.
As previously discussed, historical work on the Nazi rise generally follows a progression
that claims the actions, or inactions, of the Republic alienated a mass group of voters leading
them to become a block of protest voters. The Nazis then pandered to these voters in an effort to
get their support which allowed them the slim electoral presence to get Hitler to the Chancellery.
This work does not challenge the basic logic of this progression but seeks to build onto this
narrative the understanding that the bridge between Nazi pandering and German acceptance of
the Nazi agenda was not simply a passive protest outlet. Rather, Nazi actions to make themselves
more appealing to the masses ensured the citizenry knew the Nazis were the appropriate outlet.
While this work acknowledges that opportunism and contradictory promises certainly existed,
the Nazis efforts to get their message out to the German public were genuinely forwarded by
Nazi ideological considerations centering on the all driving mission of the activist masculine and
nationalist struggle to topple the Weimar Republic and replace the failing institution with a
dynamic and all-encompassing Volksgemeinschaft.

Non-Nazi Aversion to the Weimar Republic

Arguing the primacy of Nazi ideologically motivated action in the Nazi Party's rise to
power does not discount the Weimar Republic's tremendous impact on such events. The claim
that without the disaster that was Weimar Germany the Nazi Party would never have risen to
prominence is certainly a valid argument. Weimar Germany generated stress amongst the
German people and alienated various groups creating significant civil unrest. Arguing that the
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Weimar Republic was the primary cause of the Nazi rise however inadvertently presents the Nazi
Party as the sole opposition to the Weimar Republic. The Nazis had no such monopoly on protest
as numerous individuals and organizations protested various aspects of the Weimar Republic.
Therefore, before proceeding to explain the numerous ways Nazi ideology informed the
citizenry's choices to vote for the Nazis, it is important to demonstrate the numerous avenues of
disaffection within the Republic that would eventually filter into a mass protest vote.
The Weimar Republic brought on numerous changes across multiple planes that
received mixed reactions amongst the German people. The Republic brought to Germany
modernism, liberalism, and consumerism that many Germans endorsed, but these new concepts
also received equal condemnation within the German community. Intellectuals in particular
worried that “Americanism” was slowly taking over and diminishing German culture.181
Americanism went beyond “trusts, high rises, traffic officers, film, technical wonders, jazz bands,
boxing, magazines, and management,” but rather existed as the embodiment of the fear that
German culture would disappear within the Republic.182 Artist George Grosz, living in Weimar
Germany, characterized the changes within the Republic as evoking amongst people “ghastly
materialism and boredom.”183 Others expressed ardent fears “of the conquest of Europe by
America” and that “individual peoples are being worn away...becoming international.”184 Such
men did not endorse the ardent nationalism that would dominate the Nazi Party, but artists and
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intellectuals were concerned by the degradation of the German mind that the internationalism the
Weimar Republic invited. Thus, although many intellectuals voiced praise for the Weimar
Republic, some did express hesitations with some of modernism's side effects swirling
throughout Germany.
The Weimar Republic increased materialism and internationalism in Germany, but
perhaps a more contested result of the Weimar system was a sharp revision in women's role
within German society. The Great War eliminated a great deal of Germany’s young male
population which forced the nation's gender roles to alter. Women needed to work to provide for
themselves and their families deprived of their original breadwinners. Many Germans of both
genders expressed concerns over women entering prominence in the professional sphere. One
chief concern centered on the belief that the independent woman would not want to give birth to
the children desperately needed to replenish the German population following World War I.
Alfred Polgar expressed this fear within his work The Defenseless in which a father and son
exchanged beliefs about the rise of women. The father, representing the older generation, argued
that “the pelvis of a woman is still broader and heavier than our own; they still bear the
children.”185 Despite the rise of women and the gains they did make, those gains were not
appreciated as many politicians and intellectuals called a woman's right of employment into
question.186 A more condemnatory opinion within the Republic comes from the testimonies
gathered from various female textile workers in 1930. One woman stated “my view is that if a
housewife and mother could be at home, then the household and children would be better served.
In France, Alsace, and Saxony the women do not work in the factory and their life is easier than
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in Bavaria.”187 Another woman criticized the lack of sustainable wages despite backbreaking
labor stating “I would be happy if I could properly provide for my household and children.”188
She went on to say that she does not “know a Sunday and holiday.”189 Thus, not only were men
unhappy with women’s presence in the work force, but many women themselves expressed a
great deal of frustration at their current position brought on by the needs of the Weimar Republic.
As women became more prominent in areas previously unfamiliar to them, Germans
began to notice that the youth were also drastically changing in many uncomfortable ways. The
previously mentioned Polgar conversation between father and son began only after the son had
refused to give his seat on the train to a woman forced to stand.190 The father, stunned at his son’s
disregard for women, fears he has lost the ability to love and show respect, symbolic of the fear
that Germany’s men were becoming more effeminate and weak.191 The youth themselves did not
help ease the older generation’s concerns as historian Felix Gilbert fondly related that in his
Weimar era youth he and his friends “enjoyed shocking our elders by not wearing hats in the
summer, by not wearing tuxedos when we went out in the evenings....we liked to live our own
lives, not bound to firm, tight schedules.”192 Beyond abandoning the conventions of the past,
sexuality began to feature prominently within public discourse, but not just sexuality concerning
a married man and woman, but between single people, sometimes of the same gender. In 1929,
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the League for Human Rights called for homosexual women to “show that you are not merely to
be tolerated, but are also prepared to fight for your freedom.”193 Many individuals began to argue
that sex was no longer a woman’s “duty” to her man and her nation but rather could be had for
the enjoyment of life.194 Some even condemned the institution of marriage for failing to help
people reach the fullest extent of happiness possible.195 Many more traditional people still stood
up for sex between a married man and woman, such as the German Association for the
Protection of Mothers which in 1922 asserted that they strove “to unmask the offensive social
conditions and ethical views which tolerate and promote prostitution and venereal diseases.”196
However, the damage to public discourse had been done as even this association recognized
“human sexuality as a powerful instrument, not only for the propagation but also for the
progressive development of joy in living.”197 The Weimar Republic allowed a seemingly
uncontrollable generation the freedom to not only defy valued social conventions but also to
bring sexuality into public discourse.198 As the youth became less amenable, the older generation
increasingly grew to blame the Weimar Republic that appeared to endorse such expressions of
personal freedom.
Beyond the loss of culture, the changes in masculine domination, and the pervasiveness

193

League For Human Rights, “Appeal to All Homosexual Women, 18 September 1929,” in The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook, ed. Anton Kaes and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 704.
194
Grete Ujhely, “A Call for Sexual Tolerance, 1930,” in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton Kaes, Jay
Martin, and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 710.
195

Helene Stöcker, “Marriage as a Psychological Problem, 1930,” in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton
Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 705-708.

196

German Association for the Protection of Mothers, “Guidelines of the German Association for the Protection of
Mothers, November-December 1922,” in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and
Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 697.

197
198

Ibid, 697.
For those interested in learning about the sexual revolution that occurred in Weimar Germany a valuable resource
is Eric Weitz's Weimar Germany that features a chapter devoted to the topic in addition to analysis of the
numerous cultural changes occurring in Germany at this time Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy.

74

of the youth, the Weimar Republic witnessed one of the worst economic collapses Germany ever
experienced. As Germans faced massive unemployment, inflation, and hyper-inflation the
Weimar Republic generated a considerable amount of opposition. Heinrich Hauser described the
migration of desperate Germans along the Hamburg-Berlin highway. From his account, the
homeless of Germany “walked separately or in small groups with their eyes on the ground. And
they had the queer, stumbling gait of barefoot people...as they plodded forward in dumb
despair.”199 From a closer perspective the economic difficulties of the Weimar era presented
Germans with obstacles they were wholly unprepared for. Betty Scholem, a woman of Weimar
Germany, categorized the conditions she was enduring as “catastrophic.”200 While relaying the
events of the day to her daughter via multiple letters, Betty described the staggering difficulties
of existing in a Germany where bread cost between 900 million and 5.5 billion Reichsmarks.201
The exchange rates that Betty described would resemble the humorous musings of an economic
satirist gone mad if only they were not true. Numerous pictures exist of people carrying
wheelbarrows full of cash to buy a single loaf of bread and others depict children using bundled
Reichsmarks valued in the billions as building blocks. Thus, the Weimar Republic lost a great
deal of its original shine in the light of such tragic economic circumstances. The economic crisis
ensured that the Weimar Republic would lose many of its initial supporters.
Perhaps the most significant condemnation leveled against the Weimar Republic involved
the fact that this new form of government considerably altered politics within Germany. The new
parliamentary system received condemnation amongst Germans used to the direct rule and
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immediate results of Imperial Germany. German intellectual Carl Schmitt condemned
parliamentary democracy because in the presence of mass democracy the individual had no place
for true freedom but was instead oppressed by the majority.202 As far as Schmitt was concerned
even if Fascism and Communism disappeared from German political discourse, “the crisis of
contemporary parliamentarism would not be overcome” as there existed a fundamental and
“inescapable contradiction of liberal individualism and democratic homogeneity.”203
Conservative Ernst Niekisch condemned the Weimar Republic for bowing to the conventions of
the Treaty of Versailles blaming social democracy for concealing “from the worker the social
effects of the policy of acceding to the treaty demands.”204 Communist Ernst Thalmann would
accuse the SPD and its government of duplicating the supposed Nazi efforts to defend “the
capitalist system against the revolutionary proletariat.”205 Thus, the Weimar Republic created
many enemies of differing political backgrounds who, like the Nazis, despised the institution for
many different reasons, but mostly because the institution existed in the first place.
Returning to the overall argument of this chapter, it becomes evident that as Fritzche
among others asserted a mass protest vote was rising throughout the Republic before the Nazis
became a factor. Many opposed the changes seen within Germany’s cultural priorities and the
steady Americanization of Germany. Others opposed the rising prominence of women and
women protested the despicable conditions they faced in their expanding role. The older
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generation grew to despise the pervasive perceived perversion of the young generation fostered
by the liberalism of the Weimar Republic. Others condemned the Republic as it failed in a
government’s sacred task to maintain economic stability for its citizenry. Finally, the
parliamentary system that operated as the foundation of the Weimar Republic found enemies
amongst Germans of various political affiliations. Arguments that the Weimar Republic’s
environment negatively impacted the German citizenry and opened the doors for the Nazi rise to
power certainly embody a valid historical interpretation. However, all the Weimar Republic
accomplished was opening the door for the Nazis, but this metaphorical door was theoretically
open to any organization. Historians of the disaffection thesis are effusive in demonstrating that
opposition to the Weimar Republic was extensive and was embodied within many individuals.
Therefore, if, as argued, the Weimar Republic simply provided the opportunity the question
becomes why were the Nazis the political organization that would use the woes of Weimar
Germany to start the Third Reich?

The Failures of the DVP and DNVP

Returning to a previous assertion, the political rivals of the Nazi Party, the KPD and SPD,
had their own problems that would prohibit them from maintaining political dominance of
Germany. The SPD’s political power ran central to the maintenance of the Weimar Republic
making efforts to distance themselves from that institution’s failures detrimental to their political
authority. The KPD, believing in the revolutionary paradigm of Communism, did not ardently
participate in mass-electoral politics, sticking to their worker support base, as any such efforts to
promote stability would hinder the progress of the ultimate Communist goal, the fall of capitalist
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Germany. One of the hardest obstacles for these organizations to overcome was their disregard
for nationalist concepts. Historian William Gutsman has made the argument that the SPD was
caught between a rock and a hard place and could not come to any compromise with the
increasingly radical nationalists without alienating its own worker base.206 Also, historian
Richard Bodeck made an argument to the effect that the KPD had no interest in concepts of
German nationalism, nor cooperation with the SPD. Rather, the KPD focused on “defeating
Hitler, building a new world, protecting the Soviet Union, and planting the Soviet flag.”207 Thus,
Germany's left-wing was unwilling to effect the change demanded by the disillusioned voting
public. However, as Fritzche has argued, this radicalization and rise of nationalist politics
predated the Nazi's rise to prominence in the 1930s. Subsequently, as opposed to focusing on
why the SPD and KPD could not captivate the growing disaffection, it will be valuable to
analyze the two prominent nationalist political organizations that predated the Nazi rise. Before
Nazi ideology and the actions that enabled their eventual rise can be tied together, it is important
to discuss why alternate nationalist ideologies failed to seize opportunity and rise to prominence
within political discourse.
The German People's Party is a seldom discussed entity amongst non-academic historians,
but its existence within the narrative of the Nazi rise adds a tragic tint of “what could have been.”
Known as the DVP, this party advocated a nationalist ideology that while claiming “Marxism
ha[d] been breeding a sickly international and pacifist romanticism in the place of a resolute will
devoted to the fatherland” still advocated the maintaining of various parts of the Weimar
constitution. The DVP further intended to add a separate chamber to the Reichstag modeled on
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the English House of Lords in which members would be appointed by “churches and institution
of higher learning.”208 However, despite this sharp departure, a great deal of the DVP's ideology
matched aspects of Nazi ideology. The DVP, although advocating a new system, still held
reverence for the German past claiming their faith and “view of life [was] rooted in the spiritual
soil created in the times of Bismark and Bennigsen and before them the great minds of German
idealism.”209 They also shared a disdain for the resolution of the First World War claiming the
German people's “lebensraum [was] brutally cut down” and their freedom to live “cast into
chains through senseless treaties.”210 The DVP demonstrated a penchant for struggle rhetoric
calling for the citizenry to “wrestle its way back up through the strength of its love for the
fatherland and national solidarity.”211 Finally, the DVP stressed the primacy of the
Volksgemeinschaft as the “supreme law of the German people.”212 Therefore, the DVP stood as a
party fully capable of matching the rising tide of nationalist dissatisfaction.
The question then becomes, why did the DVP fail to see its vision of Germany's future
implemented? The strictly electoral argument places the DVP at a disadvantage to the rising tide
of new voters as the DVP demanded “that the franchise be restricted once again to those 25 years
of age or older.”213 The impact of new voters on the Weimar elections when the voting age was
lowered to eighteen is a highly contested aspect of electoral historical interpretations of the Nazi
rise as no one researcher has been able to find an effective and conclusive means of measuring
the exact numbers of these new voters or how they voted. Abraham Miller and James Robbins
take early electoral historians to task on their arguments for the disaffection thesis claiming the
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numbers do not add up.214 The disaffection thesis contends that a mass group of voters became
alienated by the failures of the SPD and DVP to maintain a stable Republic and eventually
migrated to the Nazi Party. Through their research Miller and Robbins argue that, as opposed to
disaffection, the previous non-voters were the major contributors to the Nazi rise, a claim this
work certainly agrees with in part and will explore later.215 For the time being, the massively
important swing of new voters certainly had a negative impact on the uninterested DVP.
More pragmatically, the major pitfall for the DVP was the death of its fundamentally
important leader Gustav Stresemann in 1929. Historian Stephen Fritz has a great deal to discuss
on the Stresemann front claiming that the leader was the backbone of the DVP's popular appeal.
Per Fritz, Stresemann sought to turn the DVP into a centrist party with mass appeal by
advocating his belief that the party “should form a positive link to the past, act as a harmonizer
between left and right in the present, and promote the future growth of the national
community.”216 Stresemann was instrumental in the formation and maintenance of the Grand
Coalition of the SPD and DVP that allowed the DVP to wield more power than its numbers
provided. This coalition existed until a few months after Stresemann's death when the DVP
leaned towards the industrialist and conservative members of the party who broke with the Grand
Coalition. However, Fritz is careful not to place too much importance on the death of Stresemann
claiming that he “for all his personal prestige and talents could take cultural-liberalism [and
Volksgemeinschaft focus] only so far.”217 The DVP suffered from “its rather elitist nature, loose
organization, and ideological split between those who favored cooperation with all elements in
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society and the industrial-big business wing of the party.”218 These flaws would certainly have
limited mass-support for the DVP, but Stresemann's death did signal the end of any chance for a
liberal nationalist ideology succeeding in Germany.
Beyond Miller’s and Fritz's argument for the failure of the DVP to implement its vision of
Germany's future, the disparity of their ideology in comparison with Nazi ideology offers a few
solutions for the DVP's failure to gain mass-support. The DVP's wish to see the continuation of
the Reichstag was particularly damning for the prospects of nationalist support. Also, the idea of
a second chamber not electable by the people demonstrated the DVP's elitist nature and further
hindered its prospects. For all the potential of their agenda, ignoring the masses and seeking to
limit their impact on the government made the DVP stick out like a sore thumb against the
backdrop of the Nazis who advocated “equality of rights for the German people” and asserted
that “administration and law belongs only to the citizen.”219 Therefore, in addition to the loss of
the youth vote and the fractures that resulted after Stresemann's death, the DVP could never have
risen to prominence as it would never be able to represent a true Volkspartei.
Perhaps the most prominent right wing party beyond the Nazis was the German National
People's Party, otherwise known as the DNVP. If an opening presented itself for the nationalist
wing of Germany to return to prominence, the party most likely to accomplish this task initially
seemed to be the DNVP. Following the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch the Nazi Movement was
for all intents and purposes outlawed which left the cause of German nationalism with the
already well-established DNVP. In the May 1924 elections the DNVP received 20.1 percent of
the vote, shy one percent of the SPD and over thirteen percent ahead of the National Socialist
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Freedom Party, the organization formed to stand in for the illegal Nazi Party.220 In December of
the same year elections would again be held in which the DNVP would increase by eight seats
while the National Socialist Freedom Party lost eighteen.221 The DNVP had more support than
the Nazis following the failed Putsch, the Nazi Movement's highest early fame, and would
continue to endure in the 1928 elections despite a loss of thirty seats.222 If any party besides the
Nazis could have taken advantage of the disaffection within the Republic, it would have been the
German National People's Party.
As nationalists, the DNVP’s views were not all that different from the Nazi Party’s
beliefs. In their program the DNVP advocated “the liberation of the German people from foreign
domination.”223 They also supported Austrian self-determination, which would likely have led to
unification with Germany.224 Additionally the Burgfrieden existed as a foundation to their own
ideology as their program argued “a solidly unified German nation provides the most important
foundation for German greatness.”225 They also shared with the Nazis a rejection of certain
aspects of modernity, in particular art which the DNVP argued existed not in modernism, but
“grows in the soil of a vital nationalism” thus condemning modernist art that rose from
individual expression.226 Thus, some of the pillars that the Nazis held as critical to their vision of
a future Germany were featured prominently in the DNVP ideology, but because the DNVP
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ultimately failed to dominate Germany the question becomes why did they fail?
From an electoral perspective, Jürgen Falter and Detlef Mühlberger contend that the
DNVP alienated the rural support they had relied on through the twenties which first led to the
formation of splinter rural parties.227 By the 1932 elections, the Nazis had converted these
splinter parties to their cause eliminating pivotal DNVP support. Thomas Childers showed that
DNVP loss to the Nazis went beyond the rural populations claiming “the primary victim of Nazi
success within the urban old middle class in handicrafts after 1920 appears to have been the
DNVP.”228 Additionally, Childers demonstrated that the DNVP also suffered white collar
defections to the DVP.229 These splits indicate that the DNVP itself was fracturing between the
nationalist liberalism of the DVP and the radical right wing nationalism eventually embodied
within the Nazi Party before the Nazis became a true factor.
The DNVP could not withstand the pressures of representing the right wing, failing to
ensure even the unity of its own electorate. Despite similarities in ideology and electoral
opportunity, the DNVP would eventually suffer in part because of its differences from the Nazi
Party. The DNVP called for the implementation of a constitutional monarchy that would
cooperate with a parliament elected by popular representation, a sharp departure from the Nazis
advocating an abolition of any popular representation which they claimed was inherently corrupt
and inefficient.230 Additionally, the DNVP called for equal political representation, participation
for women, and religious toleration, aspects the Nazis would ardently oppose particularly as their
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ideology resided in masculinity and anti-Semitism.231 A reading of both the platform the Nazi
Party was founded upon and the DNVP platform will demonstrate that the Nazis were much
more aggressive in their demands than the DNVP. The DNVP advocated a “revision” of the
Treaty of Versailles, whereas the Nazis wanted the despised treaty canceled in its entirety.232
Thus, the Nazis and the DNVP did have sharp differences that provide an opening for justifying
why the DNVP did not seize Germany, but these differences do not fully explain the decline of
the DNVP that allowed the Nazis the room to rise to prominence.
The DNVP was the second most powerful party in the Reichstag through most of the
1920s and therefore was only slightly less culpable in the course of the calamitous Weimar
Republic than the SPD. The DNVP could claim the SPD was responsible for many failures, but
nonetheless the stench of failure and the taint of the Republic attached itself to every member
and action of the DNVP. Thus, as the Republic declined further, proving less and less able to
support the people, the DNVP became less and less appealing to the voting public. Meanwhile
the Nazi Party stood in contradistinction to all political parties of the Weimar Republic with its
rhetoric of activism and struggle. The Nazi Party significantly differed from the rest of the
political spectrum because it was free of the failures of the Republic. The Nazis had never had
any prominent role in the Reichstag but more importantly had taken early action against the
Weimar Republic. As times got worse, the Nazis’ Putsch attempt seemed more justified, making
the Nazis more attractive as a political party.
Returning to the overall argument of this chapter, it has been argued that the difficulties
of the Weimar Republic opened the door for a nationalist party to rise to prominence. The
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German People's Party could not maintain unity amongst its ranks nor field a message that had
mass appeal to the growing electorate. The German National People's Party also failed to
maintain unity amongst its own electorate nor could the organization unify right wing
nationalism.233 Both the DVP and DNVP expressed little activist struggle going as far as
supporting various tenets of Social Democracy even as the situation across the republic worsened.
Only a party capable of touting an ideology appealing to the masses would succeed in unifying
the mass of disaffected voters across Germany. Unfortunately for Germany, that party would rise
from the ashes of the Beer Hall Putsch and eventually take the German electorate by storm.

Ideology and the Path of Legality

The Weimar Republic provided an opportunity for a party unassociated with the
Republic’s failures to seize the moment and rise to prominence. Previously powerful nationalist
ideologies of the DVP and DNVP failed to elicit mass-support from the citizenry leaving room
for a new ideology to establish itself. However, in 1924, the Nazis were hardly the organization
capable of winning over anywhere near the thirty-seven percent of the German electorate they
would in 1932.234 The Nazi movement had just attempted the fateful Beer Hall Putsch that led to
the death of many members, wounded others, landed its leader in jail, and most importantly
forced the Republic to outlaw the movement.235 The Nazis seemed to be all but discounted from
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the political sphere after losing their revolutionary gamble. The remarkable turnaround
experienced after 1925 therefore raises many questions, some beyond the scope of this work. In
order to assert that the Nazis were not only actively responsible for their own successes, but that
ideology had a tremendous impact on those successes, the activities of Hitler and the Nazi
remnant following Hitler's release is critical as shortly thereafter the Nazis changed themselves
from a rabidly anti-Republican movement into the beginnings of a sophisticated political party.
Most know that Hitler put together his political testament Mein Kampf while he was
imprisoned in Landsberg. Mein Kampf is fascinating for ideological study after 1933 in that it
helps clarify many of the actions the Nazis would eventually take once they seized power,
including the foundations to Hitler’s eventual decisions to start World War II. However, Mein
Kampf should not be regarded as a warning that everyone missed foretelling impending atrocities.
People knew about Mein Kampf, but, to put it bluntly, nobody was going to lend much credence
to a poorly written book penned by the jailed revolutionary of an outlawed party. Nonetheless,
Hitler’s stay in prison afforded him the time for a great deal of reflection and summarily he came
to a conclusion that would prove fateful for the future of Germany.
During the process of putting together Mein Kampf Hitler received a friend and loyal
supporter Kurt Ludecke for a visit. According to Ludecke, Hitler was beside himself with
optimism about his release claiming he would be out in months and as opposed to years and
subsequently the party would be re-organized shortly thereafter.236 Of particular importance to
this work however, is a statement Hitler made in prison describing a critical change in Nazi
direction. Per Hitler, “Instead of working to achieve power by armed conspiracy, we shall have to
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hold our noses and enter the Reichstag.”237 Hitler went on to argue that “if outvoting them takes
longer than outshooting them, at least the results will be guaranteed by their own
Constitution!”238 Hitler was laying out his famous path of legality in which the Nazis would
become a legitimate political party, attempt to seize control of the government via the confines of
the electoral system, and then change the government into something much more fitting Nazi
ideology. As proof of this plan's durability, the Führer would later give testimony at a 1930 trial
of three army lieutenants who supposedly worked with the Nazi Party. Per Hitler, “The National
Socialist movement will try to achieve its aim with constitutional means in the state...we shall try
to gain decisive majorities in the legislative bodies so that the moment we succeed we can give
the state the form that correspond to our ideas.”239 Thus, in 1925 Hitler laid out a political plan
that would endure as a core Nazi strategy through 1930 and into the Third Reich.
The significance of the path of legality cannot be stressed enough because it represents
not only a change in political strategy but is often viewed as a fundamental change in Nazi
ideological identity. Since their beginnings, the Nazis had preached overthrowing the Weimar
Republic but more importantly had refused to participate in the mechanics of the Weimar
Republic. By presenting themselves as a movement above the petty politics of the time, the
Nazis could garner vague pockets of support and maintain somewhat popular appeal. The 6.8
percent support in the May 1924 election demonstrated that the idea of a Nazi Movement had a
certain appeal but ultimately would fail to attain any meaningful political presence as seen in
their four percent drop just six months later.240
When faced with decline in the attractiveness and viability of their political strategy, the
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Nazis fundamentally altered the frameworks of their organization and prepared themselves to
take advantage of the opportunity presented by the Weimar Republic. The path of legality
certainly stands as a radical change considering violent removal of the Republic was discarded.
Such a dramatic change simultaneously casts doubt on the sincerity of the activism and struggle
foundations of Nazi ideology. Despite the changes, masculine activism was continued and in
many ways intensified as political violence still allowed the Nazis to maintain their identity as
the heirs to the Volunteers of the 1914. Such a scale back of the violent means to their goals may
seem like a cop out, but the basic function of Nazi violence did not change. The SA of the Nazi
Movement acted often independently of the organization and the SA would continue to do so
while on the path of legality. Regardless of what part of the 1920s one picks, the SA can be
witnessed spreading Nazi ideology to the public with fists directed towards the enemies of
Germany. Thus, the path of legality did not put a significant dent into the activism and struggle
aspect of Nazi ideology.
With the path of legality as the new directive, Hitler upon his release attempted to unify
the former members of the Nazi movement under his flag. This task was easier said than done as
various members split themselves into numerous organizations. The unifying rhetoric of the
national community Hitler used to unify the Nazis would be exemplary of the future political
campaigning to be undertaken by the party and as such requires a momentary analysis. Hitler
claimed it his task as leader of the Party “to direct the various temperaments, talents and qualities
of character in the movement into those channels...[so that] they benefit everybody.”241 Hitler
thus used the same Burgfrieden beliefs in unity, in spite of differences, to bring the various
factions back under his leadership. Additionally, Hitler chose not to bury the failure of the Beer
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Hall Putsch but rather embraced it as an event fundamental to the future of Germany and an
event that should unify the divided factions of the Nazi movement into a miniature National
Community, the Nazi Party. Per Hitler, “we do not only want to remember again those who in
November 1923 became blood witnesses of our political beliefs and aims; we also want to thank
all those who in this past year did not despair of the movement and what it stands for but labored
in its service regardless of whatever camp they felt drawn to.”242 In the same fashion that the
Nazi Movement called back to World War I as a glorious moment of unity, power, and sacrifice
Hitler would ensure the Beer Hall Putsch was put on an equivalent platform, a tool that would
not only be helpful in the impending campaigns but maintain an ideological continuity between
the Movement and the Party.
Perhaps most important to unifying fractured fragments of the movement into the Nazi
Party, and most exemplary of the Nazis eventual campaign strategy was Hitler’s staunch
assertion that although the Nazis would enter the ailing Republic, their ultimate goal of toppling
said institution would not be abandoned. According to Hitler once the party was again unified, “it
must be turned against that power to which above all we owe the collapse of our fatherland and
the destruction of our people,” the Weimar Republic.243 Further, “this does not mean an alteration
in or a ‘postponement’ of the old and main aim of our struggle, but simply its reassertion.”244 The
Nazis would therefore enter the Reichstag elections but would not abandon their initial goals the
success of which would be measured, as they had been in the days of the Movement, by “the
extent to which Marxism is destroyed and by the degree of enlightenment about its originator,
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the Jews.”245
Thus, after February 1925 the Nazis were entering new territory. They would abandon
their previous status above the petty politics and risk tainting their ideology with democratic
participation. However, despite a fundamental change in their method of attack, the Nazis would
not change their ideology. They would still preach destruction of the Republic and struggle
against the alleged Jewish Marxist influences that had brought about the devastating Treaty of
Versailles. The only thing that changed was the arena in which the Nazis chose to make their
fight for their vision of Germany's future. If anything, as opposed to representing a break from
their ideology, the new path offered the Nazis an opportunity to reconcile their actions with a
fundamental aspect of their ideology, the Volksgemeinschaft. By seeking a more diffuse popular
support base, the Nazis would strengthen the validity of an all-encompassing German national
community. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the Nazi change to the path of legality, although
opportunistic in nature, still existed as an action rooted in and motivated by Nazi ideology.

The NSDAP, the KPD, and Working Class Voters

As asserted, the Nazis would enter politics with a relatively unchanged political ideology.
This ideology, as the name National Socialist German Workers’ Party would indicate, centered
largely on the workers of Germany. Therefore, all initial efforts of the Nazi Party to enter the
electoral arena focused on gaining this voter population, which provided the Nazis with various
advantages but also an equal amount of obstacles. The worker populations of Germany were
rather disappointed by the Weimar Republic's economic instability and massive unemployment
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rates. With high unemployment workers and their unions had relatively little leverage in
negotiations and could be taken advantage of with little protest. Thus, any organization that
could provide a way for workers to escape this situation would receive considerable support
when it came time to vote for Reichstag seats. The Nazi rhetoric of unification in a struggle to
topple the Weimar Republic appealed to certain pockets of workers, but, pardoning the labor pun,
the working electorate was not a closed shop. The Communist KPD preached a message of
downfall for the capitalist Weimar that was allegedly oppressing the workers. Therefore, the
successes and failures of this first political battle, the Nazi Party versus the KPD over worker
populations, in particular the ways the Nazis tried to steal workers from the Communist fold,
must be analyzed as a valuable step towards the Nazis eventual electoral and ideological
successes.
The Nazi Movement always expressed considerable anti-Marxist rhetoric, claiming that
Marxism existed at the center of the Jewish International Conspiracy.246 Of considerable success
to the Nazis was an older political tool that blended anti-Semitism with the assertion that the
KPD’s message of overthrow of the capitalist system would duplicate on German soil the terrors
occurring in Communist Russia on German soil. In 1919, prominent Nazi Alfred Rosenberg, who
Hitler had tried to leave in power during his imprisonment, claimed “Lenin is the only non-Jew
among the people’s commissars; he is, so to speak, the Russian storefront of a Jewish
business.”247 Thus, by Nazi insinuations, the German KPD would be the storefront of a
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Communist upheaval that would bring chaos into Germany. Vague anti-Marxist rhetoric stirred
the anger of a crowd, but in order to turn such anti-Marxism into votes, Nazi efforts would have
to take stronger, more tangible forms.
Many of Hitler’s speeches featured fear tactics meant to dissuade potential KPD voters.
In 1922, Hitler asserted “so now Germany is reaching that stage which Russia has.”248 Even
earlier, Hitler asserted that “while now in Soviet Russia millions are ruined and dying....the 400
Soviet commissars of Jewish nationality do not suffer.”249 Hitler went on to criticize those who
believed that the Communist revolution would eventually end after the realization of an
enlightened world. Hitler claimed that the Communists “do not wish the end of the revolution,
for they do not need it. For them the Revolution is milk and honey.”250 The KPD campaigns
seemed to back this point as their own election strategy preached a downfall that would
necessitate violent insurrection. One 1919 KPD poster depicted a stalwart Communist fighting a
three headed hydra whose heads represented New Militarism, Capitalism, and Junkers, the
perceived pillars of Imperial and the burgeoning Weimar Germany.251 A 1924 poster depicted
another stalwart Communist holding a torch above his head with the message “The flame of
revolution must not be extinguished.”252 The call for revolutionary tumult remained in 1932
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when one poster, featuring a gigantic, threatening worker towering over a round table featuring
capitalists, soldiers, and Hitler, exclaimed “Conclude with this system” threatening the end of the
Weimar Republic.253The Nazis would make every effort to assert that the KPD was a crazed
organization bent on seeing the suffering and destruction of everything the German people held
dear. Thus, the Nazis built a foundation of fear to use against the KPD as they attempted to gain
votes from workers.
Instigating fear alone does not easily convert itself into electoral support. Rather, if a
political organization is going to rely on scare tactics to elicit votes that same organization must
demonstrate beyond reasonable doubts that they will provide the security necessary to counter
the fears they have made known. Thus, the burden fell to the Nazis to demonstrate that they
would save Germany from the Communist collapse. Hitler had gone on record in his trial for the
Beer Hall Putsch as being an enemy of Communism claiming forcefully that he was determined
to become “the destroyer of Marxism.”254 However, words are one thing, actions an entirely
different matter. The Nazis, who had already demonstrated through the Putsch that they would
resort to violent overthrow if necessary, chose to carry on this tradition and incorporate political
violence into their electoral strategy.255 The Nazis would continue their politically violent tactics
from their pre-Putsch days and demonstrate through action that they were truly capable of
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providing protection against the Communist threat.
Political violence took many forms that have been discussed in numerous historical
works and as such the reader will be spared the numerous graphic tales of the violence meted
towards numerous Communists.256 For the purposes of this work, it is more important to study
how this violence was portrayed and conveyed to the voting public. In February 1927,
Communists attempted to disrupt a speech by Joseph Goebbels and violence broke out.
Unfortunately for the KPD, “the Communists were gradually pushed under the gallery which
[Nazis] had taken care to occupy.”257 The whole event was portrayed the next day as a Nazi trap
set to defeat “Marxist Terrorism.”258 Thus, the Nazis spun a spontaneous brawl into a
premeditated strike not against political rivals, but terrorists, further equating Communism with
insurrection. Additionally, even those against the Nazi Party acknowledged the compelling
activism behind the political violence the Nazis used. Emil Julius Gumbel, a seldom referenced
anti-Nazi from the Weimar era wrote two substantial works on a specific aspect of Nazi political
violence, assassination. Gumbel argued that the left’s penchant for and foundations in workers’
unions enforced the belief that “mass action is the sole effective means of struggle,” but the right
“adheres to the heroic conception of history, according to which the hero ‘makes’ history.”259 As
such, even despicable assassinations helped in their own way to convince the voters that the Nazi
Party was committed to protecting the German people from suffering the atrocities occurring in
Soviet Russia.260
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Although fear, one of the most ancient political tools, and activism through violence
certainly had their uses in Weimar Germany, the Nazis used anti-Marxist rhetoric outside of fear
and violence that they hoped would help them gain necessary electoral support from the KPD
electoral base. A particularly intriguing argument that left wing Nazis posed to KPD supporters
was that the KPD was an extension of the overall Communist International and by extension had
very little interest in German causes. In 1925, Joseph Goebbels exemplified this tactic in a letter
directed to Bolsheviks following a debate the previous day. In the letter, Goebbels told
Communist supporters that they and the Nazis were not all that different. Their main difference,
Goebbels maintained, was that Nazism embodied a truer form of German Socialism than what
Communism offered.261 Goebbels's most powerful statement to this effect, that “Lenin sacrificed
Marx and instead gave Russia freedom. You want to sacrifice German freedom for Marx,”
effectively struck at the heart of Nazism versus Communism.262 Thus, Goebbels contended that
the KPD supporters wanted to eliminate the Volksgemeinschaft and the personal freedom of its
utopian unity in favor of accord with the terrifying Soviet Union. Therefore, the German people
would be lost in the shuffle of a greater Communist ideology, but if workers wanted to be loyal
to German causes they should join the Volksgemeinschaft and unify under the Nazi Party that
had their interests at heart.
Nazi effort to win the working class vote is a highly contested topic within the
historiography. Present work in the field seeks to undo two egregious errors in work postulated
over the years by Marxist historians. The first error contends that leftist leaning Nazis, such as

1918-1922. That disparity alone would demonstrate the degree to which the Nazis would go to see their vision
of Germany protected. Additionally, Gumbel correctly asserts that Nazi violence was generally accepted as
many judges handed down lighter sentences to street brawlers of the right and heavier sentences for those of the
left. Ibid, 101-104.
261
Joseph Goebbels, “National Socialism or Bolshevism, October 25, 1925,” in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed.
Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 127-128.
262
Ibid, 128.

95

Gregor and Otto Strasser, were kicked out of the party when Hitler broke with them in 1926.
Otto definitely broke with Hitler early, but Gregor remained in prominence until the end of 1932.
However, a great deal of literature exists to prove that the Strassers and other left-leaning Nazis
still featured in Nazi campaign efforts and publications up to the seizure of power. Richard
Hamilton agrees that leftist Nazis still existed in some capacities but cautions that what they
brought to the table was negligible. Per Hamilton, few “convinced Marxists” were convinced by
this rhetoric and those workers who did join the Nazi Party “were not likely to have done so
because of leftist themes.”263 However, in making such a claim Hamilton seems to ignore Joseph
Goebbels, one of the most noteworthy left-leaning Nazi Party members, and his importance to
Nazi electoral efforts. The standard interpretation of Goebbels and his leftist origins claims that
his 1926 promotion from Gregor Strasser's private secretary to Gauleiter of Berlin represented
his break from the leftist camp.264 However, arguing that Goebbels's completely broke with the
left is difficult to assert when arguments like the previously mentioned “National Socialism or
Bolshevism” demonstrate his desire to reconcile the Nazi Party with the workers.265 Thus,
Marxist historians are wrong in their claims that leftist Nazis had no say or role in the Party as
not only did Gregor Strasser and other left-leaning Nazis maintain a role in the Party throughout
the electoral period, but Joseph Goebbels, himself a leftist, attained one of the Third Reich's
highest positions.
The second error committed by Marxist historians fostered the Mittelstand thesis by
postulating that workers never tainted themselves by supporting the Nazis. Historian Peter
Stachura is particularly effusive in his criticism of this point contending that “the image of a
powerful, self-conscious and ideologically committed German working class valiantly resisting
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the Third Reich...has no basis in reality. It is an unadulterated myth.”266 Historians have
demonstrated that even though workers did not universally support the Nazis there were pockets
of support amongst that population. Jürgen Falter contends that while unemployed workers
supported the KPD, areas with small employment numbers typically supported the Nazi Party.267
This claim is particularly telling about the reception of Nazi arguments of the Volksgemeinschaft
versus the Soviet Union. The unemployed resented Nazi arguments for protection of property,
but those who held property feared losing their property to the collectivist terror in place in
Russia. Gary King and his associates would certainly agree with this contention as they argue
that those beyond the workers, Nazi ideology had an inherent appeal to those with means who
were afraid to lose their hard fought property.268 Falter also critically argues that working class
households by 1932 made up nearly forty percent of the Nazi electorate, a number that was tiny
compared to the total population of workers, but significant to the Nazis.269 Richard Hamilton
also acknowledges Nazi support from a conservative worker base he compares to English Tory
workers citing their disillusion with the leftist worker parties, the SPD and KPD.270 Beyond the
disaffected, Mühlberger argues that “the Nazis were successful in attracting a section of the large
number of workers not politically engaged elsewhere.”271 Thus, from all appearances Nazi
support from the working class was a diffuse but not universal grouping of disaffected workers.
During February 1927 a political debate between the KPD and Nazi Party ended in
violence which a later Nazi report indicated “visibly [demonstrated] that National Socialism is
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determined to reach the workers.”272 From the reformation of the party in February 1925 to two
years later the Nazis fought an electoral battle with the single goal of winning the working-class
electorate. However, the gains experienced by 1932 were far from a reality in 1928. In the May
1928 election, the Nazis lost two seats while the KPD gained nine.273 The results were fairly
discouraging as many Nazis had hoped to rob the KPD of their electorate and take the world by
surprise, but those in control of the reins had tempered their expectations long before election
day. Sensing that the Nazis would experience an electoral embarrassment the Party leaders, led
by Adolf Hitler, would make another change to their plan of attack that this time would lead to
significant electoral gains.

Nazi Recognition of German Disaffection

In December 1927 the Nazis would make perhaps their most important political decision
without which this work would likely never have been written. In a conference of party leaders
Hitler asserted that the Nazis “shall not yet succeed in winning much ground from the Marxists
in the coming elections.”274 Accepting that the Nazis had reached as much ground amongst
workers as they were going to at the moment, the conference agreed that the Nazis would need
support from both small businessmen and white collar workers.275 Thus, the Nazi Party decided
to diversify its efforts and expand the Nazi electoral base.276 The Nazis yet again recognized a
fundamental flaw in their strategy and adapted in a pivotal and, as to be seen, effective manner.
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The decision to expand their electoral base, abandoning their position as a solely worker political
organization put the Nazis on the path to power.
From 1928 until Hitler's appointment to the Chancellery the Nazis would conduct an all
or nothing campaign in which they made numerous promises to various social groups in order to
gain electoral support. Many of these promises were absolutely hollow if not outright false.
Empty promises are typical of every political campaign in history and it is impossible to tie
ideology to every promise. However, ideology ran central to the electoral campaign in a very
subtle but sophisticated and compelling fashion. Already demonstrated earlier in this chapter, a
strong disaffection vote existed in Germany that the Nazis recognized as valuable to their cause.
However, based on previous elections the Nazi message was of a limited appeal. Every political
party made promises to fix the ills of Germany and disillusion with such parties was becoming
evident. Thus, utopian, opportunistic promises would not have carried a cynical electorate.
Professor William Brustein has made the argument that Nazi votes were not merely negative
protest votes, but positive votes made after weighing the pros of the Nazi Party against the cons
of previous voter affiliations.277 In the scope of this discussion, this work agrees with Brustein's
argument in that it asserts that the mass-protest vote did not by default fall to the Nazi Party, but
the ways in which the Nazis actively demonstrated themselves as an outlet for protest propelled
them to power. This work departs from Brustein in that he claimed economic factors led to voter
endorsement. Nazi stances on the economy were often contradictory depending on where and
who in the Party was providing information. This work contends that Nazi ideology, as opposed
to economic stances, would prove compelling and establish a depth to Nazi support that no other
party was able to maintain. The best way to demonstrate Nazi ideology's compelling influence on
the Nazis' electoral actions and the voting public is to take a look at specific Nazi efforts to win
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over specific electoral groups.
Small-business owners for a long time belonged to the SPD, but the Nazis took extensive
efforts to secure their loyalties. In April 1932, the Nazis published a pamphlet directed at middle
class small business owners criticizing the department store Woolworth’s as a foreign entity sent
to destroy the small business owner.278 Department stores were becoming more prevalent
through the Weimar Republic and, although they helped create jobs and the semblance of
marketplace stability, these one stop shops were putting many small business owners out of
business. The Nazis recognized this problem and, in line with their general disdain for individual
materialism fostered by the stores, accused the department stores of being tools of the Marxist
International Conspiracy.279 Although blatantly false, the Nazi attack not only took action against
a direct concern of small business but also changed the issue into a nationalist one, thereby tying
the plight of the small business owner with the Nazi Party cause. Before 1930, only 26,563 of
Germany’s self-employed were members of the Nazi Party.280 However between 1930 and
January 1933 the Nazi Party had 124,579 self-employed members, a significant increase and
conversely a substantial loss for the SPD.281 By commiserating with this electoral population and
presenting themselves as an entity capable of stopping the decline of the small-business, the
Nazis received a satisfying membership bump from this previous SPD voter population.
White collar workers and big business were also electoral populations the Nazis wanted
to infiltrate in order to increase their support base. One such attempt featured Hitler address the
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Industry Club, a collection of white collar workers and business owners, in January 1932. In this
speech, Hitler lashed out against welfare and internationalism, issues which were of considerable
importance to big business.282 In particular Hitler argued that despite the considerable industrial
productivity and demand for industrial goods, “if bolshevism as a world idea tears the Asiatic
continent out of the human economic community, then the condition for the employment of these
industries” would be unable to sustain itself.283 Thus, Hitler conveyed to this audience, and many
like it, that if the SPD and KPD had their way, many white collar jobs would be lost and profits
would take sharp dives.284 Per Hitler, “there can be no economic life unless behind this economic
life there stands the determined political will of the nation absolutely ready to strike and to strike
hard.”285 As far as the Nazis were concerned, the Weimar Republic had already proven its
inability to strike, and the sooner people realized that, the sooner they could cast their vote for
the Nazi Party. Therefore, supporting the Nazi Party, who demonstrated their willingness to
combat leftist menaces in the streets, would topple the Republic and secure a stable economic
future for Germany. Before 1930 31,067 white-collar workers were members of the Nazi Party,
but between then and 1933 they numbered 147,855.286 Despite the contradicting needs of the
small-business owner and Big business, percentages of both populations found Nazi arguments
of struggle and change compatible to their general disdain for the other political parties.
Once the Nazis made inroads into these organizations, they began to look for other
avenues of support and one group presented itself, the rural populations. The Nazi Party craved
the rural electorate in particular because of its support of the similarly minded DNVP. One Nazi
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directive of 1932 laid out the procedure by which party members needed to elicit support from
rural populations. Party representatives needed to know the answers to any local questions that
might be asked, personally send out invitations to Nazi functions to each and every farmer, and
gain collections at said functions.287 The Nazis intended to duplicate this process all across rural
regions, culminating in a “big German Evening…the primary task [of which would be] making
the audience enthusiastic for our cause.”288 The Nazis also went on the attack against rival
political parties that held pockets of support in the rural lands. The Nazis released a leaflet
entitled German Farmer You Belong to Hitler! Why? in which the Nazis demonstrated the ways
by which the state capitalism of the SPD and the Marxism of the KPD would bring about the end
of the farmer’s success.289 Once again, the Nazis presented themselves as a unified front capable
of not only honoring the local interests of various rural areas, but strong enough to prevent leftist
sabotage of those interests. Nazi Party membership increased considerably within this group as
well. Before 1930, peasants numbered 17,181, but by January 1933 there were 89,800 peasants
in the Nazi Party.290 By extolling their message through the lens of various social groups'
problems and desires, the Nazis secured the large disaffection vote and thus called on a
significantly diverse electorate by the time the 1932 elections rolled around.
One of the aspects of Nazi ideology that has not been discussed in-depth in this work
centers on Nazi ideology's firm belief in a Jewish conspiracy undermining the frameworks of
German society. This complicated aspect takes full works to summarize and understand in depth.

287

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, “The Organization of Rural Propaganda, July, 1932,” in
Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, ed. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974),
105.
288
Ibid, 105.
289
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, “German Farmer You Belong to Hitler! Why?,” in The Weimar
Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994), 142.
290
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, “Partei-Statistik: Party Members as of 1 January 1935, Divided
According to Jobs and Date of Membership,” 114.

102

For the purposes of tying Nazi ideology to Nazi action though, the Nazi Party's views on solving
the “Jewish Problem” help explain in part why Nazi ideology as a whole was so captivating to
the disaffected citizens of Germany. In line with the solution to many problems, the Nazi solution
to the “Jewish Problem” during the 1920s and 1930s involved ensuring that the German people
admitted that they had a Jewish problem.291 Hitler argued that the major reason that races
suffered under the manipulations of the Jews was that people refused to acknowledge that the
Jews actively manipulated multiple facets of society.292 According to Hitler, “only a knowledge
of the Jews provides the key with which to comprehend the inner, and consequently real, aims of
Social Democracy.”293 Before proceeding it is important to stress that the anti-Semitism of Nazi
ideology did not drive people into mass-support of the party, but rather Nazi recognition of the
numerous problems of Social Democracy, although through a flawed lens, captivated Nazi voters,
who then tended to become more anti-Semitic.
The DVP and DNVP acknowledged certain problems with the Weimar Republic, but left
many of its institutions untouched if not stronger. The Nazis entered the political arena prepared
to demonstrate that almost every population in Germany suffered in some way under the
Republic. Although many of these accusations carried duplicitous promises and anti-Semitic
rhetoric, what appealed to the masses was the simple fact that the Nazis acknowledged the
totality of the Weimar Republic's failure. Furthermore, the Nazis backed this recognition with
aggressive pushes to see the institution replaced with something brand new. Thus, Nazi
ideology's desire for recognition and removal of Germany's problems informed the party's
electoral efforts in that those efforts universally worked to make the ills of the Weimar Republic
universally known.
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Closing Thoughts

In the quest to marry Nazi ideology to action, this chapter has explored the ways that
ideology impacted and directed two critical Nazi actions. The first such action, the switch to the
path of legality, has often been seen as a compromising of Nazi ideology for the sake of attaining
political power. However, numerous continuities existed between the Nazi Movement and the
Nazi Party, such as the image of the Nazis as heirs to the 1914 volunteers and the methods of
street violence, that dispel the idea of a split from ideology. If anything, the legality tactic
matched Nazi ideology more firmly by allowing the Nazis to expand the membership of the
Volksgemeinschaft thus unifying Germans in opposition to the Weimar Republic. Independent of
these continuities, the primary goal of the Nazi movement involved toppling the Weimar
Republic, a goal maintained in the legality tactic. The critical difference would be destroying the
institution from within as opposed to previously failed attempts at external action. Therefore,
Nazi ideology did not change with the implementation of legality but in actuality informed that
pivotal change.
The second action, gaining disparate support from the electorate, is much more difficult
to marry to ideology, but once argued fundamentally proves Nazi ideology's significant impact
on the Nazi rise. The Weimar Republic alienated numerous select populations of Germany from
the status quo of left-wing politics. This burgeoning protest vote lent its support to various
nationalist parties, most notably the DNVP and the DVP, and elected World War I hero Paul von
Hindenburg to the Presidency. Hindenburg, as a symbol of the past disrespected by Social
Democracy, managed to maintain popular support despite the ups and downs of the Republic
until his death. However, the nationalist parties lost support as time went passed. The DVP’s and
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DNVP's failures to eliminate the woes of Social Democracy on top of their cooperation with
those institutions led to a fracturing of support at the end of the 1920s which would be
compounded by the influx of equally disaffected youth voters. These circumstances led to the
formation of a mass-protest voting bloc that would look for outlets to express their frustration.
Despite all appearances this protest block did not flock entirely to the Nazi Party.
Childers points out that SPD defection to the Nazi Party was limited which King and associates
second claiming that “the July 1932 election witnessed a swing to the Far Left.”294 While a swing
of SPD supporters to the KPD existed, the results of such a defection was not on a massive scale,
but nonetheless demonstrate that the disaffection vote did not deterministically swing towards
the Nazi Party.295 However, those adherents who did choose the Nazi Party did so for various
reasons, but all boiled down to one core concept of Nazi ideology. The Nazis, like other parties,
offered solutions to the woes of the citizenry, but what stood the Nazis apart from other parties
was the completeness with which they assaulted the problems of the Weimar Republic. Although
promises were sometimes duplicitous, these promises demonstrated Nazi recognition of how
woefully inadequate the Republic addressed various pockets of the German population. For these
voters, hearing such an encompassing criticism meant a great deal.
Stephen Fritz sums up the above voter interpretation of Nazi ideology rather completely.
Per Fritz, “Nazism, then, was a curious mixture of fear, anxiety, and idealism- with a sense of
creating a new Germany, but in order to rectify past injustices or prevent something worse.”296
The voters looked to the Nazis who not only recognized their problems, but offered the simplest
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solution to their problems, one that no other politicians could convincingly call for, the
destruction of the Weimar Republic. The destruction of the Weimar Republic would not only fix
the wrongs of Social Democracy but prevent the KPD from turning Germany into a second
Soviet Union. The Nazi Movement had already demonstrated their willingness to act against the
Republic and the Party's continued street fighting against Communists further proved that the
Nazis could back their belief system with action. Simultaneously, the Nazis, as inheritors of the
volunteers of 1914 would in similar fashion to the presidency of Hindenburg offer a valuable
connection to the prized German past even as something brand new would be implemented. All
of these ideological aspects were captivating on top of Nazi advocacy of the reestablishment of
the Burgfrieden in the form of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. It is little wonder then why so many
disaffected voters would turn in support for the Nazi Party. Therefore, despite the duplicity and
opportunism present in the political actions of the Nazi Party during the Weimar Republic, these
actions were rooted in and forwarded by entrenched aspects of Nazi ideology that found an
enthralled audience in various pockets of disaffected German citizens.
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CHAPTER 4
VOLKSGEMEINSCHAFT: 1933 TO 1938

On March 21, 1933, German writer Erich Ebermayer recorded his thoughts on that day’s
Spring Military Ceremony in Potsdam. Ebermayer effusively relayed his excitement as the
ceremony featured President Hindenburg, the imperial world, and Hitler, herald of the “newly
ascendant world” coming together to celebrate a renewal of the German spirit.297 Although the
ceremony was directly meant to convey the power of the newly formed Reich government, a
strong symbolic element ran through the entire event. In the same fashion that spring would
bring Germany out of a cold winter and renew dynamic and beautiful elements of nature long
dormant, so too would the Nazis bring the German people out of the frigid social democratic
world that quelled the nationalism of Imperial Germany.
In his speech at the Potsdam Ceremony, Hitler echoed these sentiments of renewal.
According to Ebermayer, Hitler’s declarations stood out in their “striking moderation.”298 Hitler
did not allude to any racial or ideological enemies within or outside of Germany.299 Rather, Hitler
gave the people what they wanted discussing “preservation of the great tradition of our nation,
stability of the government instead of constant vacillation, taking into consideration all the
experiences in the life of the individual and the community.”300 The ceremony was emotional,
bringing many people to tears, as the German people came to the realization that they were being
ushered into a new era of German history that also respected Germany's past.301 Ebermayer was
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so taken aback by the ceremony that he retreated to the woods for some time alone with his
thoughts, but not everyone was as deeply affected. The writer described a young man, twentyone years old, who, unmoved by the ceremony, thought it was “all merely a rigged act” ending
his comments by warning Ebermayer rather forebodingly, “You’ll see what will happen.”302
Although dismayed by the comments, Ebermayer took a stance in support of the Third Reich that
many Germans at the onset of Nazi power shared.303 Germans stood on a precipice, their back to
the ailing Weimar Republic looking forward onto a vast valley of promise offered by the Third
Reich. Many German citizens felt the compulsion to step forward and fall into a realm they
believed would renew the German spirit long dormant, but to the great misery of many that step
would in all actuality lead somewhere far different than the valley of promise Hitler and the Nazi
Party offered.
Once the Nazis’ seized power and purged the Third Reich of their political rivals, the
Reich Government turned its attention to the German citizenry.304 During the elections of the
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1930s, the Nazis led a campaign in which they highlighted the numerous problems of the
Weimar Republic and advocated that these issues would be solved with the formation of the allencompassing national community, known to the Germans as the Volksgemeinschaft. The ideals
and emotions behind the Volksgemeinschaft certainly correlated with the sentiments of
unification and camaraderie that coursed through the Spring Potsdam Ceremony. However, the
two different reactions to the ceremony experienced by Ebermayer and his young friend
represent to two different views of the Volksgemeinschaft as it was experienced during the 1930s.
Ebermayer was swept up in the ideological aspects of the Volksgemeinschaft, in which Nazi
Germany would usher in a resurrection of the Burgfrieden from 1914, under which all Germans
became united regardless of party and class for the benefit of the German nation. The young man,
who believed the Nazi ceremony was simply a political stunt, views the Volksgemeinschaft from
the political-pragmatic viewpoint in which the Nazis simply manipulated the German citizenry
with ideas of a national community to achieve their own ends. Both of these interpretations
represent the complicated nature of the Volksgemeinschaft in Nazi Germany that many citizens of
the time struggled to fully understand, never receiving the full vision in any direct fashion from
the Nazi government.
In the same fashion that the citizenry of Germany struggled with the dual nature of the
Volksgemeinschaft, scholars face equal difficulty coming to a common conclusion on this aspect
of Nazi ideology from which almost every facet of Third Reich history branches. As the
Volksgemeinschaft along religious lines. The DNVP would similarly divide the Volksgemeinschaft along
political lines. Therefore, both the Centre and DNVP would have been neutralized in some fashion. Finally, the
Roehm faction threatened to undo all of Nazism's gains and, as any enemy of the Volksgemeinschaft would be
treated, felt the wrath of the Third Reich. All of these factions that were eliminated from Germany constituted
threats to the Nazis' vision of Germany's future and as such would have to have been removed regardless of
opportunity. Therefore, the purges the Nazis implemented against the Social Democrats, the Communists, the
Centre Party, rival nationalists, and the Roehm faction should not only be viewed as the opportunistic haphazard
actions of the sadistic Nazis who would commit the atrocities of the Holocaust, but in keeping with the
intricacies of Nazism should be also, if not primarily, viewed as the implementation of the long held goals for
the implementation of the ultimate Nazi ideological goal, the Volksgemeinschaft.
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Volksgemeinschaft itself was a fragmented concept spread throughout the entirety of the Reich,
scholarship on this subject is at least equally if not more fragmented in its efforts to ascertain the
true nature, ideological or political-pragmatic, of the national community. As many scholars of
the Volksgemeinschaft tend to have a particular, narrow focus on a specific aspect of the national
community, only an analysis and combination of scholarly work could possibly strive to resolve
the fragmentation present in this field. This chapter will explore the various arguments scholars
have made on the ideological foundations and subsequent applications of the Volksgemeinschaft
in an effort to determine the true nature of the Volksgemeinschaft.
The previous chapters have sought to marry ideology to Nazi actions, but the connection
between ideology and action is easier to establish before the Nazis took power. Without having to
worry about public opinion the Nazi Movement and Party were able to act in unison with their
ideology without significant hindrance. Once the Nazis formed the Reich government, ideology
and action became thoroughly mingled to the point where ideology appears to have taken a back
seat to action. After 1933, ideology features in post-hoc justifications for controversial actions in
order to keep the citizenry loyal. This work does not dispute the use of ideology to provide lip
service to the concerns of the German people. While after the fact justifications may be hollow
throwbacks to ideology, the various actions that necessitated ideological justification themselves
fit together with significant Nazi ideological goals. Therefore, to assert that Nazi ideology ran
central to and pushed forward many of the actions of the Third Reich not only must the true
nature of the Volksgemeinschaft, the central ideological framework for the Reich, be understood,
but also an overarching understanding that framework's role in the Reich Government efforts to
establish the Thousand Year Third Reich must be achieved.
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Citizen Interaction or Pacification?

The first step towards determining the true nature of the Volksgemeinschaft involves
solving a chicken and the egg quandary. The Volksgemeinschaft, as experienced in the Third
Reich, was a blending and balance of both ideological and political-pragmatic aspects. In order
to define the Volksgemeinschaft, a scholar must determine whether the Volksgemeinschaft
originated from ideological notions of the national community internalized by the German
people that subsequently informed the political actions of the Nazi Party, or whether the
ideological belief system behind the Volksgemeinschaft was updated to match the Nazis’ political
visions. Historians differ in their assessment of this dilemma, some believing that Nazi policy
echoed the Volksgemeinschaft while others ardently contend that the Nazis altered the national
community for their own political ends. If the true nature of the Volksgemeinschaft is to be
determined, the complex problem of the origins of the national community within Nazi ideology
and the Third Reich must be addressed.
The Volksgemeinschaft existed as a national community of people who were inherently
German and only German. As such, many historians argue that the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft
originated from already inherent anti-Semitism within the German citizenry that called for a
racial reordering of Germany. Historian Peter Fritzsche does not stand as the only historian to
make the fairly obvious argument that the Volksgemeinschaft had a strong racial foundation, but
Fritzsche is unique in his assessment that the Volksgemeinschaft was never in any form an
explicitly Nazi idea. The foundation of Fritzsche’s argument contends that the German citizenry
participated in the national and social reordering of Germany through a willingness to see their
racially pure version of Volksgemeinschaft implemented. Germans held onto notions of the
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Volksgemeinschaft from the Burgfrienden of the Spirit of 1914, when, at the onset of World War I,
the upsurge of German nationalism served to unite Germans “who had long been divided by
class, region, and religion.”305 The German failures in World War I and the following Weimar
years would sublimate these notions of unification and divide Germans to an extent entirely
unknown to most citizens. First, the Treaty of Versailles’s territorial arrangements separated
many German people territorially from the main German state. Then, the Weimar Republic
ushered in various economics catastrophes that caused considerable financial disparity and
outright poverty amongst the citizenry. Worse still Germans were left to fend for themselves in a
hostile Germany built on entirely alien concepts of social democracy. Thus, Germans looked
longingly on the days of the Kaiser when Germany was a fortress against the ills of the outside
world.
The various impediments to the fortress of the Volksgemeinschaft that Germans citizens
aspired to eliminate became personified in numerous perceived enemies of the German people.
Jews featured prominently as the enemies of national community because not only had the
Jewish people been a typical European scapegoat for centuries, but they received the burden of
responsibility for allegedly undermining German domestic society, thus forcing the Imperial
government to agree to a premature peace that led to the ruinous Treaty of Versailles.306 Thus,
according to Fritzsche, the German people were the originators of the Volksgemeinschaft, not the
Nazi Movement. By this argument, the Nazis rose to power because they simply “offered a
comprehensive vision of renewal, which many Germans found appealing.”307 The Nazis
ultimately appealed to notions that Germans already held ingrained, but the Nazis added to these
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notions a sense of urgency and fear of German enemies. Therefore, Fritzsche argues that the
Volksgemeinschaft informed Nazi ideology, a stance which taken to its logical conclusion,
acknowledges the complicity of the German people for the formation and success of the Nazi
Party. But, did the political actions of the Third Reich correlate or diverge from the national
community that the German people conceived?
Fritzsche rejects the frequently argued belief that fear-based tacit consent from the
German people enabled the anti-Jewish purges. Instead, Fritzsche makes a controversial
argument in which the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft and acts done in its name occurred because the
Nazis “simply dared to implement preconceived ideas” about the national and social nature of
Germany.308 In addition, the Nazis would have never been able to accomplish their racial purges
to the extent that they did without the active help of various German citizens of many different
walks of life.309 Through the help of various local officials the Nazis were able to expel and,
when plans changed, exterminate, the Jewish populations of Germany and the rest of Europe.
Fritzsche furthers his accusations of German citizenry by demonstrating that a great deal of
opportunism existed for German citizens who chose to manipulate the racial policies of the
Volksgemeinschaft. Multiple cases exist featuring Germans denouncing Jewish rivals to the
Gestapo in the hopes of removing an undesirable competitor.310 The Holocaust could not have
reached such a tragic magnitude without the active participation of the German citizenry.
Therefore, through his ardent argument that German citizens were not free from blame for
various atrocities occurring within the Third Reich, Fritzsche contends that the racial activities of
the Reich Government were in step with the German citizenry’s conceptions of what a national
community, free of Jewish influence, should become.
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Is Fritzsche correct in his assertion that the Volksgemeinschaft was a citizen supported
national and social reordering of Germany led in a racial direction? Throughout the Third Reich,
various actions were taken against Jewish people by German citizens including a mass boycott
against Jewish shops, but often anti-Semitic actions were of a much more inflammatory
nature.311 One citizen related the events of a mass book burning held in Berlin on 10 May 1933.
The observer specifies that this book burning was not merely a Nazi Party function because in
addition to party members, mobs of citizens and students participated throughout the day before
the master of ceremonies, Joseph Goebbels, arrived.312 Per the observer, upon his arrival
Goebbels, enthralled by the emotionalism of the moment, stood in front of the crowd and yelled
“The age of extreme Jewish intellectualism has now ended, and the success of the German
revolution has again given the right of way to the German spirit.”313 Goebbels used the same
imagery to justify book burning that Fritzsche uses to prove that the Volksgemeinschaft was
about the racial renewal of the German citizenry. As such, the Volksgemeinschaft was held
independently of the Nazi Party and subsequently received a great deal of approval, as evidenced
in the mass participation of all-day book burning. However, despite the appearance of a citizen
led formation of the national community, there are aspects of the racial Volksgemeinschaft which
fail to demonstrate that every action of the Nazi Party directed against the Jewish people
occurred with the tacit consent of the German citizenry.
A 1935 citizenship law dictated that “a Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich. He has no
right to vote in political affairs; he cannot occupy a political office.”314 The law went on to define
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Jews explicitly in a racial context.315 This law and many others that the Nazis put into effect
prohibited Jewish people from being citizens and holding political office, but the laws against
Jewish citizenry were far more stringent than what Fritzsche’s racial, citizen driven
Volksgemeinschaft called for. The Jewish racial qualifications set forth by the Nazi Party were
severe and allowed for many Germans who were not previously considered Jewish by popular
standards to be classified as Jewish and summarily ostracized in the name of the national
community. As far as the Reich Government was concerned someone with three full Jewish
grandparents, two full Jewish parents, offspring of a marriage with one Jew or an extramarital
relationship with a Jew, and other relatively minor associations with Jews was labeled Jewish
and subject to the full extent of the Third Reich’s wrath.316 The 1935 Law for Protection of
German Blood and Honor extended the purging of the national community by outlawing
marriage and extra-marital intercourse between German citizens and Jews.317 The Nazis pursued
the ends of the Volksgemeinschaft to a greater extent than the Germans’ notions of a national
community allowed for. If renewal of the German Spirit through the exclusion of foreign and
Jewish elements existed as the prime directive of the German citizens’ Volksgemeinschaft, basic
laws of exclusion and forced emigration would have sufficed to meet the German citizen’s
requirements. The Reich Government however went much further than what the Germans
consented to and followed their own fanatic desire to form a racially pure Volksgemeinschaft.
Therefore, Fritzsche’s assertion that the Volksgemeinschaft existed as a call for racial renewal by
the German Citizenry, enacted faithfully by the Nazi Party, although accurate to a certain degree,
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fails to fully identify the true nature of the Volksgemeinschaft.
If Fritzsche’s citizen led reordering argument is deemed an inaccurate interpretation, can
the Volksgemeinschaft still exist as a largely citizen held ideology that the Reich Government
endorsed independent of Nazi ideological racial extremes? John Connelly uses his article “The
Uses of the Volksgemeinschaft” to stipulate that the German citizenry participated actively in
many aspects of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. Connelly researched a set of letters exchanged
between the citizenry of the German town of Eisenach and the local Nazi Party offices. Connelly
believes that within these correspondences he has found a unique interpretation of the formation
of the Volksgemeinschaft. Connelly argues that the letters he found demonstrate a bottom up
construction of the Volksgemeinschaft in which the local party took cues from the citizenry in the
implementation of the national community.318 Thus, the Volksgemeinschaft was formed and
altered locally every time a citizen evoked “the catchword of Volksgemeinschaft to pursue their
own agendas.”319
Connelly begins his argument by stipulating that the Nazi Party set up “advice centers” in
which they hoped to receive the personal grievances of local citizens as a way to maintain
“meaning and power.”320 In theory, the citizenry would bring their problems to the local Nazi
Party branch at which point the Party would use the complaints to establish a “barometer for
judging the hopes, inclinations, longings, and distresses of the people and adjust its policies to
what it finds.”321 Connelly argues that the head of the Eisenach branch of the Nazi Party, Herman
Kohler, took great efforts to listen to his citizenry and change the social hierarchy within his
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corner of the Reich.322 Kohler was seemingly obsessed with generating opportunities for the
“Aryan commoner” and “welcomed opportunities to advance the lot of fellow disgruntled
plebeians.”323 Connelly uses many of the letters sent to Kohler to demonstrate that the citizenry
would often contact their local Nazi Party branch to denounce various individuals often in an
effort to acquire selfish gains. Per Connelly, as the economy rebounded under the Third Reich
the German citizens setup a zero-sum situation where, “to take advantage of a resource, one had
to show why someone else should be excluded.”324 Kohler fostered such behavior and slowly
purged many undesirables from the economy and subsequently from the national community.
Thus, Connelly would argue that the Nazi Party established a system of grievance that the
citizenry actively used to purge various individuals from the national community.
Connelly contends that there was a truly corrupt nature to the Volksgemeinschaft present
in the local environment. The Volksgemeinschaft was meant to unite all Germans, irrespective of
class and politics, into a community where each citizen worked for the benefit of one another.
However, “in many senses party membership implied greater claims to the services of the
Volksgemeinschaft.”325 Connelly’s argument allows for such a claim because in a realm where a
party member wanted a certain position held by a non-party member, all that had to be done was
write a letter to the local Nazi Party branch and the situation would be resolved, to the benefit of
the party member. Situations of private denouncements certainly existed as a critical aspect of
the Volksgemeinschaft. Denunciations proved fatal, however, to the citizen led Volksgemeinschaft
by, as Connelly contends, “making the political private,” i.e. exploiting the notions of the
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Volksgemeinschaft for personal gain, the citizenry “had made the private political.”326 In order to
judge one person’s claim to being a stronger example of the national community, that person’s
loyalties and actions had to be investigated. However, Denunciations often brought with them
increased attention from the Reich Government into the activities of the accusers’ daily life.
Therefore, Connelly argues that the German citizenry, through denunciations, not only actively
participated in initial purges, but also opened the door to further Party-led purges of the national
community. Thus, Connelly believes that the Volksgemeinschaft was initially a citizen held
ideology that the German people manipulated and corrupted to such an extent that the Nazis
easily replaced it with their own version of the national community.
Despite the compelling nature of the bottom-up argument that Connelly makes using very
valid primary evidence, there are many flaws within his assertions. For instance, the
Volksgemeinschaft is a national community, not an Eisenach community. To stipulate that every
city within the Third Reich matched this model stands as quite the logical leap. Eisenach was just
one city and it stands as unique to many Nazi cities in that its local branch leader, Kohler, made
himself actively available to the citizenry, holding office hours for six hours every week.327 In a
Reich Government filled with corrupt Nazi Party officials, Kohler went out of his way in many
cases to assert the will of his citizens and maintain the national community as he perceived it.
Connelly on multiple occasions alludes to the excessive zeal of Kohler, specifically calling
Kohler “exceptional” and “a particularly fanatical political leader.”328 Kohler follows a strict
code that Connelly even mentions went beyond the notions of responding to public demands and
operated outside of those demands.329 The examples Connelly subsequently provides, Kohler’s

326

Ibid, 922.
Ibid, 902.
328
Ibid, 905.
329
Ibid, 923.
327

118

exclusion of Jews, the mentally handicapped, and the formerly imprisoned are ideas that came
directly from Adolf Hitler and the Nazi upper echelon.330 Thus, the Volksgemeinschaft that
Connelly argues, consisting of manipulations of local party leaders done initially at the behest of
the citizenry, does not mesh with actual events because not only is Connelly’s example of
Eisenach unique to much of the Reich, but also Kohler’s loyalties were very typical of the Third
Reich that insisted that party leaders duplicate the policies of the main Party.
To a certain degree, Connelly’s argument asserts the presence of a citizenry that
expressed contentment with the Volksgemeinschaft because they felt they were actively
participating in its maintenance. Per Connelly, citizens in Eisenach “knew that district leader
Kohler-and the system he served-reserved terror for those outside the Volksgemeinschaft.”331
This assertion begs the question, how did the German citizenry know that they were within the
Volksgemeinschaft? Fritzsche would argue that the German citizenry knew their position in the
national community because their notions of German nationalism informed the entire concept.
However, as demonstrated through racial laws and Connelly’s arguments, the Reich Government
took considerable efforts to enforce its own definitions of the Volksgemeinschaft while
attempting to get the citizenry to think and act racially. Therefore, arguing that the citizen’s
ideological conception of the Volksgemeinschaft informed the actions of the Nazi Party is, if not
exactly implausible, at least incomplete.
David Welch stipulates as much in his article “Nazi Propaganda and the
Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s Community.” Welch does concede that the German
citizenry’s preconceived notions of the Volksgemeinschaft existed before the Nazis ever took
power because for any of the Nazi propaganda to have been effective, it needed to “preach to
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those already converted.”332 However, as opposed to being active shapers of the national
community, Welch, in contradiction to Fritzsche and Connelly, believes the German citizenry
ultimately were the recipients of the Nazi interpretation of the Volksgemeinschaft.
Welch asserts that “the political function of propaganda was to co-ordinate the political
will of the nation (the citizenry) with the aims of the state,” and if this strategy failed propaganda
needed at the very least to instill “passive acquiescence.”333 Therefore, Welch contends that the
Nazis used these already instilled notions of the German national community to establish
approval for their own Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. Welch contends that the Nazi propaganda served
two purposes in the realm of the Volksgemeinschaft. First, propaganda persuaded “the population
that short-term sacrifices were necessary” in order for the Volksgemeinschaft to be realized.334
Second, propaganda publicized, “through the means of compensation, the measures being
introduced by the regime.”335 Thus, propaganda called for people to put themselves second to the
greater national community and if they did so great rewards would follow for the loyal members
of the Volksgemeinschaft. This assertion meshes well with Nazi ideology before 1933 that called
for sacrifice in unity. Welch acknowledges that discontent and unenthusiastic complacency
existed within the Third Reich, but propaganda managed to depoliticize much of this resistant
group and subsequently allowed the German citizenry to buy into the Nazis’ vision of the
national community.336 As unemployment declined and Germans as a whole benefited from Nazi
rule, people became willing to accept Nazi propaganda messages and acquiesced to follow the
measures of the Nazi Party. Welch provides a compelling argument where the Nazis exploited
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notions of the past and used their various successes to pacify the citizenry and subsequently win
tacit consent for the Nazi ideology's interpretation of the Volksgemeinschaft.
The Reich Propaganda Ministry exists as a perfect demonstration for Welch’s
interpretation of the top down model for the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. Joseph Goebbels used a
March 1933 speech to specify what he viewed as the role of propaganda in the Third Reich.
Goebbels plainly stated that “it is the task of State propaganda to simplify complicated ways of
thinking that even the smallest man in the street may understand.”337 Goebbels intended to use
propaganda to secure the support of the masses for Nazi policies and the necessary tool for such
acts was a radicalized, repressed press corp.338 Fritz Sanger, representative of the Frankfurter
Zeitung, commented on the nature of Nazi press conferences stating, “in these conferences there
was no discussion, we were simply spoken to somewhat one-sidedly (by the government).”339
The Reich Government told reporters what the news was and prohibited newspapers from
covering various topics that portrayed the Party in an ill light. For instance, the Propaganda
Ministry banned newspapers from publishing photos in which high ranking party members were
sitting at tables featuring empty alcohol bottles, presumably consumed by said high ranking
members.340 Subsequently the Nazis were able to edit and shape any news event or Reich action
to receive approval amongst the citizenry. The Nazis clearly had power over the information the
public received and subsequently, as Welch argues, the Party could easily spin citizen-held
notions of a national community for their own benefit; much like the citizens of Eisenach had
manipulated the Volksgemeinschaft for their own gains.
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To return to the initial quandary, was the Volksgemeinschaft a German ideal that informed
Nazi policy or was the national community an ideal incorporated and edited by the Reich
Government for its own ends? The Volksgemeinschaft generally rose out of notions of German
camaraderie emerging from World War I. As such, Fritzsche contends that the origins of the
Volksgemeinschaft resided in the German people and the Nazis simply followed these notions as
a means to maintain power. However, the stringent nature of the Reich Citizenship Law’s Jewish
categorization existed to demonstrate that the Nazis operated independent of the will of the
citizens. Subsequently, the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft was an ideology separate from the notions of
World War I most Germans had previously internalized.
Connelly argues that while the citizenry made initial pleas to the notions of the
Volksgemeinschaft shared between the people and the Nazi Party, these pleas allowed the local
party to intervene in the private lives of their citizens providing the local party the means to
implement its own version of the Volksgemeinschaft. However, Connelly uses one town’s
documents and an ardent party supporter to establish his argument, consequently invalidating
said argument by demonstrating that, through party fanatic Kohler, the higher party still informed
the implementation of the Volksgemeinschaft. Therefore, arguments that contend the German
citizenry’s interpretation of the national community remained dominant throughout the Third
Reich fail to fully appreciate the Nazi Party elites’ impact on the formations of the Nazi
Volksgemeinschaft.
David Welch’s argument represents an accurate appraisal of the formation of the Third
Reich’s Volksgemeinschaft. Welch argues that the Nazis used propaganda to misappropriate
notions of the nationally held conceptions of the Volksgemeinschaft so that these conceptions
would match and justify Nazi policies. By manipulating and actively editing these notions, the
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Nazis were able to achieve tacit support for many of their initiatives allowing for a steadily
progressing, aggressive policy implementation towards total state control. The Nazis thus used
the German Volksgemeinschaft to create a loyal citizenry, but all of the arguments made about
the origins of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft dance around a particular and pressing difficulty.
Given the extensive nature of the Third Reich and its pervasive presence in all aspects of
Germany, simple pacification could not have been the ultimate goal of generating a national
community. If Welch is correct, as this thesis contends he is, in asserting that the Reich
Government actively manipulated and edited the German citizenry’s conceptions of the national
community for political-pragmatic ends, what ends were the Nazis pursuing in the name of their
own Volksgemeinschaft?

Goals of the National Community

The origins of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft, as Welch asserted, may have stemmed from
the Nazi Party’s need to create a complacent citizenry, but if the Volksgemeinschaft existed solely
as a pacifying measure, why were policies of the national community like the Reich Citizenship
Law taken to such extreme ends? Even though the origins of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft as a
political-pragmatic party led ideology have been determined, that effort was just a first step
towards ascertaining the truly complicated nature of the Volksgemeinschaft. There existed a clear
intentionality behind the development of the national community that went far beyond
maintaining a pliant citizenry. Thus, the issue that now must be addressed in order to advance
knowledge of this complicated topic involves determining what the Reich government intended
to accomplish with the implementation of their version of the Volksgemeinschaft.
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The Reich Government forcibly removed many individuals from the Volksgemeinschaft,
but not all those who received the negative attention of Nazi authorities were targeted on a racial
basis. Many of the perceived enemies of the Volksgemeinschaft were under attack because they
embodied political threats to the Nazi establishment of power. Robert Paxton presents an
interpretation of the Volksgemeinschaft within his work The Anatomy of Fascism that argues in
favor of a strictly political nature inherent in the Volksgemeinschaft. Paxton’s work analyzes
fascism in general and as such he views the Volksgemeinschaft as a political tool common within
many Fascist regimes. Per Paxton, “fascists pull forward toward dynamic, leveling, populist
dictatorship, prepared to subordinate every private interest to the imperatives of national
aggrandizement and purification.”341 Aggrandizement and purification of the German race were
two aspects that featured heavily within policies of the Volksgemeinschaft and as these aspects
featured in different fascist regimes Paxton is able to operate in direct opposition to many
scholars who contend the Volksgemeinschaft was a uniquely German ideal.
Paxton would contend processes of coordination, the unification of various aspects of life
into equivalent Nazi Party organizations, brought about the steady progression of Germany
towards “national aggrandizement and purification.”342 Paxton lays out a political model in
which “terror, division, minor concessions, and integration devices” all helped to progress the
formation of the national community as a political tool that would allow the Nazi Party to
dominate all aspects of a citizen’s life.343 Paxton’s most elaborate explanation of coordination
comes in the form of the Nazi Labor Front. Terror eliminated direct opposition within the
German population while purges slowly divided the Social Democratic and Communist
coalitions within the workforce. At Hitler’s insistence, the Nazi Party eliminated unions and
341
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formed the Nazi Labor Front under which all labor would be integrated fostering a sense of unity
in workers’ lives.344 However, as workers remained somewhat oppositional to these measures,
further integration was brought in through the Strength through Joy program, designed to foster
the Party ideology in combination with German labor’s increased leisure time.345 Slowly, even a
recalcitrant population such as workers came to be integrated within the national community, but
only after various efforts were taken by different elements of the political sphere to ensure such
actions succeeded.
As Paxton uses the Nazi Labor Front as an example, it would be best to investigate that
set of events to determine the validity of his contention. After a large and nationalistic May Day
celebration the Nazi Party swiftly moved against workers unions and replaced them with the
Nazi Labor Front. In April 21, 1933, Dr. Robert Ley laid out the plan for the coordination of the
trade unions that demonstrates that this act represented a serious political action as the “SA as
well as SS (were) to be employed for the occupation of trade-union properties and for taking into
custody the people concerned.”346 After the Trade Unions were forcibly removed, the Nazi Labor
Front was established with the expressed Volksgemeinschaft goal of internal social unification
while simultaneously educating “all Germans who are at work to support the National Socialist
State and to indoctrinate them in the National Socialist mentality.”347 The Nazi Labor Front
would strive to indoctrinate the remaining workers and thus induct them into the political, and
perceivably brainwashed, national community thus demonstrating Paxton’s strictly political
outlook on the Volksgemeinschaft
344
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Paxton’s interpretation of the Volksgemeinschaft, despite a strong political-pragmatic
outlook, is incomplete as his interpretation of the Fascist state contends that Fascism can never
settle into a state of order, eventually destroying all aspects of government in a constant need for
conflict.348 Per Paxton, “Fascist regimes had to produce an impression of driving momentumpermanent revolution.”349 Under this assumption of fascism the Volksgemeinschaft, as a political
tool was just that, a short-term political tool used to gain totality in all aspects of the state as just
one step of the Nazis’ power addiction. The Nazis used the notions of forming a national
community to maintain the idea that oppositional forces existed within the Third Reich that the
German citizens needed the Nazi Party to fulfill. However, asserting a strictly opportunistic
outlook on the Volksgemeinschaft ignores the ample evidence that demonstrates multiple
ideological goals of the Volksgemeinschaft the Reich Government professed. Although Paxton’s
interpretation does accommodate the Nazi Party’s aggressive hand in the political aspects of the
national community, his nihilistic portrayal of fascism in general fails to appropriately define the
goals of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft which evoked some fashion of long-term plan.
The Reich Government clearly intended to construct some fashion of national community
loyal to the perpetuation of the Third Reich, but the ultimate goal Paxton put forward does not
take into consideration the ways the Nazis were revising and shaping the roles of its citizens, in
particular women, on a micro level. Jill Stephenson’s work The Nazi Organization of Women
explores the various roles conceived for women in Germany from the Weimar through the Third
Reich, in particular focusing on how those roles were implemented and in what ways they were
not. Stephenson's arguments about the perceived position of women in the Nazi
Volksgemeinschaft add insight into the exploration of the goal of the national community.
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Stephenson contends that the women who initially supported the Nazi Party were not
virulent, zealous followers of the Nazi ideology.350 Per Stephenson, the women voters of the
NSDAP “had been drawn from women who disliked female political activists and women
rightists.”351 The backlash from the allegedly immoral Weimar Republic had mobilized women
to vote for a Nazi Party that wished to make women “wives, mothers, and homemakers.”352 After
the Nazis came to power and purges removed many of the feminist political activists, the Nazi
women voters subsided into political obscurity.353 The Nazis had differing perspectives on the
inclusion of women in the national community and subsequently female involvement in the Nazi
Party machinery. Robert Ley contended that “the organization of persons of one sex can
therefore not be termed a community.”354 Ley was in a stark minority however as most members
of the Nazi upper echelon, in particular Adolf Hitler, were virulently against allowing women to
have a political role in the Volksgemeinschaft.355
As anti-feminist as such stances are, Stephenson contends that the Nazi women, who
were rather politically inactive, did not often oppose such opinions. Rather, Stephenson contends
that most women who joined women’s organizations in the Third Reich did so not because of
any particular political desire, but rather they wished to elicit the benefits that came from being
such a member.356 Most damning to feminist assertions during the Third Reich were the
following statements Stephenson includes from Nazi-supporting women like Lore Bauer: “we
claim no rights for our sex such as that women politician [Rosa Luxemburg] demanded…rather
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we want to fulfill the tasks which the nations sets us as women.”357 Many women thus did not
want to assert themselves in the political realm, but rather wished to be dutiful citizens of the
Reich helping to build the all-important Volksgemeinschaft. Stephenson echoes Welch’s
pacification argument in her postscript claiming that “Once everyone believed that class and
denominational differences were irrelevant…then there would be no more class conflict” which
would inevitably “persuade the working class that they were too well off to be able to afford a
class war.”358 Stephenson argues that the Nazis took a stance that alienated women not only
because that was the Party’s ideological belief, but also Nazi propaganda and actions tried to
create a national community that guided women to believe that Volksgemeinschaft did not need
women to be involved in politics.
Evidence exists to corroborate Stephenson’s contention that women were exiled from the
Reich’s political process while the government simultaneously portrayed such exclusions as
having value to the national community. In April 1934, Hitler banned women from becoming
lawyers and judges because he and the Nazi hierarchy did not wish women to attain any power
or influence in the legal system of the Third Reich.359 Such exclusions inconvenienced numerous
women who had already, at great personal expense, gone through various legal training only to
have their personal investments ruined.360 Exclusions of this nature led to discontent, not
necessarily from women but men who protested the resulting practical difficulties from losing
well trained barristers.361 In 1933, Reich Minister of the Interior Frick furthered Hitler’s
argument for the exclusion of women claiming that, despite his insistence that no direct laws
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existed prohibiting the hiring of women, “in the event of males and females being equally
qualified for employment in the public service” the man should receive the position.362 In order
to justify such actions, the Nazi government needed to correlate these exclusions with the
existing efforts to improve the economic status of the national community. By Nazi arguments,
every woman exiled from a position freed that position for a male breadwinner.363 According to
Hitler, such actions stood to benefit the Reich as “the man’s world is said to be the state” and
anything that benefited the state was necessary for the national community.364 Going even further
Hitler argued that women engaged in a smaller world in which husband, family, children, and
home were of the greatest importance.365 However, Hitler contended that the “greater world” that
men inhabited would fail without the smaller world that women maintained.366 Subsequently, at
the Fuhrer’s behest the Nazis went to great efforts to justify their female exclusion policy as a
way to lessen the discontent arising from women’s exile from political and professional life.
Stephenson’s argument echoes Welch’s and in that manner it also fails to determine the
full extent of the Volksgemeinschaft. Admittedly, defining the goal of the Volksgemeinschaft is
not Stephenson’s main purpose for her work, but in spite of this she does provide a very
interesting assessment that provides considerable insight into how the exclusion of women in the
Reich helps to define the further goals of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. In her conclusion,
Stephenson asserts “the entire Nazi system was based on diversion and disguise, temporary
expedients to control the people until they-or, more likely, a new generation-were sufficiently re-
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educated for the myth to assume the proportions of reality.”367 Stephenson implies that the Nazis
were simply buying time until a new generation of Nazi supporters could be brought into the fold
and rendered the previous generation obsolete. For a new Nazi generation to arise the Reich
Government needed new citizens and the only group capable of meeting this demand was
women, as child bearers of the future Reich.
The Nazis made prevalent use of the ideal that women, excluded from the political and
economic realms, should take on the pivotal role of the bearers and caretakers of the youth of the
Third Reich. Jost Hermand argues in his article, “All Power to the Women: Nazi Concepts of
Matriarchy” that the Nazis’ emphasis on a patriarchal society allowed room for “the concept of
matriarchy and sought to place it in the service of a biologized view of history.”368 The Nazis
emphasized on numerous occasions the organic notion that the Volksgemeinschaft was tied to
nature and subsequently this natural aspect would be represented in a very maternal fashion. The
Volk came from the wellspring, or womb, of nature which recognized, as Hermand asserts, “the
primordial maternal womb and simultaneously a maternalization of the national concept.”369 In
the same fashion that a womb gestates a child, the Nazi Party intended for its vision of the
Volksgemeinschaft to gestate a citizenry capable of carrying on its vision. In strictly ideological
terms therefore, Hermand asserts that the Volksgemeinschaft’s intention was to generate a
citizenry that perfectly fit the Nazi vision.
Hermand does not operate entirely in the ideological realm, however, as he spends parts
of his article dealing in the very practical world of women in Nazi Germany. Per Hermand, the
Nazis had no interest in making women equal citizens to men, but did strive to incorporate
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women into the Volksgemeinschaft.370 Hermand demonstrates that beyond chauvinistic
condescension, the Reich Government went about various methods to demonstrate a respect for
the women of Nazi Germany, but that respect was directed to those amongst women who decided
to be mothers.371 Hermand uses a quote from eugenic gynecologist August Mayer’s 1938 work
German Mothers and the Rise of Germany to demonstrate the important role women held in the
notions of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft stipulating that “the worth of a nation is shown in the
preparedness of its women to become valuable mothers.”372 Mayer went on to contend that the
Third Reich needed “a sublime mothers’ throne, before which men stand in respect (because) the
existence or non-existence of our people is decided solely by the mother.”373 Mayer clearly
expressed as backed by Hermand, that the Nazi hierarchy intended for women to become
mothers of the future Reich citizens. These women would produce the children necessary for the
future of the proposed Thousand Year Reich.
Stephenson contends, as backed up in the events, that women were exiled from the
professional aspects of the community, at which point Hermand argues the Nazis placed an
emphasis on women’s role as mother of the Reich. Hermand’s contention that women had an
important ideological role as matriarch is demonstrated in a 1934 Hitler speech that expressed
the Nazi belief in women as the womb of the Third Reich.374 Hitler asserted that in order for the
Reich to exhibit “strength of vision, of toughness, of decision, and of the willingness to act,” the
woman must be willing “to risk her life to preserve this important cell (the Reich) and to
multiply it.”375 Women would risk their lives for the Reich in childbirth as Hitler claimed that
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every birth was a battle a mother “waged for the existence of her people.”376 Therefore, coming
from the Führer one can see that Hitler had a general ideological plan for the women of the Third
Reich, a sentiment that found support in the public. One woman of the Third Reich, Emilie
Muller-Zadow, claimed that “the place that Adolf Hitler assigns to women in the Third Reich
corresponds to her natural and divine destiny.”377 Using language of the Volksgemeinschaft,
Emilie goes on to claim that as all mothers care for their young, a national community would be
formed where “old barriers and prejudices fall away, and the gulf of class differences is bridged
over.”378 However, as Hitler’s speech and Emilie’s words were spoken after the previously
mentioned exclusion of women from the legal profession and other acts carried against women,
the question becomes, was the matriarchal role of women brought on as an afterthought to keep
women loyal to the Reich or genuine Nazi policy?
The Nazi ideological emphasis on women as the wombs of the Third Reich was not an
afterthought argument meant to appease dissenters. Rather, the Reich Government actively
sought to encourage births within Germany going so far as introducing an incentive system
designed to encourage couples to produce future citizenry. In June 1933, the Nazi Government
passed the Law for the Reduction of Unemployment in which section 5 called for the
implementation of marriage loans.379 Under this law, “people of German nationality” who get
married can apply for a loan of 1,000 Reich marks.380 However, as the law is intended for the
reduction of unemployment, the loan could only be granted if a wife gave up her job and
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intended to remain outside of the workforce for the term of the loan.381 This qualification
presumably freed up women to stay at home and give birth to the future members of the Third
Reich. An added incentive of the marriage loans, directed towards childbirth, stipulated that upon
the birth of a child a quarter of the loan was forgiven.382 State secretary of the Reich Finance
Ministry, Fritz Reinhart, stipulated in 1935 that the loans saw an increase in marriage and
childbirths, citing a 27.3 percent increase in marriage and 86,503 more births in the first six
months of the loan program.383 Thus, the Nazi Party’s program of marriage loans fulfilled both
the exclusion of women from the workforce that Stephenson argues and the matriarch role that
Hermand argues.
To return to Stephenson’s assertion about the Volksgemeinschaft, the Nazis were trying to
generate an increase in children, but not children who would be solely raised by these matriarchs.
Rather, as Stephenson argues, the Nazis desperately desired from the revision of women’s roles
“a new generation” of Nazi supporters.384 The Nazis made no secret that they desired to mold a
future generation of ardent Nazi supporters out of the children of the current Reich citizenry. In a
1934 speech to the National Socialist Women’s Organization, Hitler stated clearly that the youth
“will become Germany when we no longer exist! They will preserve everything we have created
and built. We are working for them.”385 This quote does not particularly appear to be
demonstrative of a plan to convert the youth as any speech directed towards a matriarchal
audience will emphasize sacrifice for the future generation. However, Hitler did not say mothers
would work towards fostering the future German generations, but rather we, the Reich
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Government included, would take a hand in raising the German youth. Hitler romanticized the
future plans of the youth by appealing to notions of the national community, an example being
his statement that “the only thing that enables us to overcome all...is the view from the present
into the future, from ourselves to the generation coming after us.”386 However, despite Nazi
language stressing the importance of parental influence in fostering the unifying notions of the
Volksgemeinschaft within their children, in action the Nazis had a far different vision for the
German youth’s role in the Third Reich.
Although official Nazi inculcation of children had existed under the Reich Minister of the
Interior, the Hitler Youth was not recognized as the official organization for conversion of the
youth until December 1936. 387 In the law making the Hitler Youth official the Nazis declared
that “the future of the German nation depends upon its youth, and German youth shall have to be
prepared for its future duties.”388 The Nazis intended to use the Hitler Youth to impress upon
children their responsibilities in the future of the Third Reich, but this education would be
accomplished in a manner separate from parents and educators as, according to the law, “The
German Youth besides being reared within the family and school, shall be educated physically,
intellectually, and morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people and community,
through the Hitler Youth.”389 The Reich Government intended to indoctrinate children in the
methods of National Socialism so as to generate a citizenship loyal to the Nazi vision of the
national community, thereby generating their own enduring Volksgemeinschaft. If the Third
Reich had lasted for multiple generations this vision would have been realized as the Nazis,
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through the Hitler Youth, were already creating die hard, ideologically driven supporters by 1936.
At the very beginning of a child’s Hitler Youth career, the Nazi Party ensured that the
member would be taken aback by the splendor of the Third Reich. According to one memo
discussing how Hitler Youth inductions were to be carried out, “the cub and the young lass must
regard this hour of their first vow to the Fuhrer as the holiest of their whole life.”390 The
ceremony of induction into the Hitler Youth itself was steeped in Nazi ideology. In the speech
given by all Hitler Youth leaders, the youth were welcomed into “the community of all German
boys and girls.”391 The leaders go on to say that “the Führer demands of you and of us all that we
train ourselves to a life of service and duty, of loyalty and comradeship.”392 Subsequently, these
recruits would represent a “proud picture of German youth.”393 The ceremony heavily
emphasized the national community’s unifying nature, culminating in a demonstration of
subjugation to the will of Adolf Hitler as each member swore: “I promise always to do my duty
in the Hitler Youth in love and loyalty to the Fuhrer and our flag.”394 Thus from the beginning,
the Hitler Youth used established aspects of Nazi ideology, in particular emphasis on the notions
of the Volksgemeinschaft, to create a small force of citizens who were intended to become the
most ardent supporters of Hitler to ever walk the earth.
Robert Paxton argued that the Nazis' goal with the national community was an explicitly
pragmatic undertaking in which the Volksgemeinschaft existed solely as a political tool to gain
total power over the citizenry. However, Paxton’s argument contending a nihilistic aspect of
fascism is rather short sighted because the Nazis expressed clear visions of the future
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independent of the need for never ending conflict. Jill Stephenson’s work on the exclusion of
women in the Reich echoes Welch’s pacification theory but also provides the caveat that the
Nazis were actually appeasing the active citizenry in an attempt to buy time for another
generation of even more ardent supporters to materialize. As Hermand asserts, women were
given a matriarchal role in the Reich, but pacification was a secondary concern as the true
intentions of exclusions were to act on the matriarchal role for women. The Reich Government
sincerely believed women were of great significance to the Third Reich in exclusion from
Hitler’s “greater sphere” because they would give birth to the future generation of Nazi citizens.
The goal of the Volksgemeinschaft therefore was to convert the German citizenry across multiple
generations into pliable members of the Nazi’s vision of the Thousand Year Reich. The Reich
Government used notions of the national community already held dear by German citizenry,
unity, sacrifice, and loyalty, to pacify the existing citizens into a state in which they would
acquiesce to the creation of a truly Nazi citizenry. Nazi citizenship would not be tainted by social
democracy nor raised in an environment of doubt. Thus, dating back to the first Nazi meetings in
Munich, every action of the Nazi Movement, Nazi Party, and Reich Government slowly built
towards a primary ideological goal, the conversion of a citizenship that fully matched the Nazi
conception of the Volksgemeinschaft; a citizenry totally loyal to the will of the Führer and
Germany's future within the Third Reich

The Stark Implications of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft

The Nazis used the Volksgemeinschaft ideology to appease the existing citizenry until a
future Nazi citizenship could be developed thus forming the true Nazi national community. As
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succinct as this definition seems, this description does not fully define the entire nature of the
Volksgemeinschaft. This explanation simply provides an origin, methodology, and an
intermediate goal of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. All of Nazi history may have been building
towards a conversion of German people into a Nazi Citizenship, but this was merely a step on the
path to the creation of a truly pure Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. Converting German people to the
Nazi vision existed as a powerful and ambitious goal, but as long as foreign influences existed
the Nazi Citizen would never be entirely pure. Thus, any attempt to determine the true nature of
the Volksgemeinschaft would be woefully inadequate without investigating the ways that Hitler’s
plans for war, the sole means to eliminate foreign influences from the German citizenry,
informed the Nazi conception of the Volksgemeinschaft.
Historian Richard Evans uses his vast narrative, The Third Reich in Power, to
demonstrate that the Nazi conception of the Volksgemeinschaft slowly dominated every aspect of
a German citizen’s life with the ultimate purpose of slowly cultivating a citizenry prepared to
devote themselves entirely to the Third Reich in the prosecution of war. Per Evans, “war had
been the objective of the Third Reich and its leaders from the moment they came into power in
1933.”395 One aspect of citizens’ lives that needed the aggressive attention of the Reich
Government was the perceived presence of Jewish, corruptive influences. In order to mobilize
the population for the impending war, a racial reordering would be necessary, but unlike
Fritzsche, Evans contends that this racial reordering did not come from the citizenry, but from
the top of the Nazi hierarchy, Adolf Hitler. Hitler believed the Jews were a “subversive,
parasitical element” who needed to be removed from the Reich before the Germans could be
strong enough to wage a war against those who tried to keep Germany down.396 Thus, the
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Volksgemeinschaft, according to Evans was a top down effort designed to eliminate Jewish and
other foreign influences thereby preparing the German citizenry for war.
Evans argues that the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft generated a “cultural revolution, in which
alien cultural influences-notably the Jews but also modernist culture generally-were eliminated
and the German spirit reborn.”397 Only if the Nazis took over all aspects of Germans’ lives while
they simultaneously purged foreign influences would the Reich Government be able to cultivate
a population capable of dominating the world in the name of Germany. Thus, Evans offers a
much more encompassing and flexible narrative for the Volksgemeinschaft than the scholars
previously mentioned. As opposed to focusing on a specific aspect of the Volksgemeinschaft, like
the citizen, race, gender, and so on, Evans uses his vast narrative work to demonstrate that the
Nazis very actively and persistently went after every aspect of a citizen's life that they felt stood
in the way of the ultimate prosecution of war.
Ample evidence exists to corroborate Evans’s argument for the nature of the
Volksgemeinschaft. In September 1933 the Nazis setup the Reich Chamber of Culture which
operated under the Reich Minister for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels
who was empowered to “decree laws and general administrative regulations as well as
amendments for the purpose of enforcing this law.”398 This September law set up smaller
chambers operating under this Chamber of Culture which would supervise archives, the press,
radio, theater, music, and the creative arts.399 Thus, Goebbels received ultimate control over
various aspects of German culture and slowly proceeded to convert these institutions to the will
of the Nazi Party. If an artist, journalist, actor, musician, and so on refused to join their respective
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chamber, there could be costly consequences for the outsider. For example, the Reich Editorial
Law of October 1933 explicitly mandated that “editors are legally combined in the Reich
Association of German Press. Every editor belongs to it by virtue of his registration on the
professional roster.”400 Thus, if you worked as an editor, you were a member of the Press
Chamber. If you were not a member you were not allowed legally to be an editor. The Nazis
implemented these procedures across the board in the Reich Chamber of Culture. In addition to
mandating membership in the organization, one could only be a member if you “possessed
German citizenship” and were “of Aryan descent, and not married to a person of non-Aryan
descent.”401 Thus, all cultural institutions would consist of racially qualified German citizens
putting forth Nazi approved works in a process that steadily removed corrupting influences from
the German citizenry,
Coordination of German culture involved more than bringing cultural institutions under
the Reich because to fully ensure corrupting influences were removed from the
Volksgemeinschaft those who refused to join Nazi backed institutions had to be disposed of.
Early in the Third Reich those who would oppose the Reich Government’s power often
emigrated in order to escape the attention and persecution of Hitler’s flunkies. According to
Evans, “2,000 people active in the arts emigrated from Germany in 1933 and the following
years.”402 Those who did not wish to have their creative vision stymied, or quite frankly feared
for their lives, chose to leave Germany. In some cases these individuals did not wish to leave
Germany, but the financial situation that resulted from being excluded and denigrated by the
Reich Government made it impossible to maintain a living within the Third Reich. Numerous
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examples, two thousand at least, exist that tell this tale, but those stories are well known. Perhaps
less renowned is Wilhelm Furtwängler's quiet inquiry into why the Nazis were waging a war
with German culture.
A correspondence between Wilhelm Furtwängler, a prominent symphonic conductor who
chose to stay within the Reich’s good graces, and Joseph Goebbels demonstrates the impact of
cultural coordination and the arguments used to justify such actions. In a letter directed to
Goebbels, Furtwängler politely objected to the exile of his many esteemed peers, but he prefaced
said objection with a statement in line with the Nazi ideology of the pure, unified
Volksgemeinschaft. Furtwängler stated “let our fight be directed against the rootless, subversive,
leveling, destructive spirit, but not against the real artist who is always creative and therefore
constructive, however one may judge his art.”403 Despite the fact that this letter condemned Nazi
coordination and forced exile, Furtwängler still claimed that the fight against subversive
influences existed as “our fight.”404 As early as April 1933 the Reich Government was already
able to force subtle resistive elements into a position of basic agreement with their policies.
Goebbels’s reply to this letter demonstrated the extent to which Nazi Germany was willing to go
to rid German culture of any subversive elements. Per Goebbels, “art must not only be good, it
must also appear to be connected with the people, or rather, only an art which draws on the
people itself can in the final analysis be good and mean something to the people for whom it is
created.”405 In addition, “there must be no art in the absolute sense as known by liberal
democracy.”406 Goebbels invoked the exclusion of artists who experienced success thanks to
notions of corruptive liberalism, but he only went this far after arguing that art needed to match
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the notions of the Volksgemeinschaft. Cultural coordination demonstrates, unlike previous
arguments, a truly adversarial, party led foundation of the Volksgemeinschaft that strove for a
purification of the community that would eventually be free of the parasitic Jewish influence
Hitler despised.
Evans’s argument for the Volksgemeinschaft is two-fold because once corruptive
influences were removed from the Reich, the population needed to be prepared for a war that
would return Germany to international prominence. Per Evans, “Hitler personally drove
Germany towards war from the moment he became Reich Chancellor, subordinating every other
aspect of policy to this overriding aim.”407 Ample evidence exists to prove that Hitler’s main goal
in the Third Reich was to launch what eventually became the Second World War. In a February
1933 meeting of the Reich Cabinet, Hitler insisted that rearmament of Germany begin
immediately. Hitler stressed on multiple occasions that “for the next four to five years the main
principle must be: everything for the armed forces.”408 Subsequently, “every publicly sponsored
measure to create employment had to be considered from the point of view of whether it was
necessary with respect to rendering the German people again capable of bearing arms.”409 The
German people were to be made ready for a war and as such every manipulation and
implementation of the Volksgemeinschaft ideology carried this element of military preparedness,
not in the sense of being economically prepared, but rather being prepared ideologically to be
loyal to the Reich beyond infringement.
Military preparedness of the German people predated and heavily influenced the other
measures of the Volksgemeinschaft previously discussed. According to an official statement
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following the nationalization of the labor unions, the conversion of the unions was in step with
“the struggle against Marxism which has been proclaimed by the Führer.”410 In Hitler’s speech to
the National Socialist Women’s Organization, the Führer stated, “You must complement man in
this struggle that we are leading for our people’s freedom, equality, honor, and peace, so that we
can look to the future as fighters of our people!”411 The speech given at the Hitler Youth
induction read, “you too now march in step with the youngest soldiers.”412 In addition Hitler
Youth members motto was “Führer command-we follow!”413 a statement furthered by a Hitler
Youth poem which ends with “You, Führer, are our commander! We stand in your name. The
Reich is the object of our struggle, it is the beginning and the Amen.”414 Evans provides a very
accurate argument for the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft because the national community ideology that
permeated the German citizenry was itself thoroughly permeated by the idea of struggle in the
form of Hitler’s desire to prepare the Third Reich for war.
Evans assertion that the Volksgemeinschaft was primarily an initiative to cultivate an
entirely loyal German population for the purpose of waging war is obscured within his vast
cultural-political narrative constructed in an effort to explain all Nazi history from 1933 to 1938.
As such, Evans's narrative lacks a direct purpose for Hitler’s war beyond megalomania. Historian
Stephen Fritz puts together a much more succinct argument for the Nazis’ use of the
Volksgemeinschaft as a preparatory agent for war. Combining Fritz’s argument with Evans's
narrative provides a compelling and sound analysis of the military and ideological nature of the
Nazi Volksgemeinschaft.
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Fritz begins his book Ostkrieg, an in-depth military history of the Eastern Front of World
War II, in a fashion fairly unique to works of military history. Fritz devotes considerable
attention early to the ways in which the ideology of Adolf Hitler, and subsequently the Nazi Party,
led to the formation of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft and ultimately the Second World War. Similar
to Evans’s point, Fritz contends that the Nazis were pushed by “a radical anti-Semitism that
viewed Jews as a conspiratorial, destructive force in world history.”415 However, whereas Evans
takes a somewhat distended stance on the Nazis’ use of the Volksgemeinschaft to foster a war
population, Fritz takes a much more direct approach.
Fritz contends that almost all of the actions in the Third Reich stem back to Hitler’s fears
of repeating the mistakes of the First World War. Hitler fully succumbed to the Stab in the Back
Legend, believing that a betrayal of Germany had come at the hands of the Jews consequently
leading to the loss of the First World War.416 Hitler argued before coming into power that if as
many as twelve thousand Jews had been killed at the outset of the war, many German lives could
have been saved and the war would have taken a much different turn.417 This rabid anti-Semitism
explains the initial exclusion measures carried out against various Jews and other perceived
enemies of the Reich. Hitler did not want any corrupting influences within his Volksgemeinschaft,
but more importantly, as Fritz contends, the national community was meant to bind all “racially
valuable Germans and prepare them for the struggle ahead.”418 Thus, Fritz provides a military
justification for Evans’s focus on coordination as the Volksgemeinschaft was manipulated and
crafted in order to prevent a future Stab in the Back by generating a national community that was
explicitly created to not betray the Third Reich and revisit the shame brought about by the end of
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the First World War.
Prevention of the Stab in the Back is not the sole justification Fritz provides for the
establishment of a Volksgemeinschaft. According to Fritz, Hitler was also driven by “the
necessity of securing Lebensraum (living space) for the German nation as a means of ensuring its
survival.”419 The Volksgemeinschaft existed as a cornerstone of the Nazis’ plans to create a
German citizenry capable of seizing Lebensraum for the future perpetuation of the German Race.
Fritz lays out a model for the development of the Volksgemeinschaft that relies heavily on the
Nazis’ interpretation of Social Darwinism. Fritz claims that Nazis strove to create a national
community that could compete with the United States for international dominance, but in order
to do that the Germans needed to seize critical Lebensraum.420 In World War I, the hunger
blockade implemented by the British starved nearly 750,000 Germans and Hitler believed that
the German people were subsequently weakened to such an extent that they were unable to
oppose the Stab in the Back.421 Given their borders in 1938, the Germans could easily be
blockaded again and Hitler recognized that Germany had serious deficiencies in “food,
capitalism, and raw materials.”422 Thus, if the Nazis were to have any success on the
international stage, land would be needed to in order for the German race to exist independently
for the duration of the Thousand Year Reich.
Fritz would assert that Hitler believed the purpose of the Nazi state was to “secure the
existence of the Volk.”423 Coordination removed the enemies of the Reich and brought all
German citizens under the Nazi banner of German unity. Through the various methods of
coordination the German people were crafted into a loyal population and, as evidenced by the
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drastic state of affairs at the end of the Second World War, no betrayal of internal enemies would
occur as long as the Nazi government was in power. A national community was formed capable
of carrying on the military goals of the war, but, as far as the Nazis were concerned, the war
itself was fundamental to the formation of the Volksgemeinschaft. “Either the German Volk
struggled for Lebensraum and assured its existence, or its racial enemies would deny it the means
to life and, thus, assure its extinction.”424 Therefore, Fritz asserts that the Nazis would eventually
urge this carefully crafted national community to test itself against the world in a contest in
which the strongest would be fit for survival.
Coordination as a tool against removing the possibility of another Stab in the Back is
explicitly demonstrated Dr. Robert Ley’s proclamation following the May 1933 seizure of trade
unions. In justifying the actions taken against the trade unions, Ley claims that “above all we
must prevent your enemy, Marxism and its satellites, from stabbing you again in the back.”425
Although the intention of using such a statement in this proclamation was meant to stir
nationalist hatred for the end of World War I, the truth behind the statement should not be
disregarded. A high ranking member of the Nazi Party used the Stab in the Back Legend as
justification for removing the supposed corrupting influence of Marxism fostered by the trade
unions. Thus, as Fritz asserts, the prevention of the mistakes of World War I featured throughout
the coordination actions of the Third Reich.
Fear of repeating World War I certainly finds a basis within the events of the Third Reich,
but does the risky notion of waging a war for the perpetuation of the German race in a social
Darwinist conflict find solid foundations in the events? In the previously mentioned 1933 Reich
Cabinet meeting, Hitler directly claimed that “Germany’s position in the world depended
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decisively upon the position of German armed forces.”426 Hitler in 1933 substantiated, shortly
after calling for major rearmament in four to five years, that war would be a necessary
determinant of Germany’s power in the world. In addition, a September 1933 Hitler speech
iterated Fritz’s Social Darwinist conclusion fairly decisively. Hitler contended that while it
seemed that National Socialism at that time had taken over, “only those who have not fully
comprehended the character of this tremendous struggle can believe that the struggle between
ideologies has thereby come to an end.”427 Hitler clearly geared up for a conflict with those he
believed fostered the Jewish conspiracy. Thus, Fritz’s assertion that the Volksgemeinschaft
existed as an item of the Nazis plan to wage a social Darwinistic war for the future of the
German race is well founded.
Fritz and Evans have come to the heart of the contradictory nature within the
Volksgemeinschaft. These two historians contend that the Reich Government used the notions of
the Volksgemeinschaft to prepare a strong and unified German citizenry capable of waging a total,
racial, and ideological war. However, as Fritz asserts, this total war itself was necessary to the
perpetuation of the national community. Without the catalyst of war, the German race would not
be able to seize much needed materials or prove the dominance of the German race capable of
earning international respect. However, the war had the potential destroy the national community,
as eventually occurred with the fall of the Third Reich in 1945. Despite this risk, war was
necessary because given the fact that German land was small and resource deprived, the
Volksgemeinschaft could never truly be independent of corrupting international influence until
sizable lebensraum had been achieved between the Reich and those corruptive elements.
Therefore, according to these two scholars, the Volksgemeinschaft is best understood as the
426
427

Noakes and Pridham, “Hitler Insists on Priority for Rearmament, February 8 1933,” 381.
Adolf Hitler, “Hitler on the Ideological Aims of National Socialism, September 1933,” in Documents on Nazism,
1919-1945, ed. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), 333.

146

desire to create a powerful and independent community of “true” Germans that could not be fully
realized until the Third Reich opened itself up to the risk of war.

Closing Thoughts

In a September 1935 Party Rally in Nuremberg, Hitler made a speech in which he took
time to address the youth of Germany. Hitler claimed that the German people were becoming
“more sturdy and disciplined” and the youth were beginning to follow suit.428 Hitler went on to
assert that the value of a German was no longer bound in their ability to drink copious amounts
of beer.429 Rather, “in our eyes the youth of the future must be slim and slender, swift as the
greyhound, tough as leather, and hard as Krupp Steel.” The Fuhrer then claimed that it was the
obligation of the Volksgemeinschaft to “educate a new type of man so that our people is not
ruined by the symptoms of degeneracy of our day.”430 It would only be a few more months
before the Hitler Youth became the officially recognized mechanism for such an education.
Therefore, the ultimate goal behind the Nazi ideology was the establishment of a truly
pure Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. In order for this to be realized, the Nazis called for the German
citizenry to be crafted into a population capable of accomplishing all of the Reich Government's
ambitious goals. However, the process towards establishing an entirely pliable and yet hardened
society was not an overnight occurrence. The Nazis began to use notions of the German
Volksgemeinschaft to attain approval for various Nazi policies while simultaneously crafting
these notions into a Nazi interpretation of the national community that exceeded the standards
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held by most Germans. After achieving outward loyalty amongst the citizenry, the Nazi
government began shaping spheres within the Reich; the masculine sphere strengthened the
existing community while the feminine prepared the future community. As children were born
into the Third Reich, they would be entered into Nazi youth organizations and begin an
education steeped in Nazi ideology and myth. These children would eventually become the
citizens of a Germany who would wage aggressive and all-encompassing war to determine that
the Nazi citizen was truly superior and fit to dominate the world.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Antrieb431

At 11:30 on the night of April 28th 1945, a bewildered Traudl Junge, Adolf Hitler’s
youngest secretary, followed her boss to the military conference room of Hitler’s Berlin
Bunker.432Junge was confused as to why she was being summoned at such a late hour for
dictation, a request made more puzzling given the environment surrounding Berlin. The Red
Army had been firing artillery into the city of Berlin for the past four days as they prepared for
their assault on the Reich capital.433Over the past few days various upper echelon Nazi officials,
most notably Herman Goering and Albert Speer, had fled Hitler’s bunker in the hopes of saving
themselves and as much of their property as possible.434Certain members went beyond simply
fleeing and blatantly forsook Hitler and the Third Reich, most notably Reichsführer-SS Heinrich
Himmler who, just a few days earlier, made surrender overtures to the Swedish Prime
Minister.435All of these circumstances combined with the impending fall of the Third Reich and
the end of the Second World War seemed far more important than simple dictation, but what
Junge did not realize was that Hitler intended to dictate his final political testament.
Hitler’s mind had been failing him over the previous weeks burdened as he was by the
failed total war and the looming end to his personal rule. During his stay in the bunker, the

431

German for Impetus
Ian Kershaw, Hitler:1936-1945 Nemesis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 821.
433
Ibid, 809.
434
Ibid,799.
435
Ibid, 819.
432

149

Fuhrer launched into acerbic bouts of rage that were more severe than any of his previous
demagogic rants. Just six days earlier Hitler lashed out at four of his commanders for allowing
the Red Army into the northern suburbs of Berlin.436 For a half hour he screamed at these
commanders to such an extent that even those used to Hitler’s momentary bursts of anger were
utterly stunned.437 Beyond rage, Hitler dwelled in his own world, barely registering the severity
of the situation or the input of those around him.438 Thus, when Hitler set about making his final
political testament, the Fuhrer was hardly of sound mind.439
After relaying matters of his personal affairs and estate, Adolf Hitler set about dictating
his final political testament, knowing that he would take his own life shortly after its completion.
The Führer began by arguing that he had never wanted to pursue a World War. According to
Hitler, the war “was desired and instigated exclusively by those international statesmen who
were either of Jewish descent or worked for Jewish interests.”440 Hitler had always blamed the
Jewish people for everything wrong in the world and the fact that he held on to this belief system,
including it in his final testimony calls the entirety of his already condemnable worldview into
question. If Hitler staunchly believed Jews were truly responsible for a war clearly perpetrated
by himself, a belief bed rocked in irrational denial, who is to say all of Hitler’s beliefs were not
based on similar denials? Who is to say that Nazi ideology, influenced to a considerable extent
by Hitler’s own weltanschauung, was not the expressions and manifest will of a psychopath
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completely out of touch with his surrounding reality?
The Third Reich was supposed to last for a thousand years, but when Hitler committed
suicide in 1945 the Reich crashed into oblivion after only twelve years. By 1945 Nazi Germany
was losing across multiple fronts in Europe, suffering defeat at the hand of a coalition of nations
evoking tenets stretching from welfare capitalism to Marxism. The drastic differences between
1938, when the Reich Government had guided Germany to unprecedented levels of political
power, and 1945 are often used to demonstrate the failure of Nazism as a political philosophy. As
Hitler tightened his grasp and began implementing the Final Solution he provided historians with
all of the evidence they would need to assert the Nazis were simply power-hungry bullies with a
racial agenda. As established throughout this work, very few historians actually credit Nazi
ideology as being of any value against what many historians consider a largely opportunistic
Nazi Party.
This work has not totally dissolved notions of opportunistic Nazis, but nonetheless has
demonstrated that ideology was central to numerous pivotal actions throughout Nazi history. The
Beer Hall Putsch exists not as a drunken rabble of nationalists attempting to take control of
Germany; Hitler did not even have designs on the Nazis leading the new government. Rather, the
Putsch existed as a band of Germans, aware of their subjugation and suffering under the Weimar
Republic, joining together and, similar to the 1914 volunteers, taking action against the enemies
of a united Germany. The switch to the path of Legality appeared to compromise of the violent
aspects of Nazi ideology, but not only did violence continue, but such a path by accepting
previously excluded elements of Germany into the Nazi fold, reaffirmed the primacy of a unified
national community. The countless political, utopian, and opportunistic promises made during
the Reichstag elections were motivated by Nazi ideology's insistence that the German people
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recognize that their ills could be tracked to the Social Democracy and Marxism prevalent within
the Weimar Republic. Finally, the Nazis intended to build a Volksgemeinschaft with the dual
purpose of appeasing the present citizenry while that citizenry produced the future Nazi
citizenship. In theory, the new Nazi citizenship would then be prepared for the struggle of
existence to secure the lebensraum necessary for Germans to become the dominant race. Thus,
this work has demonstrated that despite the historical profession's exclusion of ideology, treating
it as an afterthought justification for action, Nazi actions cannot be separated from ideology.
Throughout this work ideology has been argued as not only tied to Nazi actions but has
also been asserted as an impetus for such actions. The specific actions analyzed in the previous
three chapters demonstrate Nazi ideology's influence and ties to Nazi action, but to argue
ideology as the impetus stands as a truly bold assertion; an assertion rooted in the assumption
that Nazi ideology was compelling enough to motivate action. Certainly this work has
demonstrated the attractiveness of Nazi ideology. In the early stages of the Nazi Movement, the
initial Nazi followers internalized various notions of German identity amplified by the intensity
of the First World War. These first Nazis certainly found calls for a restoration of the masculine
activism of the 1914 volunteers fascinating and inspirational, but to argue that these aspects of
ideology motivated the followers of the Nazi Movement to conduct a Putsch certainly appears to
ignore other fundamental motivations like peer-pressure, economic strife, and hunger, that most
certainly had an impact on the decision to act. These differing motivations can be perceived
throughout every stage of Nazi history. After 1933, the threat of violence, arrest, and murder
certainly stand as strong evidence in favor of the argument that numerous motivations existed to
compel action outside the parameters of Nazi ideology. Thus, if Nazi Ideology was not only tied
to Nazi actions, but, as this work asserts, acted as a motivating impetus for such actions, said
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ideology must be evaluated in terms of its ability to compel action.
In tying ideology to action, this work has sought to lessen the determinism of the view
that Nazism was strictly opportunistic in nature. However, such a task is difficult because the
Nazis often committed actions in stark contrast to their ideology. Such actions have spawned a
considerable amount of historical work that has cemented the idea of an opportunistic Nazi
organization in professional, public, and amateur interpretations. Much of this historiography has
been explored throughout this work, but as much as such work has been analyzed countless more
works exist. One such counter argument unexplored in this work resides in the life of Germans
during 1937-1938. The most critical argument to be made against Nazi ideology as an impetus
for action makes the claim that the true motivation for support of Nazism was not the compelling
nature of its ideology, but the compelling nature of Nazism’s results. Between 1933 and 1938 the
German economy rebounded to a staggering effect restoring employment across Germany
simultaneously restoring the German people's faith in the German economy. Thus, many
historians have argued that the stability the Nazis provided, as opposed to the ideology they
espoused, was what compelled the citizenry to support the Nazis. If Nazi ideology is to be
demonstrated as compelling, it will be necessary to deconstruct the idea that citizens were
motivated solely by the stability the Nazis offered.
The idea that economic stability fostered support of the Third Reich is far from a recent
argument. Notably, Tim Mason argued in his 1977 work Social Policy in the Third Reich that the
Nazis launched Blitzkrieg wars to increase their resources and military expansion without
implementing unpopular economic measures.441 More recently, Eric Johnson and Karl-Heinz
Reuband came together in 2005 to present their work What We Knew, a compilation of their
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research analyzing over three thousand written surveys and two hundred in depth interviews,
taken from 1991 through 2001, of former citizens of the Third Reich.442 The surveys were
conducted amongst a strong number of both Jews and non-Jews in order to get a full picture of
those living in Nazi society. What We Knew is of value to the present discussion in that many of
the questions asked focused on determining the motivations for supporting the Third Reich.
Admittedly there are problems with their survey work that are inescapable, many of which they
acknowledge. For instance, the most problematic aspect of oral histories on Nazi Germany is that
not many former citizens are willing to be forthcoming with their support of the Nazi agenda out
of shame and fear. The inclusion of Jewish former citizens in the survey certainly precludes any
support of Nazi ideology. Therefore, some responses may present false and biased data, a risk
somewhat minimized by What We Knew's large sample. Next, assuming they were looking for a
twenty-five year old during 1938, the age range of such respondents during the survey would be
seventy-eight to eighty-eight years old depending on when Johnson and Reuband made contact.
Additionally, such a distance of time between the survey and the events places a cap on the age
of the respondents when they lived in the Third Reich. Thus, mostly youth during the Third
Reich would be able to respond in numbers somewhat representative of their former populations.
However, this last flaw works in favor of this work's analysis as the young were arguably the
most indoctrinated by Nazi ideology offering a valuable comparison. Therefore, if ideology is to
be asserted as comparable or surpassing pragmatic, economic concerns' ability to inspire action,
analysis of What We Knew'sfindings will be of fundamental importance.
Breaking briefly from economic motivations, fear of Nazi terror stands as an often argued
motivation for Nazi support. Johnson and Reuband asked respondents to mark whether they
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feared either their own arrest or a family member's arrest “constantly,” “occasionally,” or not at
all.443 Contrary to popular arguments, between sixty-two to seventy-one percent of respondents,
depending on certain cities' results, expressed no fear of being arrested by the Gestapo. Less than
ten percent felt constant fear, thus fear as a motivator, one of the main foundations of the
argument for opportunistic Nazism, was fairly weak amongst the younger Reich public.
Returning to economic versus ideological motivations, What We Knew asked respondents to pick
what they liked “best about National Socialism.”444 Respondents picked three of eight different
choices and these results were charted. The “fight against unemployment” featured on sixty-two
to sixty-nine percent of respondents’ choices. The next three highest motivation aspects were
“Less crime,” “Construction of highways,” and “support of families,” all parts of the practical
benefits of Nazism, not the ideological. Ideological motivators such as “Community feeling,”
“idealism,” “overcoming of powerlessness,” and “Jews less powerful” paled in comparison never
combining in any city to exceed the “fight against unemployment.”445 Therefore, putting aside
the potential false representations of support, according to these surveys a large population of
ideologically susceptible youth were most motivated to support the Nazis because of various
pragmatic concerns, which has led historians to question ideology's role as a motivator and
impetus for action.
What We Knew's results are certainly troubling to this work's argument of ideology's
impetus role, but it is easy to assert the popularity of economic and practical aspects amongst
citizenry. Beyond bias and fear, support tends to float towards those political organizations that
better the economy and infrastructure, especially when times are prosperous. Along these lines,
historian Shelley Baranowski agrees in full with the idea that economic, pragmatic motivations
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pushed those who supported the Nazis to act. Baranowski argues the centrality of consumerism
to Nazism, going as far as asserting an implicit consumerist foundation to the
Volksgemeinschaft.446 More importantly to the present discussion, Baranowski contends that even
soldiers who lived outside of the material benefits of the Third Reich were nonetheless motivated
by economic, pragmatic ends. Per Baranowski, “for the military, entertainment, tourism, and
consumption became not merely ancillary to combat, but the very ends of warfare.”447 However,
Baranowski's conclusions, like many other historians who advocate economic primacy, suffer
from the same two fundamental flaws. First, many historians gloss over the importance of
pragmatic concerns to Nazi ideology not only as pacification measures, but as the desire to
provide the German citizenry with proof that their lives should and would be demonstratively
better than other competeing races. Therefore, restoring unemployment, rebuilding infrastructure,
and numerous other Nazi endorsed rebuilding actions correlated with the Nazi ideological need
to strengthen Germany for the conflict of nations. Second, while economic and pragmatic
concerns are often pointed to as reasons people supported and worked for the Third Reich, these
arguments are easily established for the time period of 1933 to 1938, but what about 1942 to
1944?
With the Allied bombing campaign, fully underway by 1943, the German people were
hardly able to enjoy some of the finer elements of the Third Reich. Additionally, the total
mobilization for war hindered the economy leading to limits on foodstuffs, aesthetics, and other
resources that previously fostered Nazi support. Yet, despite the loss of these economic and
pragmatic resources, the German citizenry continued to fight, struggle, and work for the Third
Reich until its utter collapse in 1945. Many would point to fear as a motivator for such support,
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but as Johnson and Reuband demonstrated, fear was not as strong, or at least as memorable, a
motivator within Germany. So, as the German economy and Third Reich collapsed around them,
what motivated Germans to act?
Stephen Fritz's work Frontsoldaten analyzes the mindset of the German soldier during the
Second World War. Fritz asserts that ideology's importance to the soldier had been underanalyzed within the historiography claiming that “the average German soldier, perhaps to a
surprising degree, exhibited and embraced various forms of ideological commitment to
Nazism.”448 Fritz asserts the primacy of the value of community and camaraderie amongst the
landser as evidenced by one such soldier's claim that “we believed in a new community, free
from class conflict, united in brotherhood under the self-chosen Führer.”449 This same soldier
wrote in 1937, “we're putting our conception of National Socialism into action: we are all the
same in our service for our people, no one is asked his origins or class.”450 Certainly the landsers
can be considered a different creature from the average citizen as their experience is noticeably
isolated in comparison with other citizens. One such soldier acknowledged as much claiming “at
home things are different, people walk straight past each other and only take notice at marches or
rallies.”451 Therefore, one can consider the impact of the Second World War's combat on the
landsers as comparable to the First World War's impact on the Nazi Movement; the war and
combat amplified senses of ideology and identity not held as ardently by those separated from
the front lines. Nonetheless, the average landser certainly had economic, pragmatic concerns to
motivate action, such as wages for relatives back home, pensions, and the military-industrial
complex. However, Fritz, in his copious analysis of these soldiers’ wartime writings,
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demonstrates that despite these motivations the landsers still placed a primacy on ideology as
their impetus for action even as defeat became inevitable.
Fritz asserts that for the Landsers as the war worsened “ideological instruction served as a
welcome prop in sustaining morale and motivation.”452 As the possibility for victory declined
soldiers turned to ideology for motivation. Specifically, soldiers relied on the miniature national
community of the front and the camaraderie it inspired to push them through those trying times.
For the rest of Germany, ideology's impact is difficult to gauge. Fritz's second substantial work,
Endkampf, analyzed the mindset of the German people as the Second World War came to a
devastating close. Fritz splits the end of the war into three phases, the first of which is most
important to this work. This phase featured the last relevant days of Nazi authority, after this
phase Nazi rule by terror and enemy advances became muddled into a terrifyingly brutal
existence for all parts of Germany. Per Fritz, before these collapses and “despite a general war
weariness and desire to end the war, the majority of Germans nonetheless continued to follow the
Nazi regime's orders and to do their duty.”453 During this phase Fritz points out that ideas like
“loyalty, courage, discipline, patriotism, and camaraderie” motivated the people to continue in
the hopes of some kind of reversal of fortune.454 Similar to the soldiers who relied on the national
community to motivate them to persevere, the Reich citizenry fell back on the unifying rhetoric
of the Volksgemeinschaft to keep working for a Nazi agenda that was quickly disintegrating.
Therefore, when the economic and pragmatic benefits of the Third Reich were stripped away
during the final phases of the war, ideology as an impetus for action was firmly demonstrated.
The primacy of ideology as a motivator is debatable as a great deal of individual variation
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troubles such assertiveness. However, 1942 to 1944 Germany demonstrated that Nazi ideology
could indeed motivate action within people, especially those who strongly adhered to such
ideology before the war. Therefore, ideology not only informed actions but also could compel
people to take action, validating the assertion of Nazi ideology as an impetus for action.
Returning to the question of “what was Nazism,” has this work helped the general
historical effort to answer this question? Numerous historians covered throughout this work have
asserted the opportunistic nature of Nazi adherents as the primary aspect of Nazism. This
opportunism becomes more pronounced when the Nazis began their program of massextermination and totalitarian control of the German citizenry after starting the invasion of the
Soviet Union. However, this work has sought to diminish the idea that Nazism was solely an
opportunistic organization of power hungry sociopathic anti-Semites. While those descriptions
are certainly apt in many cases, such portrayals simplify the nature of Nazi action. Under the
opportunistic arguments, Nazism was simply the belief system of broken demagogues who
gained a voice during uniquely stressful economic times. As such, Nazism can be trivialized as
an entirely unique situation in history and summarily treated in exclusion to the rest of history.
However, Nazism was far from simple.
If Nazism was strictly opportunistic racism then it would have remained on the outskirts
of political and national relevance much like the American Klu Klux Klan. However, this work
has demonstrated that Nazi ideology was very attractive to various sections of Germany. Nazi
ideology preached more than anti-Semitism and anti-Marxist rhetoric. In all actuality, Nazi
ideology was built on a foundation of inclusion and recognition. From its inception, Nazi
ideology sought to duplicate the Burgfrieden and activism of the 1914 volunteers through the
formation of a Volksgemeinschaft. The Nazi Volksgemeinschaft would not only restore valued
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aspects of German identity but recognize the problems face by both the present and past
Germans. In solving these problems the Nazis would create a stronger, more durable Thousand
Year Reich that would propel Germany to unprecedented heights. Belief in this future resided at
the center of and compelled Nazism’s followers to commit various high profile actions, even
when the benefit of such actions were negligible or by 1944 non-existent. Therefore, Nazism is
vastly more complicated than many historians believe, which mandates more in-depth analysis of
ideology's importance to Nazism.
Despite demonstrating that ideology and action were tied together in pivotal ways, much
more work needs to be done to determine the exact nature of Nazism. As asserted in the
introduction any work that seeks to focus on one aspect of Nazism and determine the exact
nature of Nazism from that aspect is doomed to fail before it ever begins. This work has no
intention of establishing a catchall definition of Nazism but rather has simply chipped away at
the vast scholarship supporting interpretations that too often focus on the condemned leadership
and their opportunistic, eventually nihilistic, behavior. Hopefully, this work increases awareness
of the historical relevance of Nazi ideology leading to further scholarship on the topic. Such
scholarship will hopefully help demolish such simplistic understandings of Nazism. Only once
such an identity is done away with can historians come to a fundamental and encompassing
understanding of the belief system and actions that led to atrocity and terror. In a claim
mentioned in the introduction, William Sheridan Allen stated that Nazism was a “problem of
perception,” an assertion that rings true for the historiography of Nazi Germany as such
scholarship cannot seem to avoid looking at Nazism through the lens of the Holocaust.455 Until
more efforts are taken to avoid portraying Nazism in terms of the terrible crimes committed in its
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names, the true nature of this entity will forever be obscured and the Holocaust and the suffering
it caused will still be misunderstood. The continuing scholarship that fosters arguments of
Nazism as the expression of megalomaniacal mass-murders must yield to the reality that Nazi
ideology not only informed and motivated many of the pivotal actions of Nazi history, but that
this ideology surpassed its adherents finding commonality and expression in mass-society
making Nazism a problem relevant to human nature, not simply an unbalanced and localized
minority.

161

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albert, Kaiser Friedrich Wilhel Viktor. “Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Reply, December 31, 1901.” In The
Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and
Sally A. Winkle. London: Routledge, 2002.
———. “The Kaiser Speaks from the Balcony of the Royal Palace,” August 1, 1914. German
Historical Institute. http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=815.
———. “Wilhelm II’s Easter Message,” April 7, 1917. German Historical Institute.
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=1808.
Aleskerov, Faud, Manfred J. Holler, and Rita Kamalova. “Power Distribution in the Weimar
Reichstag in 1919-1933.” In Politics & Economics. University of Hamburg, 2011.
Allen, William. “Farewell to Class Analysis in the Rise of Nazism: Comment.” Central
European History 17, no. 01 (1984): 54–62.
———. The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922 -1945. New
York: Franklin Watts, 1984.
Baird, Jay W. “Goebbels, Horst Wessel, and the Myth of Resurrection and Return.” Journal of
Contemporary History 17, no. 4 (1982): 633–650.
Baranowski, Shelley. “Nazism and Polarization: The Left and the Third Reich.” The Historical
Journal 43, no. 4 (December 2000): 1157–1172.
———. Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich. Campbridge:
Campbridge University Press, 2007.
Bartels, Adolf. “The Struggle of the Age, 1920.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by
Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994.
Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobold von. “The September Program, September 9, 1914.” In The Nazi
Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A.
Winkle. London: Routledge, 2002.
Blackbourn, David, and Geoff Eley. The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and
Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Bodek, Richard. “Communist Music in the Streets: Politics and Perceptions in Berlin at the End
of the Weimar Republic.” In Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern
Germany: New Perspectives, edited by L. E. Jones and James Retallack. New York:
Campbridge University Press, 1992.
Brozat, Martin. “Goebbels and the Communists, February, 1927.” In Documents on Nazism,
1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape,
1974.
“Bulletins from the Front I, 1914.” German Historical Institute. Accessed July 26, 2012.
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=804&startrow=1.
Cecil, R. “Review of Hitler’s Mein Kampf: An Analysis By Maser, Werner; Hitler’s
Weltanschauung: Entwurf Einer Herrschaft by Jackel, Eberhard.” International Affairs
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 46, no. No. 4 (October 1970): 746–747.
“Censorship in Practice, 1914-1916.” German Historical Institute. Accessed July 26, 2012.
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=937.
Chamberlain, Houston Stewart. “Letter Ro Kaiser Wilhelm II, November 11, 1901.” In The Nazi
Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A.
162

Winkle. London: Routledge, 2002.
Chickering, Roger. “Political Mobilization and Associational Life: Some Thoughts on the
National Socialist German Workers’ Club.” In Elections, Mass Politics, and Social
Change in Modern Germany: New Perspectives, edited by L. E. Jones and James
Retallack. New York: Campbridge University Press, 1992.
Childers, Thomas. The Nazi Voters: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983.
———. “The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote.” Journal of Contemporary History 11,
no. 4 (1976): 17–42.
———. “The Social Language of Politics in Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in
the Weimar Republic.” The American Historical Review 95, no. 2 (April 1990): 331–358.
———. “Who, Indeed, Did Vote for Hitler?” Central European History 17, no. 1 (March 1984):
45–53.
Childers, Thomas, and Eugene Weiss. “Voters and Violence: Political Violence and the Limits of
National Socialist Mass Mobilization.” German Studies Review 13, no. 3 (October 1990):
481–498.
Class, Heinrich. “If I Were Kaiser, 1912.” In The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of
Texts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle. London: Routledge, 2002.
Connelley, John. “The Uses of the Volksgemeinschaft: Letters to the NSDAP Kreisleitung
Eisenach, 1939-1940.” The Journal of Modern History 68, no. No. 4 (December 1996):
899–930.
Deutsche Vaterlandspartei. “Founding Proclamation of the German Fatherland Party, September
2nd 1917.” In The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts, edited by Roderick
Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle. London: Routledge, 2002.
Deutsche Volkspartei. “Program.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes,
Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Deutschnationale Volkspartei. “Program.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton
Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1994.
Dietrich, Donald. “National Renewal, Anti-Semitism, and Political Continuity: A Psychological
Assessment.” Political Psychology 9, no. 3 (September 1988): 385–411.
Donson, Andrew. “Models for Young Nationalists and Militarists: German Youth Literature in
the First World War.” German Studies Review 27, no. 3 (October 2004): 579–598.
Ebermayer, Erich. “Diary Entry on the Day of Potsdam, 21 March 1933.” In The Nazi Germany
Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle.
London: Routledge, 2002.
Epstein, Klaus. “Shirer’s History of Nazi Germany.” The Review of Politics 23, no. 2 (April
1961): 230–245.
Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich. New York: The Penguin Press, 2004.
———. The Third Reich at War. New York: The Penguin Press, 2008.
———. The Third Reich in Power. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.
Fackenheim, Emil. “Nazi ‘Ethic,’ Nazi Weltanschauung, and the Holocaust. Morality After
Auschwitz: The Radical Challenge of the Nazi Ethic.” The Jewish Quarterly Review 83,
no. 1/2 (October 1992): 167–172.
Falter, Jürgen. “The Social Bases of Political Cleavages in the Weimar Republic, 1919-1933.” In
Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany: New Perspectives,
163

edited by L. E. Jones and James Retallack. New York: Campbridge University Press,
1992.
Falter, Jürgen, and Michael Kater. “Wähler Und Mitglieder Der NSDAP: Neue
Forschungsergebnisse Zur Soziographie Des Nationalsozialismus 1925 Bis 1933.”
Geschichte Und Gesellschaft 19, no. 2 (1993): 155–177.
Falter, Jürgen, and Detlef Mühlberger. “Anatomy of a Volkspartei: The Sociography of the
Membership of the NSDAP in Stadt and Landkreis Wetzlar, 1925-1935.” Historical
Social Research 24, no. 2 (1999): 58–98.
Falter, Jurgen W., and Reinhard Zintl. “The Economic Crisis of the 1930s and the Nazi Vote.”
The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 19, no. 1 (1988): 55–85.
Ferguson, Niall. The Pity of War. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1999.
Feuchtwanger, E.J. From Weimar to Hitler: Germany 1918 -33. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1995.
Freisler, Roland. “Hitler’s Decision Creates Practical Difficulties, January 1937.” In Documents
on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London:
Jonathan Cape, 1974.
Frick, Wilhelm. “Frick’s Guidelines on the Employment of Women Civil Servants and Teachers.”
In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham.
London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
Friedrich, Jörg. The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945. Translated by Allison Brown.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
Fritz, Stephen. Endkampf: Soldiers, Civilians, an the Death of the Third Reich. Lexington: The
University Press of Kentucky, 2004.
———. Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II. Lexington: The University Press of
Kentucky, 1995.
———. Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press, 2011.
———. “The NSDAP as a Volkspartei? A Look at the Social Basis of the Nazi Voter.” The
History Teacher 20, no. 3 (May 1987): 379–399.
———. “The Search for Volksgemeinschaft: Gustav Stresemann and the Baden DVP, 19261930.” German Studies Review 7, no. 2 (1984): 249–280.
Fritzche, Peter. Germans into Nazis. Campbridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
———. Life and Death in the Third Reich. London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2008.
———. “Presidential Victory and Popular Festivity in Weimar Germany: Hindeburg’s 1925
Election.” Central European History 23, no. 2/3 (September 1990): 205–224.
———. Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
———. “Weimar Populism and National Socialism in Local Perspective.” In Elections, Mass
Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany: New Perspectives, edited by L. E.
Jones and James Retallack. New York: Campbridge University Press, 1992.
Gatzke, H. W. “Hitler and Psychohistory.” The American Historical Review 78, no. 2 (1973):
394–401.
German Association for the Protection of Mothers. “Guidelines of the German Association for
the Protection of Mothers, November-December 1922.” In The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley:
164

University of California Press, 1994.
Gilbert, Felix. “Felix Gilbert on Berlin in the 1920s: The Weimar Generation,” 1988. German
Historical Institute. http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3850.
Goebbels, Joseph. “National Socialism or Bolshevism, October 25, 1925.” In The Weimar
Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
———. “The Tasks of the Ministry Propaganda.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited
by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
Göhre, Paul. “Working-Class Life, 1891.” German Historical Institute. Accessed July 26, 2012.
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=652.
Grosz, George. “Among Other Things, a Word For German Tradition,” 1931. German Historical
Institute. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=4793.
———. “Autobiography, 1946.” In The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts,
edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle. London: Routledge, 2002.
Grundig, Lea. “Visions and History, 1964.” In The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of
Texts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle. London: Routledge, 2002.
Gumbel, Emil Julius. “Four Years of Political Murder, 1922.” In The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994.
Guttsman, W.L. The German Social Democratic Party, 1875-1933. London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1981.
Hamann, Brigitte. Hitler’s Vienna: A Dictator’s Apprenticeship. Translated by Thomas Thorton.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Hamilton, Richard. “Braunschweig 1932: Further Evidence on the Support for National
Socialism.” Central European History 17, no. 01 (1984): 3–36.
———. “The Rise of Nazism: A Case Study and Review of Interpretations: Kiel, 1928-1933.”
German Studies Review 26, no. 1 (February 2003): 43–62.
———. Who Voted For Hitler? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
Hauser, Heinrich. “The Unemployed, April 1933.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited
by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994.
Heilbronner, Oded. “Catholic Plight in a Rural Area of Germany and the Rise of the Nazi Party.”
Social History 20, no. 2 (1995): 219–234.
Hermand, J. “All Power to the Women: Nazi Concepts of Matriarchy.” Journal of Contemporary
History 19, no. 4 (1984): 649–667.
Hindenburg, Paul von. “The Stab in the Back, November 18, 1919.” In The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994.
Hitler, Adolf. “A Different Kind of Party, January 7, 1922.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945,
edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Address to the Industry Club, January, 27, 1932.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook,
edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994.
———. “Genoa Conference Speech, 12 April 1922.” In The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April
1922-August 1939, edited by Norman H. Baynes. New York: Howard Fertig, 1969.
165

———. “Hitler on the Ideological Aims of National Socialism, September 1933.” In Documents
on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London:
Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Hitler’s Call to the Former Members of the NSDAP, 26 February 1925.” In Documents
on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London:
Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Hitler’s Oath of Legality at the Leipzig Trial, September 1930.” In Documents on
Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan
Cape, 1974.
———. Hitler’s Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf. Edited by Gerhard
Weinberg. Translated by Krista Smith. New York: Enigma Books, 2003.
———. “Hitler’s Speech to the National Socialist Women’s Organization, September 1934.” In
Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham.
London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Hitler’s Views on the Role of Women, September, 1934.” In Documents on Nazism,
1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape,
1974.
———. Mein Kampf. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1999.
———. “Munich Speech, April 13, 1923.” In The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August
1939, edited by Norman H. Baynes. New York: Howard Fertig, 1969.
———. “Munich Speech, August 1, 1923.” In The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August
1939, edited by Norman H. Baynes. New York: Howard Fertig, 1969.
———. “Munich Speech, September 12, 1923.” In The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922August 1939, edited by Norman H. Baynes. New York: Howard Fertig, 1969.
———. “On the Revival of Our Movement, 26 February 1925.” In Documents on Nazism, 19191945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Politics and Race: Why Are We Anti-Semites, April 20, 1923.” In The Speeches of
Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, edited by Norman H. Baynes. New York: Howard
Fertig, 1969.
———. “Race and Economics: The German Workman in the National Socialist State, April 24,
1923.” In The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, edited by Norman H.
Baynes. New York: Howard Fertig, 1969.
———. “Some Fundamental Demands of the Party, September 18, 1922.” In The Speeches of
Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, edited by Norman H. Baynes. New York: Howard
Fertig, 1969.
———. “Speech Following the Murder of Rathenau, 28 July 1922.” In The Speeches of Adolf
Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, edited by Norman H. Baynes. New York: Howard Fertig,
1969.
———. “The Change in Emphasis from the Workers to the Middle Class, 1927.” In Documents
on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London:
Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “The Change in Emphasis from the Workers to the Middle Class, December 1927.” In
Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham.
London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “The Great German May Celebration, May 1, 1923.” In The Speeches of Adolf Hitler,
166

April 1922-August 1939, edited by Norman H. Baynes. New York: Howard Fertig, 1969.
———. “The Morass of Parliament or the Fight for Freedom, May 4, 1923.” In The Speeches of
Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, edited by Norman H. Baynes. New York: Howard
Fertig, 1969.
———. “The Paradise of the Jew or the State of the German People, April 27, 1923.” In The
Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, edited by Norman H. Baynes. New
York: Howard Fertig, 1969.
———. “Views on Youth, September 1935.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by
Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
Jackel, Eberhard. Hitler’s Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power. Translated by Herbert Arnold.
Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1972.
Jeffries, Matthew. “Weimar, the Working Classes, and the Rise of National Socialism,” 1992.
Johnson, Eric A., and Karl-Heinz Reuband. What We Knew: Terror, Mass Murder, and Everyday
Life in Nazi Germany. Campbridge: Basic Books, Inc., 2006.
Jones, L. E. “Inflation, Revaluation, and the Crisis of Middle-Class Politics: A Study in the
Dissolution of the German Party System, 1923-28.” Central European History 12, no. 02
(1979): 143–168.
Jones, L.E. “Generational Conflict and the Problem of Political Mobiization in the Weimar
Republic.” In Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany: New
Perspectives, edited by L. E. Jones and James Retallack. New York: Campbridge
University Press, 1992.
Jones, Larry Eugene. “Nationalists, Nazis, and the Assault Against Weimar: Revisiting the
Harzburg Rally of October 1931.” German Studies Review (2006): 483–494.
Kater, Michael. The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders 1919-1945.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Kayser, Rudolf. “Americanism,” 1925. German Historical Institute.
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3853.
Kershaw, I. “Hitler and the Uniqueness of Nazism.” Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 2
(2004): 239–254.
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler: 1889-1936 Hubris. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998.
———. Hitler:1936-1945 Nemesis. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.
King, Gary, Ori Rosen, Martin Tanner, and Alexander F. Wagner. “Ordinary Economic Voting
Behavior in the Extraordinary Election of Adolf Hitler.” Journal of Economic History 68,
no. 4 (2008): 951.
Kocka, J. “Germán History Before Hitler: The Debate About the German Sonderweg.” Journal
of Contemporary History 23, no. 1 (1988): 3–16.
Koenigsberg, Richard A. Hitler’s Ideology: A Study in Psychoanalytic Sociology. New York: The
Library of Social Science, 1975.
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands. Die Flamme Der Revolution, 1924. German Historical
Institute. http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/images/SCHLI-R-1.jpg.
———. Schluss Wit Diesen System, 1932. Women in European History. Accessed November 11,
2011. http://womenineuropeanhistory.org/index.php?title=File:KPD.jpg.
———. Was Will Spartakus, 1919. Images and Testimonies of German History. Accessed
November 2, 2011.
http://www.dhm.de/ausstellungen/bildzeug/qtvr/DHM/n/BuZKopie/raum_30.01.htm.
Koshar, Rudy. “Political Gangsters and Nazism: Some Comments on Richard Hamilton’s Theory
167

of Fascism. A Review Article.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 28, no. 4
(October 1986): 785–793.
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Brian Holmes. “The Nazi Myth.” Critical
Inquiry 16, no. 2 (1990): 291–312.
Lange, Sophus. “Soldiers Describe Combat II, 1914-1915.” German Historical Institute.
Accessed July 26, 2012. http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=807.
Langer, Walter. The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report. New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1972.
League For Human Rights. “Appeal to All Homosexual Women, 18 September 1929.” In The
Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994.
Ley, Robert. “Proclamation of the Action Committee for the Protection of German Labor, 2 May
1933.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey
Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
Lipset, Seymour. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1960.
Lochner, Louis. “The Burning of the Books, May 10 1933.” In Documents on Nazism, 19191945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
Lowry, Stephen. “Ideology and Excess in Nazi Melodrama: The Golden City.” New German
Critique 74, no. Special Issue on Nazi Cinema (Spring-Summer 1998): 125–149.
Luckas, John. The Hitler of History. New York: Random House, 1997.
Ludecke, Kurt. “Hitler’s Decision to Adopt the Parliamentary Tactic, 1924.” In Documents on
Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan
Cape, 1974.
Luxemburg, Rosa. “War and the Working Class, January 1916.” German Historical Institute.
Accessed July 26, 2012. http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=1835.
Maser, Werner. Hitler: Legend, Myth & Reality. Translated by Peter Ross and Betty Ross. New
York: Penguin Books, 1973.
Meinecke, Friedrich. “The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections, 1946.” German
Historical Institute. Accessed July 26, 2012. http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=821.
Miller, Abraham H., and James S. Robbins. “Who Did Vote for Hitler?: A Reanalysis of the
Lipset/Bendix Controversy.” Polity 21, no. 4 (Summer 1989): 655–677.
Miller-Lane, Barbara. “Nazi Ideology: Some Unfinished Business.” Central European History 7,
no. 1 (March 1974): 3–30.
Monthly Magazine of the Society for Physical Culture. “Vigor and Beauty, 1906.” German
Historical Institute. Accessed July 26, 2012. http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=738.
Morrow, Jr., John H. The Great War: An Imperial History. Abingdon: Routledge, 2005.
Mosse, G. L. Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990.
———. “National Cemeteries and National Revival: The Cult of the Fallen Soldiers in
Germany.” Journal of Contemporary History 14, no. 1 (1979): 1–20.
———. “Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience.” Journal of Contemporary
168

History 21, no. 4 (1986): 491–513.
Mosse, George L. “Friendship and Nationhood: About the Promise and Failure of German
Nationalism.” Journal of Contemporary History 17, no. 2 (1982): 351–367.
Mühlberger, D. “The Sociology of the NSDAP: The Question of Working-class Membership.”
Journal of Contemporary History 15, no. 3 (1980): 493–511.
Muller-Zadow, Emilie. “Mothers Who Give Us the Future, 1936.” In The Nazi Germany
Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle.
London: Routledge, 2002.
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei. “A Nazi Handbill Advertising a Hitler Speech,
February 1920.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and
Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “German Farmer You Belong to Hitler! Why?” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook,
edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994.
———. “Nazi Plan to Take over Free Trade Unions, 21 April 1933.” In Documents on Nazism,
1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape,
1974.
———. “Partei-Statistik: Party Members as of 1 January 1935, Divided According to Jobs and
Date of Membership.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes
and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Propaganda Aimed at Artisans and Retail Traders, April, 1932.” In Documents on
Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan
Cape, 1974.
———. “The Forming of the SA, August 3, 1921.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited
by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “The Organization of Rural Propaganda, July, 1932.” In Documents on Nazism, 19191945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “The Program of the NSDAP, 24 February 1920. [Doc 1708-PS].” In Nazi Conspiracy
and Aggression. Vol. IV. Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1946.
———. “The Stormtrooper’s Pledge, 1921.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by
Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
Niekisch, Ernst. “Where We Stand, August 1926.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited
by Anton Kaes and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Nissen, L.F. “The ‘Atom’ Vacuum Cleaner: Advertisement by the Firm L.F. Nissen, 1906.”
German Historical Institute. Accessed July 26, 2012. http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=643.
Noakes, Jeremy, ed. “Nazi Activity in the Schools, 21 November 1930.” In Documents on
Nazism, 1919-1945. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
Noakes, Jeremy, and Geoffrey Pridham, eds. “Ceremony of Admission into the Cubs of the
Deutsches Jungvolk, April, 1940.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945. London:
Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Correspondence Between Furtwangler and Goebbels, April, 1933.” In Documents on
Nazism, 1919-1945. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. Documents on Nazism. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Editorial Law, October 4, 1933.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945. London:
Jonathan Cape, 1974.
169

———. “Hitler Forbids the Admission of Women to the Practice of Law, April 1934.” In
Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
———. “Hitler Insists on Priority for Rearmament, February 8 1933.” In Documents on Nazism,
1919-1945. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Law Relating to the Reich Chamber of Culture, 22 September 1933.” In Documents on
Nazism, 1919-1945. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Nazi Plan to Take over Free Trade Unions, 21 April 1933.” In Documents on Nazism,
1919-1945. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. Nazism: 1919-1945 A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. New York:
Schocken Books, 1983.
———. “Official Encouragement of Marriage, June 1933.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945.
London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Poem for a Hitler Youth Ceremony in 1941.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945.
London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Press Directives of the Ministry of Propaganda, 1938.” In Documents on Nazism,
1919-1945. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Proclamation to All Working Germans, 27 November 1933.” In Documents on Nazism,
1919-1945. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
———. “Views on Youth, September 1935.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945. London:
Jonathan Cape, 1974.
Office of the US Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, ed. “[Doc. 1392-PS] Law
on the Hitler Youth, 1 December 1936.” In Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Vol. III.
Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1946.
———. “[Doc. 1417-PS] First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of 14 Nov. 1935.” In
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Vol. IV. Washington D.C.: US Government Printing
Office, 1946.
———. “[Doc. 3179-PS] Law for the Protection of the German Blood and German Honor of 15
September 1935.” In Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Vol. IV. Washington D.C.: US
Government Printing Office, 1946.
———. “[Doc. 3569-PS] Adolf Hitler: My Private Will and Testament, April 29, 1945.” In Nazi
Conspiracy and Aggression. Vol. IV. Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office,
1946.
Orlow, Dietrich. The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1969.
Paxton, Robert. The Anatomy of Fascism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.
Perry, Joe. “Nazifying Christmas: Political Culture and Popular Celebration in the Third Reich.”
Central European History 38, no. 4 (2005): 572–605.
Peukert, Detlev J. The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity. New York: Hill and
Wang, 1987.
Polgar, Alfred. “The Defenseless: A Conversation Between Men, 1928.” In The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994.
Rauscher, Ulrich. The Cinema, 1913. Accessed July 26, 2012. http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=702.
Reinhardt, Fritz. “Reinhardt on the Economic Recovery, January 29, 1935.” In Documents on
Nazism, 1919-1945, edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan
170

Cape, 1974.
Roosevelt, Theodore. “Inaugural Address of Theodore Roosevelt,” March 4, 1905. The Avalon
Project. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/troos.asp.
Rosenberg, Alfred. “The Russian-Jewish Revolution, February 1919.” In The Nazi Germany
Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle.
London: Routledge, 2002.
Sanger, Fritz. “The Government Press Conference, 1964.” In Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945,
edited by Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974.
Schmieder, Eduard. “Soldiers Describe Combat I, 1914-1915.” German Historical Institute.
Accessed July 26, 2012. http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=806.
Schmitt, Carl. “On the Contradiction Between Parliamentarism and Democracy, 1926.” In The
Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward
Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Scholem, Betty. “Betty Scholem on the Inflation, October 1923.” German Historical Institute.
Accessed July 26, 2012. http://germanhistorydocs.ghidc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3842.
Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1959.
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands. “The Party Leadership Responds to Opposition,
August 14-16, 1915.” German Historical Institute. Accessed July 26, 2012.
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=964.
Stachura, Peter. “The Political Strategy of the Nazi Party, 1919-1933.” German Studies Review 3,
no. 2 (1980): 261–288.
Stachura, Peter D. “National Socialism and the German Proletariat, 1925-1935: Old Myths and
New Perspectives.” HISTORICAL JOURNAL-LONDON-CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS- 36 (1993): 701–701.
Stackelberg, Roderick, and Sally A. Winkle, eds. “The Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919.” In
The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts. London: Routledge, 2002.
Staudinger, Hans. The Inner Nazi: A Critical Analysis of Mein Kampf. Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1981.
Stephenson, Jill. “Modernization, Emancipation, Mobilization: Nazi Society Reconsidered.” In
Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany: New Perspectives,
edited by L. E. Jones and James Retallack. New York: Campbridge University Press,
1992.
———. The Nazi Organisation of Women. London: Croom Helm, 1981.
Stöcker, Helene. “Marriage as a Psychological Problem, 1930.” In The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994.
Streicher, Jules. “Appeal for the Boycott of All Jewish Enterprises, 31 March 1933.” In The Nazi
Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of Texts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A.
Winkle. London: Routledge, 2002.
Textile Workers. “My Workday, My Weekend, 1930.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook,
edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994.
Thälmann, Ernst. “The SPD and NSDAP Are Twins, 19 February, 1932.” In The Weimar
171

Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Tucholsky, Kurt. “The Spirit of 1914, 1924.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by
Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994.
———. “We Nay Sayers, 1919.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes,
Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Tyrell, Albrecht. “Fuhrer Befiehl.” In Nazism: 1919-1945 A History in Documents and
Eyewitness Accounts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle. New York:
Schocken Books, 1983.
Ujhely, Grete. “A Call for Sexual Tolerance, 1930.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited
by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994.
Wagner, Richard. “Judaism in Music, 1850.” In The Nazi Germany Sourcebook: An Anthology of
Texts, edited by Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle. London: Routledge, 2002.
Waite, R. G. L. “Adolf Hitler’s Guilt Feelings: A Problem in History and Psychology.” The
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1, no. 2 (1971): 229–249.
Walter, Hilde. “Twilight for Women?, 7 July, 1931.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, edited
by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1994.
Weitz, Eric D. Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2007.
Welch, D. “Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s Community.”
Journal of Contemporary History 39, no. 2 (2004): 213–238.
Zweig, Stefan. “The Monotonization of the World, 1 February 1925.” In The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook, edited by Anton Kaes, Jay Martin, and Edward Dimendberg. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994.

172

VITA
DERRICK J. ANGERMEIER

Personal Data:

Date of Birth: March 31, 1987

Education:

Notre Dame High School, Chattanooga, Tennessee 2005
B.A. History, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, 2009
B.A. Political Science, University of Georgia, Athens.
Georgia, 2009
M.A. History, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City,
Tennessee 2013

Professional Experience:

Substitute Teacher, Catoosa County Public Schools,
Ringgold, GA 2009 – 2010
Substitute Teacher, Notre Dame High School, 2009 - 2011
Tuition Scholar, East Tennessee State University, 2011 –
2012
Graduate Assistant, East Tennessee State University, 20122013

Presentations:

Der Führer’s Race: An Analysis of the Progression of the
Nazi Volksgemeinschaft, Kingsport Alliance for Continued
Learning, Kingsport, Tennessee March 2012
Cornered By the Nazi Party?: An Analysis of the Electoral
173

Failures of the Nazi Party’s Political Rivals, Phi Alpha
Theta Carolinas Regional Conference, Charlotte, North
Carolina, March 2012
World War I Determinism: Examining How the Nazi Party
Used Notions of the First World War to Achieve Early
Notoriety, 62nd Annual Meeting of the New York
Association of European Historians, Oswego, New York
October 2012
Nazi Manipulation of the National Community, 28th Annual
Meeting of the Ohio Valley History Conference, Johnson
City, Tennessee October 2012
Loss Before 1933: An Analysis of the Failures of the Social
Democratic Party, the Communist Party of Germany, and
the German National People’s Party to Prevent Nazi
Electoral Success, Ohio University 8th Annual History
Graduate Student Conference, Athens, Ohio February 2013
How the Anglo-Americans Learned to Worry and Fear a
Nazi Bomb: An Analysis of the Transition of British and
American Fears of Nazi Atomic Work into Cold War
Antagonisms, 2013 Georgia State University Graduate
Student Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, April 2013

174

